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The Accident Model Document (Volume III, Part 2) is one of three documents of the Prelimi-
nary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base program.
Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power
module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that
give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the
sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurrence.
Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is
used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant acci-
dents/events in each mission phase.
The only significant hazards during the Prelaunch and Launch/Ascent Phases of the mission
are those which arise from criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this
time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.
Terrestrial hazards can result during the Orbital Operations Phase arising from accidents
which curtail the mission and result in the uncontrolled random reentry of a reactor with a
potentially large core fission product inventory. In general, the highest probability acci-
dents occur during the Reactor Disposal Phase. Failures during disposal or eventual re-
entry after a successful high earth orbit disposal can result in earth impact of the reactor
and subsequent criticality and/or distributed fission product accidents. However, the high
probability reentries tend to have long orbital decay times and the short decay, more
hazardous, reentries have a very low probability of occurrence.
Recommendations for the incorporation of safeguards (design and operational features) to
reduce or eliminate the accident probability are identified.
The results of these studies are generally applicable to all present and past candidate space
nuclear reactor power conversion systems that utilize the moderated uranium-zirconium
hydride reactor and are independent of the power conversion system. The only identified
exception is the mercury rankine (SNAP-8) system, where potential ecological hazards
associated with mercury have not been evaluated.
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FOREWORD (U)
The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research.
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications.
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those of
the Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
Table A. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety Documentation
Volume
I
Part 1
Part 2
II
Part 1
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III
Part 1
Part 2
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VI
This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
Table B. Study Area Cross Reference
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DISCUSSION
•Section number is included where
appropriate
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
The Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System presents a preliminary
but comprehensive assessment of public and ecological safety of the Zirconium Hydride (ZrH)
Brayton cycle reactor electrical power system as applied to a Space Base Program. The
reference power system hereafter referred to as the reactor power module was derived from
the Phase A Space Base studies recently performed for the NASA by McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration (MDAC) and North American Rockwell (NAR) (References 1-1 and 1-2).
Results of the analysis have led to the conclusion that the use of a reactor power module in
space operations can present a very low risk to the general public. Although specific risk
values are presented, the intent is to provide a reference from which future configuration
changes (affecting failure modes, probabilities, source terms, etc.) can be factored into the
analysis. Therefore, the results of this study can serve as a point of departure for the
nuclear safety analysis of reactor power modules on future manned space missions.
The PSAR is presented in three separate documents as follows:
72SD4201-3-1, Volume III, Part 1 - Reference Design Document (ROD)
72SD4201-3-2, Volume HI, Part 2 - Accident Model Document (AMD)
72SD4201-3-3, Volume III, Part 3 - Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
Figure 1-1 illustrates the basic logic and structure of the PSAR. The Accident Model Docu-
ment (AMD) is contained in this volume. The AMD (Part 2) serves to identify the occurrence
and probability of potential mission related failure modes and sequences which can lead to
public nuclear safety hazards.
The RDD (Part 1) provides a description of (1) safety related systems, subsystems and com-
ponents, (2) the mission, and (3) the supporting facilities and operations necessary to accomplish
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the mission. The NSAD (Part 3) supported by the HDD and AMD, describes the radiological
consequences that could result from the failures, assigns mission risk and identifies design
and/or operational features that could minimize or eliminate the potential hazards.
1.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE ACCIDENT MODEL DOCUMENT
The primary purpose of the Accident Model Document (AMD) is to identify credible and
potentially serious accidents to the terrestrial population and ecology resulting from the
use of the Zirconium Hydride (ZrH) Reactor -Brayton cycle power system on a manned space
mission. The specific objectives are listed below.
1. To identify potential modes of failure in the ground handling, prelaunch, flight
and disposal phases of the mission affecting the reactor and its nuclear fuel.
2. To determine the probability of occurrence of the identified failures.
3. To describe or model the environments to which the reactor is subjected as a
result of the various failures.
4. To evaluate the effect of the failure-induced environments on the reactor and
potential radioactive source terms.
Although the zirconium hydride reactor system in conjunction with the proposed Space Base
Mission provided the basis for this study, the approach and considerations presented here
can be extended to other types of nuclear reactor systems. The nominal Space Base orbit
is 500 km at an inclination of 55 . The reference mission assumes that the reactor power
modules for the Space Base are launched from Complex 39 at Kennedy Space Center using
an INT-21 launch vehicle. Space tugs from the orbiting base will withdraw the reactor
power modules from the payload shroud and dock them to the Space Base. Each power
module will be brought to full power (330 kWt) and operated continuously for its five-year
nominal lifetime. At this point, each reactor will be shut down, separated from the Base,
and placed in a 990 km (535 run) circular orbit to allow decay of the fission product inventory.
Figure 1-2 illustrates the mission phases considered in this study.
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To provide an inclusive assessment of the safety implications of a reactor powered energy
conversion system, this study has considered the subject of nuclear reactor safety from
the Prelaunch to the Reactor Disposal Phases of the mission. Accordingly, the effects of
the terrestrial and orbital environment as well as Ihe possible failures of associated systems
have been included in this analysis. In particular, the close interdependency between the
reactor and the energy conversion system has necessitated an analysis of the consequences
of various conversion and radiator loop failures.
4.0 REACTOR DISPOSAL i
• SHUTDOWN
• SEPARATION/STABILIZATION
• TRANSFER BURN
• COAST TO APOGEE
• CIRCULARIZATION BURN
3. 0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
• CHECK-OUT
• START-UP
• OPERATION
• EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
2.0 LAUNCH/ASCENT
• LAUNCH
• S-IC BOOST
• S-II BOOST
• RENDEZVOUS AND DOCKING
1.0 PRELAUNCH
• TRANSPORTATION
• RECEIPT, INSPECTION, STORAGE
• CHECKOUT AND ASSEMBLY
• INTEGRATION AND TEST
• COUNTDOWN
Figure 1-2. Mission Phases for Mission Accident Analysis
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To arrive at the most probable reactor power module failures and radiation exposure modes,
various design and operational features have been evaluated in some detail. It is the intent
of this study to recommend nuclear safety oriented design and operational changes at a
point in the program where they can be implemented at minimal cost. Therefore, it is
expected that the potential problem areas identified would be diminished or eliminated by
future design iterations. However, since the reactor/shield (R/S) assembly is a highly
complicated system, particular care must be taken when any design changes are implemented.
A flow diagram of the contents of this document is shown in Figure 1-3. The Introduction is
followed by Section 2 which describes, in general terms, the types of hazards which can be
generated by the use of a nuclear reactor. Section 3 discusses the characteristics of the
zirconium hydride reactor and its most probable behavior under various accident conditions
of interest for this mission. A quantitative discussion of the radioactive source terms
associated with potential accident conditions is presented in Section 4. The expected physi-
cal behavior and source term results for the reactor are combined with abort sequence
trees in Section 5 to identify the potential accidents of most concern and the probabilities of
occurrence.
Evaluations of the consequences of the important potential accidents to the terrestrial popula-
tion and ecological system are presented in the Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
(Part 3 of Volume HI).
1.2 SUMMARY
The types and severity of potential nuclear reactor accidents are related to the basic char-
acteristics of the reactor. The likelihood of their occurrence, however, is determined to
a large extent by the overall power module design and operation.
The zirconium hydride reactor can be classified as a hydrogen moderated, thermal neutron
spectrum reactor using fully enriched uranium and having a relatively large negative
1-5
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temperature coefficient. In order to achieve a compact design, the core is under-moderated.
The outstanding features of the reactor include the following:
1. A meltdown compaction is impossible for the design and mission considered.
2. Due to the already compact design, as well as other features, a core compaction
excursion appears to have a very low probability of occurrence.
3. Water immersion of the core will cause a reactor excursion (Section 3.1.2),
however, significant core immersion would require a major breach of the primary
coolant loop.
4. Depending on the rate of reactivity increase, reactor excursions from drum
movement are possible; however, the negative temperature coefficient (exhibited
by two prototypes) will tend to moderate the severity of such excursions.
In general, the zirconium hydride reactor can be considered to be a relatively safe reactor
concept. Future design iterations should give attention to the following points:
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1. Substantial additions of prepoison to increase reactor lifetime may lead to high
U235 inventories resulting in the feasibility of a meltdown compaction excursion.
2. The negative temperature coefficient exhibited during the SNAP 8-ER and SNAP
8-DR tests should not be compromised by future design changes.
3. The maximum possible reactivity addition rate of the drum control system should
minimize the possibility of an excursion due to a control system and/or human
error.
From the standpoint of system design, the reactor appears to be most susceptible to damage
due to; (1) temperature excursions resulting in clad rupture, (2) reentry burnup, (3) in-
advertent drum rotation prior to operation, and (4) water immersion.
Failure modes resulting in major reactor temperature excursions include emergency shut-
down, rupture of the primary loop, pump failure and power conversion system failure. In
order to prevent core meltdown, with the attendant release of radioactive fission products,
a combination emergency/afterheat removal heat rejection system is recommended.
The adequacy of the lithium hydride shield to function as a reentry protection shield has
yet to be proven. A thorough assessment of its reentry behavior is required to determine
the necessity for a separate reentry protection system. The conclusion of this investigation
may have a significant bearing on future design concepts.
Inadvertent control drum rotation prior to reactor operation (launch abort, etc.) can be pre-
vented by the use of mechanical interlocks. Interlocks would be released prior to reactor
start-up. The provision of mechanical interlocks in the reactor control drum design should
receive more emphasis.
Water immersion could result in an excursion if a sudden surge of water enters the core.
Although it appears more probable that quasi-steady state operation would result if the
reactor loop or pressure vessel were breached, tests should be conducted to quantitatively
measure the rate of water introduction into the core under different accident conditions.
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A terrestrial safety tree analysis was prepared for an Earth Orbital Space Base mission,
assuming a five-year lifetime of the two zirconium hydride ractor power modules. The
mission was divided into four phases: (1) Prelaunch, (2) Launch/Ascent; (3) Orbital Ope-
rations, (4) End of Mission (Reactor Disposal). The analysis indicates that for the refer-
ence design the probability of mission success is 8. 8 x 10 (no nuclear accident followed
by a successful boost to desired disposal orbit). Figure 1-4 illustrates the classification
of accident and failure probabilities used in this study.
Because of the small fission product inventory generated during low power acceptance test
operation, the only nuclear hazard of any real significance during prelaunch and launch/
ascent is that which results from an inadvertent reactor criticality. This can occur during
prelaunch as a result of:
• Inadvertent control drum rotation (Probability of occurrence = 1.2 x 10 )
• Immersion in hydrogenous medium (degree waters, liquid propellants, etc.)
(Probability of occurrence = 2.2 x 10~5)
—3However, the most probable (1. 5 x 10 ) reactor response to a prelaunch accident at KSC
is a damaged lithium hydride reactor radiation shield, resulting in a radiation field around
the reactor caused by gamma radiation from fission product decay.
For the Launch/Ascent Phase, three possibilities for reactor criticality were found:
1. Immersion in hydrogenous medium (ocean, river, deluge water, etc.)
(Probability of occurrence = 8.6 x 10"^)
2. Control drum rotation following high energy impact
(Probability of occurrence = 2. 3 x 10~5)
3. Core compaction/drum rotation following land impact at terminal velocities
(Probability of occurrence = 3.6 x 10~5)
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During launch/ascent, an estimated pro-
_3
bability of 2.3 x 10 for a Eurasian land
impact exists. Assuming land impact of an
intact reactor at terminal velocities (>250m/
sec) the following results are possible:
1. Quasi-steady state critical opera-
tions (1 x 10-2 relative probability)
2. Reactor disassembly with excur-
sion (core compaction/control
drum motion, or over modera-
tion) (1 x 10-2 relative probability).
3. Reactor disassembly, no excursion
(9. 8 x 1Q-! relative probability). .
10
IMPOSSIBLE
Figure 1-4. Classification of Accident
and Failure Probabilities
Boost failures which result in reactor deep ocean impacts are assumed to lead to "No Dis-
cernible Hazard" to the i
estimated to be 4.4 x 10
populace. The probability of occurrence for such an accident is
-2
Various in-orbit accidents* that lead to a premature reactor reentry are considered to have
_4
a cumulative probability of 3.4 x 10 . The majority of these accidents are manifested by a
loss of reactor cooling which induces fuel cladding failures and possible rupture of the pri-
_4
mary loop (2.4 x 10 probability of occurrence). Release of hydrogen moderator and fission
product gases will be characteristic of these accidents.
*"Accident" is used to include all undesirable and generally unplanned events which may or
may not result from a system/component failure or malfunction.
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On the basis of analytical and experimental investigations performed by the General
Electric Company (reference Section 3.4.1.3),it is assumed that the LiH shield has a
50% probability of preventing reactor disassembly during reentry. Therefore, the pro-
-4 -4bability of a reactor entering intact is 1.7 x 10 (3.4 x 10 x 0.5).
If the LiH shield fails during reentry, it is assumed that all the fuel elements are released
from the reactor core and exposed directly to the reentry environments. This can lead
to widespread atmospheric, water, and ground contamination due to fuel element ablation
and fission product dispersion.
For intact reentry (reactor is capable of going critical) the resultant earth impact can be
classified into four basic categories with the following probabilities:
1. Land impact (relative probability = 2.7 x 10 )
2. Deep ocean impact (relative probability = 7.0 x 10 )
-43. Impact in reservoir (relative probability = 2.7 x 10 )
_24. Impact in waters containing edible marine life (relative probability =3 .0x10 )
These intact reentry conditions present several potential hazards. Land impact may lead
to a direct exposure hazard if the reactor/shield disassembles. Inhalation of radioactive
participates and contamination of food crops can also occur. Burial of an intact reactor
where rain and surface wate'r can fill the crater presents a configuration which is susceptible
to water moderation and subsequent criticality. This situation would most probably result in
quasi-steady state operation. Impact in a reservoir or water containing edible marine life
may constitute an ingestion hazard. In addition, due to a lack of evidence to the contrary,
-2
a small probability (1 x 10 ) has been accorded to the possibility of an excursion at impact
prompted by core compaction and drum rotation.
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In the nominal situation, the reactor power module is to be placed in a high earth orbit at
the end of its useful life. The reference disposal altitude selected for this study is 990 km,
circular (HDD-Part 1, Appendix A). Events associated with reactor disposal into high
earth orbit lead to four general possibilities:
1. Successful boost to desired disposal orbit (probability of occurrence = 8. 8 x 10 )
2. Subnominal boost to intermediate or lower orbit (probability of occurrence =
l . lxlO-2) ,
-93. Immediate reentry (probability of occurrence = 4.5 x 10 )
4. No orbit altitude change from reference 500 km orbit (probability of occurrence =
4.5 x 10-4)
Orbital decay, from whichever orbit is achieved, is followed by reentry through the Earth's
atmosphere at end of orbital lifetime, with the reactor either burning up in the atmosphere
(50% relative probability) or surviving (50% relative probability) and impacting randomly
on the earth's surface.
A detailed description of the Reactor Disposal System is contained in the RDD (Part 1). Of the
potential malfunctions identified during disposal of the reactor to high earth orbit, four are
_3
considered plausible each having a mission probability of occurrence of approximately 10 .
These accident cases are shown in Figure 1-5 and are identified below:
Case A - G&C failure detected prior to transfer, repair not possible, terminate
disposal sequence and reenter by orbital decay from 500 km circular
orbit (> 5 year orbital decay time).
Case B - Successful transfer burn, G&C failure detected prior to .circularization,
repair not possible; terminate disposal sequence and reenter by orbital
decay from 990 x 500 km elliptical orbit (> 21 year orbital decay time).
Case C - One rocket fails at transfer, both rockets fire at apogee, reenter by
orbital decay from 985 x 743 km elliptical orbit (> 106 year orbital decay
time).
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Case D - Successful transfer burn, one rocket fails at apogee, reenter by orbital
decay from 990 x 743 km circular orbit (> 108 year orbital decay time).
The potential terrestrial radiological hazards of the accidents caused by the above listed
malfunctions, if safety countermeasures are not implemented prior to reactor reentry, are
discussed in the Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD), Volume in, Part 3.
1.3 REFERENCES
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Figure 1-5. Plausible Disposal Orbit Transfer Cases
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SECTION 2
POTENTIAL TERRESTRIAL NUCLEAR HAZARDS
The intensity and sources of the nuclear hazards which can result from a reactor system
accident are dependent upon the type of accident and the particular characteristics of the
system design. In general, radiation hazards to the terrestrial population can occur by
direct exposure, inhalation or ingestion of radioactive materials. The specific accidents
treated in this study are those which can lead to these modes of exposure.
The various modes of radioactive exposure can occur, with a few exceptions, at virtually
any point during the mission. However, due to the nuclear processes characteristic of
reactor operation, the probability of particular hazards arising and their potential severity
will change drastically over various phases of the mission. These aspects of the investiga-
tion will be presented in the subsequent sections of this document.
Table 2-1 lists the possible terrestrial hazard sources and associated exposure modes. A
brief discussion of exposure modes and the types of accidents capable of causing the radia-
tion hazards are presented below. A more detailed discussion of the overall system events
contributing to the accidents is given in Section 5, Mission Accident Analysis.
2.1 DIRECT RADIATION EXPOSURE TO AN INTACT REACTOR
A reactor is considered to be intact if the capability for criticality exists. Direct radiation
exposure of the ground population to an intact reactor could be expected to occur as the
result of a ground transportation or handling error, launch mishap, pre-orbital or orbital
reentry. The reference design reactor is accorded a low probability of remaining intact
after earth impact from orbit (see Section 3. 4. 2).
2.2 DIRECT EXPOSURE TO A DISASSEMBLED REACTOR
The term "disassembled reactor" refers to a condition of core damage severe enough to
prevent criticality under any condition. The ultimate degree of reactor disassembly would
constitute complete destruction of the core configuration, with the release and dispersal of
broken fuel elements.
. . . 2-1
2.6 INGESTION OF FISSION PRODUCTS AND ACTIVATED MATERIALS FROM GROUND
' AND WATER DEPOSITION
Potential for the ingestion of ground deposited radionuclides can occur by the direct contam-
ination of food plants by way of absorption through the roots of plants from the soil. Water
deposition of radionuclides can result in their ingestion through the drinking supply or by
edible sea foods. The nuclides which have been found to be of primary importance are
Strontium-89 and 90, Iodine-131 and Cesium-137.
Accident types leading to this hazard source include: ground transport and handling, launch
mishaps, orbital destruction and premature reentry. Handling and launch mishaps occurring
at the KSC would be less apt to result in an ingestive hazard source since much of the radio-
nuclides can be contained within an unpopulated area.
2.7 INHALATION OF AIRBORNE FISSION PRODUCTS AND ACTIVATED DEBRIS
Inhalation of radioactive materials is particularly dangerous to the lungs and bronchial lymph
nodes, however, depending upon various physical factors, including particle size, radio-
nuclides can be transported throughout the body.
Obviously, the potential causes of this hazard source are identical to those identified for
direct exposure to airborne fission products and both of these hazards can be expected to
exist concurrently.
The propensity of the Zirconium Hydride reactor to generate these hazard sources is dis-
cussed in the following section.
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SECTION 3
ACCIDENT DEFINITION
The potential hazard sources which can occur during the mission phases and cause exposure
to the terrestrial populace are listed in Table 3-1. The accidents that give rise to these
hazard sources are defined in detail in this section. Conclusions drawn from this investiga-
tion are used in selecting the occurrence probabilities of various hazard sources; these re-
sults are factored into the overall risk analysis contained in the NSAD (Volume IE, Part 3).
3.1 REACTOR AND ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM SUMMARY DESCRIPTION
This subsection briefly reviews the characteristics of the zirconium hydride (ZrH) reactor
power module. A detailed description is contained in the HDD (Volume III, Part 1).
The reference design reactor consists of a cylindrical core surrounded by ten rotating control
drums. The core is composed of 295 cylindrical, uranium-zirconium hydride fuel elements.
Figure 3-1 pictures the ZrH reactor and a typical fuel element. Uranium fuel loading is 12.2
kg and comprises approximately 11 percent of the fuel weight. A cladding material protects
the fuel elements from the NaK coolant. Hastelloy-N was assumed to be the clad material,
however, Incoloy 800 is also a candidate. The maximum fuel element centerline temperature
in the reference design is estimated to be 1000 K (1340 F). The fuel element array is set on
a variable pitch to compensate for the neutron flux distribution. At the center of the core,
the fuel element spacing is 1.14 mm (0. 045 in ) and narrows to 0. 254 mm (0. 010 in ) at the
core edge.
Each of the ten control drums consist of a neutron reflector and absorption section made of
BeO and Ta-lOW, respectively. The drums are supported by self-aligning ball-and-socket
bearings. Drum rotation is produced by a stepper motor operating through an integral 6:1
gear set. Individual or "gang" rotational modes can be selected by the operator. Although
a final control system design has not been formulated, it is recommended that a mechanical
device be incorporated to prevent unintentional drum rotation.
3-1
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BEARING
BeO-POISON
CONTROL DRUM
X CONTROL DRUM
ACTUATOR
FUEL ELEMENT
SCB-1 COATING
SPHERICAL TOP CAP
VIBRATION DAMPER
FUEL MATERIAL
89.5 w t % Z r
10.5 w t % U
22
REFERENCE ZrH REACTOR DESIGN DATA
NO. OF FUEL ELEMENTS 295
CORE DIAMETER 0.290M
ACTIVE CONTROL DRUMS 10
REACTOR VESSEL O.D. 0.559M
REACTOR VESSEL HEIGHT 0.744 M
GROOVE LESS SINGLE
PIECE CUP PLUG
DIAMETRAL GAP
6.3x10 NH
f f f f i j i f f f , f , J If f f r f f f f f r\ ( f.<>*.xw
(16.825 in.)
0.427m
(17.50 in.)
0.444m
Figure 3-1. Reference ZrH Reactor and Fuel Element
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The entire core and control drum assembly is housed within a pressure vessel. Adjacent
to the pressure vessel is a shaped 4?r gamma and neutron radiation shield which is configured
as shown in Figure 3-2. At the top of the reactor assembly the sum of the individual layers
of tungsten and lithium hydride approximates 85 and 560 mm respectively. The widest portion
of the shield, however, is at the bottom where 160 mm of tungsten and 790 mm of lithium
hydride are required. The exterior of the shield is clad in stainless steel.
2.35m
(93 in.)
GALLERY
(PRIMARY LOOP EQUIPMENT)
1.20m
(47.25 in.)
LITHIUM HYDRIDE
(NEUTRON SHIELD)
TUNGSTEN
(GAMMA SHIELD)
Figure 3-2. Reactor Shield
The zirconium hydride core can be classified as a hydrogen moderated, slow neutron spec-
trum reactor using fully enriched uranium. Two prototype reactors, SNAP 8-ER and SNAP
8-DR, exhibited significant negative temperature coefficients; prompt neutron lifetimes of
—fi
approximately 8 x 10 seconds. In order to achieve the planned lifetime, a prepoison is
added to the core to provide additional positive reactivity over the operating period. Europium-
151 and Samarium-149 are currently employed as burnable poisons.
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Reactor coolant enters the lower vessel plenum of the reactor through four 38 mm diameter
inlet lines and flows upward through the region around the control drums to the upper plenum.
The coolant reverses direction and then flows down through the core to the outlet plenum.
Energy is transferred to the power conversion system by means of a counterflow, inter-
mediate loop heat exchanger. The results of the SNAP 8-ER and DR tests indicated fuel
element swelling. This was partially attributed to coolant flow maldistribution in the core.
A proposed fuel element design (Reference 3-1) utilizes spiral wrapped fins to obtain a closer
tolerance on coolant channel size and encourage coolant channel mixing. A new inlet plate
also improves the coolant flow distribution.
In the reference design, two reactors operate at an individual power level of 330 kWt. Cool-
ant enters the reactor at a temperature of 860°K (1090°F) and exists at 945°K (1240°F). As
shown in Figure 3-3, the primary coolant transfers energy to an intermediate NaK loop which
is capable of carrying heat energy to either of three power conversion systems. Rejection
of the waste system heat is accomplished by a parallel radiator loop system using a sodium/
potassium (NaK, 78 wt % K) coolant.
3.2 POTENTIAL REACTOR ACCIDENTS
The following subsection discusses four major types of accidents which the zirconium hydride
reactor may experience:
1. Reactivity accidents
2. Reactor temperature excursions
3. Orbital collisions
4. Premature reentry
The analysis performed relied to a large extent on SNAP-8 Reactor Development Program
reports; however, the conclusions drawn in this study do not necessarily reflect the results
obtained in the SNAP-8 Reactor program documentation.
3-5
aovians ams OOTHVHS MOOT HOIVIQVH
l
I
0.
9-
«i
1
t-
T-
ft
a
8
O-T
i
*
sP
»jLnr
b
., tH B
>i_
' CM - -
?
•^ S
* u
t-' f-1
| L _.
* u
fi <i v
1
C
I
3 w
i
o
JS Xt
a
0)
•4->tn
>>
02
0)i— i
o
§
PQ
^
o^
a
O
u
CO
oo
i
co
a
0
 3
r< <N
.4 H
3-6
3. 2. 1 REACTIVITY ACCIDENTS
Three types of reactivity accidents were considered to have a sufficient likelihood of occur-
rence to warrant investigation: (1) inadvertent control drum motion, (2) over moderation of
the core, and (3) core compaction.
3.2.1.1 Control Drum Motion (Reactivity Accident)
In general, inadvertant movement of control drums to a more reactive position has the
potential of producing accidents ranging from a minor to a most serious nature. Unexpected
movement of the control drums could conceivably result from impact, malfunction of the
control system, or human error. Design changes must be incorporated to prevent occur-
rences which lead to serious accidents.
At the beginning of operating life the reactivity of the zirconium hydride reactor in the drums-
out position is - $4. 85; total worth of the drums is estimated to be $10. 50. Therefore,
partial rotation of the drums to a reflector-in position can result in a supercritical condition.
Figure 3-4 illustrates the approximate change in reactor power as a function of time for
various step additions of power. This calculation assumes a negative temperature coefficient
equal to that evaluated in the SNAP 8-ER tests (Reference 3-2). Even partial drum rotation
has the capability to cause considerable energy release. The greater the reactivity insertion,
the greater the prompt energy release. A reactivity insertion of $5.65 ($10.50 - $4.85) is
the maximum credible for the reference reactor.
Drum rotation due to accidental impact prior to orbit insertion is a possibility during ground
transportation, prelaunch handling operations, and launch. It is recommended that mechani-
cal interlocks be incorporated into the control drum design which would prevent such a occur-
rence. Prior to ope ration, these interlocks would be selectively released by ground control
to permit drum movement for control system functional tests.
Drum rotation due to a collision in orbit or upon impact from an earth orbital reentry is also
a possibility. Additional discussion of this situation is contained in Section 3.4.
3-7
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Figure 3-4. Change in Reference Reactor Power vs. Time
for Various Step Additions of Reactivity
Present plans to control the zirconium hydride reactor during orbital operation employ a
computerized system with an operator override capability. It is conceivable that a nuclear
excursion could be experienced by excessive control drum motion during normal operation
due to a computer malfunction. In addition, a human error through the override system
could also result in a catastrophic excursion. Prevention of excessive reactivity increases
due to drum movement can be accomplished by designing the control drum system such that
the maximum possible ramp reactivity increase will be insufficient to cause a destructive
excursion.
The ZrH reactor core negative temperature coefficient, characteristic of SNAP 8-ER and
SNAP 8-DR, will aid in the control of any excursion. Figure 3-5 illustrates the approximate
sensitivity of reactor power increases for various ramp reactivity additions for a core with
a SNAP 8-ER negative temperature coefficient as is assumed for the reference reactor.
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3.2.1.2 Reactor Over-moderation
Since the ZrH Reactor core is undermoderated, introduction of additional moderator material
(e. g., water) into the core has the potential of making the core become super-critical. It is
estimated (Reference 3-3) that after 5 years of operation the maximum amount of excess re-
activity available during a water immersion is $13. 20. Therefore, water entering into the
reactor core can undoubtedly result in a severe excursion. A more fundamental question to
be assessed is whether water or other moderating material is likely to enter the core during
various accidents. Potential overmoderation of the reactor core could occur during trans-
portation to KSC, launch pad operations, launch ascent and post-orbital reentry in water.
Precise mechanisms leading to such an excursion have not been identified, however, several
precautions discussed below should be followed.
Transportation. The preferred modes of transport from the factory to the launch center
are by barge and air. It is anticipated that the reactor will be in its launch configuration
with the conversion systems and radiators attached. This entire system will be encased in
a steel container which is pressurized with an inert gas. Design of the container should be
sufficiently strong to prevent rupture in the event of any credible mishap; e. g., such that
the container will float in the event of an accident over water until it can be retrieved by
rescue operations. It is expected that close control of this design is possible and that the
probability of an excursion under these conditions is small.
In the unlikely event that an accident of sufficient severity to rupture the container occurs
during transportation, the reactor may be exposed to water. However, for water to enter
the core additional failures must occur. The most probable way for water to enter the core
is by means of the intermediate heat exchanger. A breach of the primary loop would permit
contact of NaK and water resulting in the release of substantial amounts of energy due to the
hydrolysis reaction. As water enters the core, oxidation of the NaK will proceed; the effect
of this reaction upon the integrity of the reactor core should be investigated. The path the
water must follow to the core is:
• Through the heat exchanger
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• Down the piping to the outlet plenum
• Across the orifice plate
• Up the coolant channels
Under these conditions, it is unlikely that water can enter the core rapidly enough to cause
an excursion. The most likely occurrence under these conditions is for the core to reach
what has been described as a "quasi-steady state" in which the core becomes critical, boils
the water from the core, cools off and repeats the process (Reference 3-3). If recovery of
the core is impossible, eventually, the processes of corrosion, fuel swelling and related
effects would result in release of fission products to the water.
It appears from the above that for a destructive excursion to occur a major breach of the
core vessel would have to occur.
Launch Pad and Launch/Ascent Operations. Overmoderation of the core while on the pad
and during launch is a possibility due to the significant amount of water surrounding the
launch facilities. In the event of an accident at the time of lift-off,the launch pad is flooded
with water. Release of the reactor into the flame bucket area or water deluge pit could re-
sult in overmoderation. However, once again, the likelihood of an excursion will be tem-
pered by the reactor configuration.
If a launch abort occurs after lift-off,a substantial probability of reactor water immersion
continues to exist. Located less than 300 m from the launch pad are the 30 x 30 m burn
pond and the 75 x 45 m holding pond. Figure 3-6 illustrates additional bodies of water sur-
rounding the launch pad including Banana Creek, Indian River, Indian River Lagoon and the
Atlantic Ocean.
For the case where an accident occurs on the pad or during ascent there is a greater proba-
bility of damage to the reactor power module as compared to the transportation accident pre-
viously cited. Propellant explosions and/or fires could cause exposure of the core directly
to water and/or hydrogenous fuel. Therefore, if an accident does occur, a greater proba-
bility of core water immersion must be accorded the launch accident.
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Figure 3-6. Launch Pad Area
Post-Orbital Reentry. The remaining situation in which overmoderation is considered
possible is post-orbital reentry of the reactor. Assuming water impact, the likelihood
of water immersion resulting in a reactivity accident is related to the condition of the
reactor at impact. Also of importance is the fact that the reactivity of the core is lower
at this time than in the previous cases considered. For the reference design there is
considered to be an equal probability of the reactor shield assembly surviving or not
surviving reentry. If the reactor does not survive reentry an excursion due to over-
moderation is considered non-credible. Assuming that the reactor survives it is possible
for the reactor to become disassembled upon water impact - again yielding a zero prob-
ability for a reactivity accident. In the event that the reactor survives impact, either the
quasi-steady state or excursion possibility exists, depending on the ability of the water
to rapidly flood the core.
In the case of land impact it has been postulated that overmoderation is possible due to
rainfall forming a pond about the impact area. This probability is considered to be small
since disassembly of the reactor upon land impact is very high (See Section 3. 4).
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3.2.1.3 Core Compaction
Core compaction involves increasing the density of the nuclear fueled core. Normally, two
types of reactor core compaction are possible: (1) an "impact" compaction in which the fuel
elements are brought closer together, and (2) meltdown compaction resulting in a super-
critical configuration of the core.
ALLOWABLE CLADDING
INTERNAL FUEL
ELEMENT PRESSURE*
(NO FACTOR OF SAFETY)
•DATA OBTAINED
FROM REF. 3-4
FOR HASTE LLOY - N
1000°K
TEMP PK}
•B DISSOCIATION
PRESSURE
Meltdown compaction (Case 2) for the ref-
erence design reactor is considered to be
non-credible. During a zirconium hydride
core temperature rise, the first significant
event would be rupture of the fuel element
cladding due to a decrease in cladding
strength and an increase in the zirconium
hydride dissociation pressure. The tem-
perature-pressure relationship is shown in
Figure 3-7 where the allowable stress for
Hastelloy-N and zirconium hydride dissoci-
ation pressure is plotted as a function of
temperature; rupture can be assumed to
occur in the vicinity of 1034°K (1400°F)
clad temperature necessitating a clad tem-
perature rise of „ 80 K. If the core is void
of coolant at this time, hydrogen will es-
cape freely into the flow channels and out
of the system. The process of hydrogen dissociation from zirconium can be expected to
accelerate with increasing temperatures. Two important effects result from the hydrogen
dissociation and evolution:
1200°K
Figure 3-7. ZrH Fuel Element Rupture
Temperature
Approximately 40 kcal/g mole H2 is absorbed by the hydrogen during the dissoci-
ation of ZrH. This amounts to a total heat absorption capability of 50 kw-hr.
Core reactivity will decrease drastically due to loss of hydrogen moderator. The
inventory of unmoderated uranium, 12. 2 kg, is insufficient to cause criticality.
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The first effect will tend to stabilize the rising core temperature until the bulk of the hydro-
gen is removed. Secondly, the loss of moderator precludes the possibility of a supercritical
mass from forming under any meltdown conditions. Therefore, if sufficient hydrogen is
released, a supercritical meltdown is impossible.
Retention of hydrogen in the core under ex-
treme overtemperature conditions is not
considered feasible. Assuming the primary
coolant loop is intact at the beginning of the
temperature excursion, hydrogen would be
forced into the already filled coolant loop.
Initially, a back pressure would develop to
inhibit further hydrogen dissociation, how-
ever, due to the exponential pressure -
temperature relationship, the pressure in
the coolant loop would soon rise sufficiently
to rupture the piping. It is important that
this occurs so the dissociation process can
continue. The pressure/temperature re-
lationship for ZrH is shown in Figure 3-8
(Reference 3-4).
900 1000
TEMPERATURE °K
I I
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Figure 3-8 Variation of Hydrogen Dissociation
Pressure in ZrH vs. Temperature
It is concluded that a meltdown of the ZrH reactor core will not cause a destructive excursion.
A compaction of the ZrH reactor core due to an impact situation (Case 1) is considered
highly improbable if the core is shut down before impact. As previously stated, the core
fuel elements are separated by spacers; the spacing varies between 1.14 mm at the core
center to 0.25 mm at the core edge. Therefore, the possibility of further compaction is in-
hibited by the already compact design and by the presence of spacers. An impact of sufficient
energy to cause additional compaction is much more likely to result in partial or complete
disassembly of the core. If the core compaction occurs during reactor operation, a greater
likelihood for a reactivity accident exists. The phases of the mission in which a cold com-
paction can occur are discussed in Section 5.
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3.2.2 REACTOR TEMPERATURE EXCURSIONS
The successful long-term operation of the ZrH reactor is highly dependent upon the ability
to maintain design temperatures within the core. While local core temperature variations
due to flow maldistribution (Section 3.1), neutron flux peaking, and other phenomena may
result in performance degradation, more serious temperature excursions can constitute a
potential hazard to the terrestrial population. Two excessive temperature situations which
could result in core destruction are; (1) loss of coolant or coolant flow, and (2) a power
conversion system failure.
Orbital destruction of the core due to excessive temperatures would result in the release of
fission products and activated materials which would cause long term contamination of the
upper atmosphere gradually affecting the Earth's population and ecology as the radioactive
particulate matter settles into the lower atmosphere. Immediate contamination of the Space
Base and the surrounding environment would
result from the evolution of gaseous and
volatile fission products.
The probability of a core destruction is de-
pendent upon the time required to achieve
reactor shutdown once the temperature ex-
cursion is detected. Assuming no energy
transfer from the core, the estimated core
temperature rise versus time for various
power levels, is shown in Figure 3-9. For
each second of delay in shutting down, the
o
core temperature rises 3.7 K. Such a
delay in achieving shutdown quickly and
reliably, once a loss in cooling capability
ASSUMES A THERMALLY
INSULATED CORE
200 400 600 800 1000
TIME AFTER SHUTDOWN (SEC)
Figure 3-9. Estimated Core Temperature
Rise vs. Time After Shutdown
3-15
is apparent, is critical in preventing reactor destruction. Therefore, sensitive temperature
excursion detection instrumentation, coupled to an automatic shutdown device is required
and recommended as a safety design feature.
A discussion of reactor coolant loop damage and power conversion system failure, assuming
immediate reactor shutdown following the malfunction, is presented in the following discus-
sion.
3. 2. 2. 1. Reactor Coolant Loop Damage
A major reactor temperature excursion could result from a loss of cooling capability caused
by damage to the coolant loop. The possible failure (accident) modes are:
• Pump failure
• Coolant flow blockage within the reactor vessel
• Meteroid puncture
• Weld or material failure
Each of these failure modes are discussed below with respect to their propensity to cause
rupture of the pressure vessel. Pump failure and flow blockage mishaps should exhibit
lower temperature increases than the latter two failure modes. This is due to the fact that
the fluid inventory within the core provides an excellent conductive path to the core outer
surface, thereby lowering interior temperatures (assuming no vapor blanketing).
Pump Failure. The primary coolant loop in the reference design includes two thermoelectric
electromagnetic pumps in series. Therefore, two simultaneous pump failures are necessary
before a temperature excursion can develop. This redundant design approach lowers the pro-
bability of a reactor temperature excursion due to pump failure.
In the event that both pumps fail simultaneously and reactor shutdown is immediate, the
average core temperature would rise until the radiative losses from the Reactor/Shield
(R/S) surface are equal to the afterheat generated.
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Temporarily ignoring the transient portion
of the reactor response, the steady state R/S
assembly temperature profile 2.8 hours after
shutdown was calculated. Results are shown
in Figure 3-10 for two reactor operating
conditions. During this phase of the failure,
the maximum core temperature (at the clad
surface) was calculated to reach 960 K
(1270 F). This simplified two-dimensional
calculation assumed three homogeneous
regions (core, drums and neutron shield)
with zero contact resistance between
regions. Partially offsetting the low core
temperatures calculated under these simpli-
fying assumptions is the neglect of thermal
radiation from the R/S assembly ends.
Another important assumption was that the
R/S assembly had an unobstructed view to
space (sink temperature = 250 K).
In the reference design the latter assump-
tion cannot be applied as the R/S assembly
will see a higher sink temperature due to its
placement within the radiator envelope
(Figure 3-11). For the reference design,
(assuming a reactor operating history of
330 kWt for 5 years), the maximum clad
o
temperature is expected to rise to 998 K.
The temperature at which clad rupture will
occur is a function of cladding strength and
DISTANCE FROM CENTERLINE
Figure 3-10. Steady State Temperature
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Figure 3-11. Reactor Power Module
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internal fuel element pressure. Assuming that hydrogen, dissociating from the U-ZrH
matrix, was the sole contributor to internal fuel element pressure, the expected clad rup-
ture temperature was calculated to be approximately 1045 K (1420 F). This point has been
shown graphically in Figure 3-7. Since the maximum core steady state temperature is
relatively close to this value, it is anticipated that during the period immediately following
the pump failure, core transient temperatures will exceed 1045 K. The induced pressure
vessel stresses caused by the release of gases to the coolant loop and attendant fuel swelling,
combined with a decrease in containment vessel strength, suggest the possibility of reactor
vessel rupture and subsequent release of radioactive fission products, activated coolant, and
structure material into the Space Base environment.
It is recommended that primary coolant loop pump failure modes be studied in more depth
to ensure against the possibility of orbital and terrestrial contamination. The inclusion of
an emergency (and afterheat) energy removal system is a solution to this potential problem.
Coolant Flow Blockage. Coolant flow blockage can arise in the reactor loop due to fuel ele-
ment swelling and structural failures, however, blockage resulting in total flow stoppage is
unlikely. Therefore, the possibility of a serious temperature excursion resulting from
coolant flow blckage is considered to be small.
Meteoroid Puncture. The portions of the primary loop which are most susceptible to mete-
oroid damage are the primary heat exchanger and accumulator. These components are ex-
posed to the space environment since they are located opposite the Space Base side of the
power module.
The damage criteria used in determining meteoroid protection requirements is that proposed
by Loeffler (Reference 3-5),
i / f i 9/1 °AT 1/3/3 1/3/?~
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where
t = required armor thickness in inches
a
_ oo, • 1/3 1/2.-7/6., 1/2 -1/2 2/3K = 0.231 in cm ' ft Ib gm sec
a = damage thickness factor
y = materials cratering coefficient
3
p = meteoroid density in gm/cm (0. 5)
3
p = armor material density in Ib/ft (494)
V = meteoroid velocity in ft/sec (81,200)
E = Young's Modulus of Elasticity at operating temperature in Ib/in (21 x 10 )
„ , ,,»-ll gm particlesa = 3.1 x 10 fi ^
ft - day
0 = 1.22
2A = vulnerable (external surface) area of armor in ft
T = mission time in days (1825)
P(o)= design probability of no critical damage
The constants a and y vary from material to material and with damage mode. The cratering
coefficient y for a wide range of materials has been determined experimentally. For stain-
less steel, Lieblein and Diedrich give a rear surface damage factor for dimpling of 2.4 and
a cratering coefficient of 1. 67 (Reference 3-6).
Using these values, the probability of damage as a function of heat exchanger thickness is
given in Figure 3-12. This calculation indicates that high probabilities of meteoroid non-
penetration can be achieved with modest heat exchanger shell thicknesses. Since the heat
exchanger and accumulator are protected on one side by the R/S assembly, these estimates
of required thickness are considered to be conservative.
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Figure 3-12. Heat Exchanger Shell Thickness vs. Probability of No Critical Damage
Puncture of the primary loop by a meteoroid, resulting in a loss of core coolant, would pro-
duce higher post-shutdown temperatures than during a pump failure or a coolant flow block-
age.
Puncture Caused by Miscellaneous Accidents. Various other accidents which could result
in a loss of primary coolant are weld failures, collisions with logistic vehicles, debris, ex-
plosions, etc. Punctures caused by these types of accidents will have an effect on the system
similar to that caused by meteoroid puncture.
3.2.3 POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM (PCS) FAILURE
In the reference design system two reactors are operating at 330 kWt each. Three power
conversion systems are connected to each reactor, two of which are kept on standby.
Failure of a PCS is relevant to the subject of reactor temperature excursions since the PCS
is the link between the reactor and heat sink. Therefore, failure of the PCS resulting in the
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termination of heat rejection can result in a serious reactor temperature excursion. Due
to the inherent complexity of the PCS, failure can stem from many internal causes: radiator
loop rupture, compressor failure, turbine failure, etc. In addition, external occurrences
such as a collision with a logistic vehicle may cause failure of the PCS. Internal failures
may occur suddenly or over a period of time. In the latter instance degraded power system
performance1 may alertlthe crew so that corrective action may be taken prior to complete
inoperation of the power system. If it is apparent that a serious malfunction may occur
within the PCS, the reactor power must be reduced gradually and primary coolant flow rate
increased in order to lower the core temperature without inducing severe thermal stresses.
Concurrently, one of the standby PCS units can be brought to power to eliminate any large
discontinuity in the power output.
Assuming normal PCS operation prior to the failure, the severity of the impact on the reactor
'l
is a function of the time delay between the detection of the failure and reactor shutdown. In
the worst instance, when a sudden failure occurs, the reactor temperature excursion will be
less severe than in previous cases (Section 3. 2. 1) where the primary coolant loop was inoper-
ative. This is a consequence of the ability of the reactor to reject heat from the primary heat
exchanger and the intermediate loop without the need of electrical power from the PCS. In
the reference design, the use of thermo-electromagnetic (TEM) pumps to provide circulation
in the primary and intermediate loops, independently of the PCS, is an important design
safety feature for this type of failure.
It would be advantageous to have multiple PCS units operating to reduce the impact of a PCS
failure on the reactor system. This arrangement may require an additional standby PCS
due to the Brayton machinery lifetime limitations. It is recommended that this approach be
considered for the present design.
3.3 PREMATURE REENTRY
Accidental or so-called "premature" reentry of the reactor power module can occur during
the launch, operational or post-operational phases of the mission. Although reentry during
any of the mission phases presents a potential terrestrial hazard, reentry resulting from a
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launch abort in which orbit is not achieved must be accorded a relatively low probability of
causing an unsafe condition for the following reasons:
1. Values of reentry heating and impact velocity will be lower than that of an earth
orbit decay reentry, thus, decreasing the probability of. reactor disassembly.
2. The fission product inventory is negligible during this phase of the mission.
3. Drum lock-out devices (previously recommended) should be in place during launch
to prevent accidental drum rotation at impact.
In light of these considerations, the discussion of reactor/shield and power module reentry
and impact behavior will concentrate on the increased hazards associated with reentry from
earth orbit.
3. 3. 1 REACTOR/SHIELD REENTRY BEHAVIOR
Reentry of the R/S assembly from earth orbit can result from collision with various logistic
vehicles such as the Space Shuttle, meteoroid collision, an explosion aboard the Space Base,
and reactor disposal operations. The present design philosophy is predicated upon the belief
that the lithium hydride (LiH) neutron radiation shield is capable of providing sufficient re-
entry heating and land impact protection to prevent reactor disassembly. A recent analytical
and experimental investigation, performed by the General Electric Company has indicated
that the reentry protection offered by LiH may be incapable of preventing disassembly of the
reactor during reentry. Test results are presented in Section 3.3.1. 3.
The ability of the reference design to survive aerodynamic heating is influenced by the orien-
tation of the reactor/shield during the reentry. Due to the location of its center of pressure
and center of gravity (Figure 3-2)>it is anticipated that a gallery end-forward, stable reentry
would be most likely (Figure 3-13), however, the cause of entry and the details of the final
design will determine the exact reentry behavior. A tumbling or spinning R/S reentry would
have a greater chance of achieving a successful reentry. Most of the reentry discussion will
center around the worst case "gallery end forward" mode.
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GALLERY END FORWARD TUMBLING SIDE-ON SPINNING
Figure 3-13. Various Reactor/Shield Reentry Modes
3. 3. 1.1 Properties of Lithium Hydride
Since the LiH neutron shield constitutes the major fraction of the R/S assembly,it was
necessary to investigate the properties of LiH prior to the reentry evaluation.
LiH is a white, solid material which belongs to the saline family of hydrides. Unlike other
hydrides, LiH is a relatively stable compound below its melt point, exhibiting only modest
decomposition pressures of H . The relatively good stability is due to a weak Li-H covalent2 2
bond. The physical properties of LiH pertinent to its use as a reentry protection material
are listed in Table 3-2; this data was obtained from Reference 3-4.
The heat absorption capability of LiH is due to its specific heat ( solid phase), latent heat
of fusion (liquid phase), and heat of dissociation (H gas phase, Li liquid phase). Dissocia-
L*
tion of the H from Li will occur in appreciable amounts at about 800 K; a curve of dissocia-
£i
tion pressure versus temperature is given in Figure 3-14.
Since the density of pure Li is considerably less than that of the hydride, significant expan-
sion of the material occurs as dissociation proceeds. An increase in thermal conductivity
will also occur with increasing H evolution.
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Table 3-2. Lithium Hydride Properties
Property
Molecular Weight
Melting Point
Temperature for 1 atm of
Dissociation Pressure
Density of Solid @ STP
Density of Liquid @ MP
Thermal Conductivity of Solid
Specific Heat of Solid @ STP
Specific Heat of Liquid @ MP
Latent Heat of Fusion
Heat of Dissociation @ 298°K
Value
Metric Units
7.948
961°K
1170°K
2318 N/m3
1734 N/m3
0.0116 cal/sec-cm°K
1. 02 cal/gm-°K
1. 9 cal/gm-°K
3
5. 96 x 10 joules/kg
f\
2. 34 x 10 joules/kg
English Units
1270°F
1647°F
48.4 lb/ft3
36. 2 lb/ft3
2.8 Btu/hr-ft-°F
1250 Btu/lb
4910 Btu/lb
Chemically, LiH is a powerful reducing
agent which has proved useful in various
industrial processes such as the descaling
of metals and as a drying agent. The solid
LiH is hygroscopic, and reacts with water
and water vapor at room temperature. This
characteristic necessitates storage in a dry
atmosphere.
Of interest here is the possible chemical
behavior of LiH in the reentry environment.
As the temperature of the LiH increases the
following dissociation process occurs:
1 I
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Figure 3-14. Plateau Dissociation Pressures
Lithium - Lithium Hydride System
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2 LiH »~2 Li + H - 41.7 k cal/g mole (3-2)
(s)°r (1) (1) <g>
Both reaction products are strong reducing agents. In the liquid state, Li may undergo
the following reactions in air:
4 Li + O ^-2 Li O + 141. 7 k cal/g mole (3-3)
" / V "(1) <g)
6 Li + N —»~2 Li N + 45. 9 k cal/g mole (3-4)
(1) (g)
Under normal atmospheric conditions, the oxidation reaction (3-3) will occur preferentially
o o
to the nitriding (3-4). H also undergoes oxidation in air above 860 K (1090 F) according
^
to the following reaction:
2 H2 + O »~2H2O + 68. 3 k cal/g mole (3-5)
Exothermic reactions of lithium and hydrogen with air can be a serious disadvantage for the
successful use of lithium hydride as a reentry material.
As the melting point of LiH is reached during reentry, the rate of LiH dissociation increases.
This phenomena has the potential of contributing to the capability of LiH as a reentry material
in the following manner:
• According to equation (3-2), 41.7 kcal/g mole of energy is absorbed in the dissocia-
tion process.
• The molecular H2 dissociation product may act as a transpirant when injected into
the boundary layer.
Extensive analyses and testing programs conducted by both industry and government have
shown that the injection of gas from a reentering body into the boundary layer results in a
reduction of heat transfer to the body. This effect, called vapor blocking, has been attributed
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to a thickening of the boundary layer with a corresponding decrease in the heat transfer
coefficient. This mechanism is pictured in Figure 3-15.
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Figure 3-15. Transpiration Cooling Process
The magnitude by which the vapor blocking term reduces the incident heat flux can be esti-
mated by a correlation presented by Eckert (Reference 3-7). For Laminar flow:
*- = 1 - i. 82 (3-6)
where:
q = incident heat flux
q = incident heat flux without vapor blocking
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to v) . = mass transfer flux of transpirant material from the wall
w
(pu) = mass flux of gas at the boundary layer edge
e
Re = Reynolds number at the boundary layer edge
6
(pjn) = product of density and viscosity of the gas at the boundary layer edge
6
(ppt) = product of density and viscosity of the gas at the reference enthalpy condition
c
Ma = molecular weight of gas in the boundary layer
Me = molecular weight of transpirant gas
Inspection of equation (3-6) indicates that a low molecular weight dissociation product
(equation (3-2)) should exhibit excellent vapor blocking properties. Using a typical earth
orbital decay reentry trajectory for the reference design, it is found from equation (3-6)
that the vapor blocking term reduces the incident heat to the body by a factor of approximately
2. At the peak heating condition of
blocking term is 3330 cal/gm LiH.
2
f 416 w/cm , the effective heat capacity of the vapor
Therefore, the heat capacity of LiH during reentry consists of its specific heat, latent heat
of fusion, heat of dissociation and the vapor blocking contribution. Assuming an initial LiH
temperature of 422 K (300 F) the total heat capacity is calculated to be approximately 7575
cal/gm; the individual components of this term are listed below.
Specific heat = 819 cal/gm
Latent heat of fusion = 694 cal/gm
Heat of dissociation = 272 cal/gm
Vapor blocking contribution ~ 3330 cal/gm
The heat capacity arrived at may be highly optimistic depending upon the actual behavior of
the LiH during the reentry process. For example, if the LiH melts and is forced into the
free stream in droplet form without dissociating, the effective heat capacity could be reduced
to the sum of the specific heat and latent heat of fusion, 1513 cal/gm.
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3. 3.1. 2 | Analytical Reentry Model
The configuration of the R/S assembly and its assumed location within the Power Module
(PM) has been shown in Figure 3-11. Premature reentry of the reactor could conceivably
begin with reentry of the entire Space Base, PM or R/S alone. However, at some point
during the reentry, aerodynamic heating and/or inertial forces will cause release of the R/S
from both the PM and Space Base. In order to formulate a realistic reentry model it was
necessary to assess the importance of the initial reentry mode of the power module.
Separation of the reactor/shield from the remainder of the power module or spacecraft can
be expected to occur when the aluminum radiator and associated support structure reach
their melt temperature of ~ 920 K (1200 F). The altitude at which this condition occurs was
determined by means of the General Electric MASS and ABTON computer programs (Ref-
erences 3-8, 3-9). Figure 3-16 illustrates the velocity and altitude of the power module
as a function of time for an Earth Orbital Decay (EOD) reentry. The onset of melting, as
calculated by ABTON, was found to occur at approximately 97. 5 km (320, 000 ft). Investiga-
tion of the reentry trajectory for the Space Base also resulted in the conclusion that radiator
melting would begin in the vicinity of 97. 5 km. Therefore, it can be concluded that if reentry
of the R/S is initiated while attached to the power module or Space Base, release of the R/S
will occur prior to the peak heating regions of reentry. In addition, the velocity of the re-
entry body at the time of release will be approximately equal to its orbital velocity. Extra-
polating this result one step further, it can be stated that the reentry behavior of the R/S is
essentially independent of its initial reentry mode.
Using the reactor/shield (R/S) configuration shown in Figure 3-2, appropriate ballistic
coefficients for various types of reentry orientations were calculated and are shown in
Table 3-3 for a reactor mass of 17.7t (39 klb). The drag coefficient as a function of geo-
metric position, altitude, Mach number and angle of attack are shown in Figures 3-17
through 3-20, respectively. Using this data in conjunction with the General Electric Com-
pany MASS computer code, the trajectory shown in Figure 3-21 was obtained.
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Figure 3-16. Power Module - Reactor End First (Earth Orbital Decay at 122 km)
Table 3-3. Reactor/Shield Assembly Ballistic Coefficients
Reactor/Shield Assembly
Gallery Forward
Gallery Backward
Side On
Tumbling
Continuum /3
Newtons/m2 (Ib/ft2)
82, 100 (1715)
43,300 (905)
29,500 (616)
34,900 (729)
Free Molecular J3
Newtons/m2 (lb/ft2)
53,200 (1110)
16,900 (352)
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Figure 3-21. Reactor - Gallery End First (Earth Orbital Decay at 122 km (400 kft))
The Earth Orbital Decay (EOD) aerodynamic heating rate and consequent ablation for a
gallery end-first reentry is shown in Figure 3-22. Of the approximately 610 mm of LiH
placed at the gallery end, half is expected to be ablated. This assumes that the heat capacity
of the LiH consisted of sensible heat plus heat of fusion with an initial shield temperature of
475°K (400°F).
Another possible reentry situation arises during the Reactor Disposal Phase of the mission.
In the reference design, disposal is accomplished by two propulsive maneuvers—a thrust at
the reference orbit which results in transfer to the disposal attitude, and a thrust at apogee
to effect circularization at that selected disposal attitude. Direct reentry (within a few days)
to the earth is possible as the result of a large thrust vector error (i. e., retrograde firing)
due to an engine misfire or a guidance and control and attitude error during the transfer or
circularization burn. It is more probable, however, that a misaligned thrust vector will re-
sult in a relatively small error that places the power module in some "off-nominal" orbit
resulting in a premature reentry (orbit lifetime less than planned).
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Figure 3-22. Lithium Hydride Ablation and Aerodynamic Heating Flux vs. Time
Four cases were examined to study the effect of direct reentry upon the R/S assembly.
The trajectories obtained for each of these cases are shown in Figures 3-23 through 3-26.
The amount of LiH ablated for each situation as a function of the reentry angle, y, is pro-
vided in Figure 3-27 for AV's of 225 and 400 m/sec. Comparison of these results with
those obtained for the EOD situation indicates the EOD reentry is more severe due to
higher integrated heating.
3.3.1.3 Lithium Hydride Test Results
The reentry protection capability of LiH has been of interest to industry for several years.
This interest has stemmed from the possible application of LiH as both a neutron radiation
and reentry protection material for various radioisotope heat source programs. In late
1970 the General Electric Company conducted arc-tunnel reentry simulation tests on LiH;
the results of these investigations have been included where appropriate in this study.
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Arc-tunnel reentry simulation testing was
performed to evaluate the effective heat
capacitance of LiH. Test specimens (Fig-
ure 3-28) were 12. 7 mm in diameter and
either 15. 2 mm or 38.1 mm in length. The
cylindrical specimens consisted of a matrix
of LiH and 304 stainless steel tubes, each
with a 1. 8 mm I. D. and a 2. 3 mm O. D.
Particular emphasis was placed on main-
taining an oxygen-free environment during
the infiltration of the specimens with LiH
and prevention of LiH voids.
MATERIAL:
• CASE-304 STAINLESS STEEL
• TUBE-304 STAINLESS STEEL
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Figure 3-27. Amount of LiH Melted During AV
Reentry Reactor Release at 122 km (Gal-
lery End First)
SPECIMEN DIMENSIONS:
SHELL LENGTH
'A'- 38.1 MM
'B'- 15,2""MM
SHELL OUTER DIA.-'12.7 MM
TUBE O. D.-2.3 MM
• TUBE I. D.-1.8 MM
Figure 3-28. Lithium Hydride Matrix Holder
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The experimental test program was conducted in the hypersonic arc tunnel at General
Electric's Valley Forge Space Technology Center. Four specimens were tested at a heat
2 • • £flux of 111 w/cm and a stagnation pressure.of 1. 60 x 10*
outstanding observations from the tests are listed below:
  3 210 Newtons/m (12 mm Hg). The
1. A bright pink glow in the boundary layer indicated intense oxidation of the test
specimen (Li and possibly H).i ' . • ^
2. Visual and motion picture observations indicated some spallation of LiH during
the test.
3. Uneven recession provided some evidence that internal hydrogen pressure buildup
may have ejected LiH into the boundary layer.
fi4. Assuming a LiH heat capacitance of 1.49 x 10 joules/kg (3125 Btu/lb), the test
specimen lifetime was a factor of 2 to 3 less than analytically predicted or an
approximate effective heat capacity of 4. 77^7.16 x 105 joules/kg (1000-1500
Btu/lb).
The overall conclusion of these tests was that the oxidation of LiH in the boundary layer
reduces the effective heat capacitance of the material. At the higher stagnation pressures
expected during the reentry of a zirconium hydride reactor/shield assembly, the effect of
i
the oxidation reactions may be intensified.
Lithium hydride arc-tunnel reentry simulation tests were also conducted by NASA-Ames
Laboratories with test specimens supplied by Atomics International. The results of these
tests, as presented by McDonnell-Douglas, Reference 3-10, are shown in Table 3-5. These
findings indicate that the effective heat capacity of LiH is significantly higher than that indi-
cated by the General Electric test results; however, the effective heat capacity obtained at
Ames was less than the value that could be hypothesized if, the effective heat capacity associ-
ated with LiH heat of dissociation and transpiration properties were included (Section 3. 3.1.1).
Both test results agree that the ablation capability of LiH is in question when used during
orbital reentry.
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Table 3-5. NASA, Ames LiH Tests
Specimens supplied by AI
Solid LiH
Steel wool-UH
Honeycomb-LiH
Flat and rounded ends
With/without SS container
Test conditions
Facility
Heat rate
Dynamic pressure
Number of tests
Low density constructed-ARC-supersonic jet
679 w/cm2-sec (600 Btu/ft -sec)
o o
3.42 x 10 Newton/m (0. 03 atm)
21
Effective heat capacity
(sensible + latent heat
of fusion)
Oxidation effects
Spalling, etc.
Melting behavior
Results
Test
f*
1. 33 x 10 joules/kg
(2,781 Btu/lb)
None apparent
4%
Flows freely
Analysis
fi •
1.42 x 10 joules/kg
(2, 970 Btu/lb)
Same
Not included
Same
3.3:. 2 IMPACT BEHAVIOR
The behavior of the reactor assembly at impact is important in determining the amount of
radioactive material released. The design objective is to achieve complete integrity of the
reactor system at the time of impact. Accomplishment of this goal is complicated by the
high impact velocities characteristic of reentry bodies with a high ballistic coefficient.
High velocities combined with dense impact media can possibly result in a disassembly or
deformation of the reactor and core.
The highest impact velocity will occur with a gallery end-forward reentry; however, more
likely, the reactor assembly will begin to tumble once peak pressure has been experienced.
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Tumbling reentry prior to impact will reduce the impact velocity from the gallery end-for-
ward case.
For most situations the impact velocity can be equated to the terminal velocity which is ex-
pressed by the following relationship:
VT =V 2WV 3-7
An analysis was conducted to determine the possibility of reactor dissassembly at impact.
The investigation assumed a reentry body mass of 18,180 kg (40K Ib) with a reactor core
mass of 818 kg (1.8K Ib). A minimum impact velocity of 238 m/sec (782 ft/see) was used
which corresponds to the calculated impact velocity for tumbling reentry. The results of
this study are summarized in Table 3-6.
Table 3-6. Results of Impact Study
Impact
Location LiH Temperature Conclusion Remarks
Granite
Granite
Water
Water
339°K (150°F)
589°K (600°F)
339°K (150°F)
589°K(600°F)
0. 609 meters of LiH crush-up
is needed. Probable deforma-
tion and rupture.
Severe plastic deformation of
core with probable rupture of
individual fuel elements
Reasonable chance of core
surviving impact
Severe plastic deformation of
core with probable rupture of
individual fuel elements
Marginal situation for a
gallery end-first impact
LiH has little crush-up
capability at this tempera-
ture and above-this situ-
ation is more realistic
than the 339°K case
Effect of LiH reaction -
with water on pressure
vessel should be investi-
gated
LiH reaction with water
will be accelerated at this
temperature level
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Since the LiH shield will experience considerable ablation during reentry and that some
core vessel embrittlement could occur after prolonged operation it can be concluded that a
high probability of core deformation and disassembly exists. If an intact core at impact is
determined to be an important safety consideration^ is strongly recommended that a re-
design of the reentry body be initiated to lower the impact velocity and/or increase the
integrity and ablation capability of the reentry body.
3.4 ORBITAL COLLISIONS AND EXPLOSIONS
Orbital collisions and explosions have the potential of causing severe damage to the power
module which can result in a nuclear hazard to the Space Base and terrestrial population.
Orbital collisions can occur with meteoroids, space debris, logistic vehicles, detached
modules and with the reactor power module during disposal operations. Sources of potential
explosions include: the gas management, disposal propulsion and space base propulsion
systems, environmental control tankage and logistic vehicle propellant tanks.
The effects of a collision or explosion may have a relatively minor or major impact on the
reactor/shield depending upon its location and intensity.
3.4. 1 MINOR ORBITAL COLLISIONS AND EXPLOSIONS
Examples of minor accident effects are radiation shield damage, control drum mechanism
failure, control drum motion, temporary flow instabilities, etc.
Damage to the radiation shield can be easily detected and, if necessary, shutdown and dis-
posal of the power module can be effected. Major damage to the radiation shield would also
result in severe power module damage.
Failure of the control drum mechanism would also necessitate shutdown and disposal of the
power module; however there would be no immediate danger to the Space Base. In this
situation, shutdown of the reactor might be accomplished by temperature cycling the
reactor by varying the primary coolant flow rate. This procedure would result in acceler-
ated hydrogen loss, with a consequent rapid loss of reactivity. The rate of hydrogen loss
3-38
increases with temperature due to the increase in the fuel element barrier permeability and
diffusion of hydrogen through the zirconium hydride.
Other failure modes, which can have relatively minor effects are perturbations of the con-
trol drums or flow instabilities which will lead to temporary excursions which are self-
corrective or can be easily controlled by proper operator action.
3. 4. 2 MAJOR ORBITAL COLLISIONS AND EXPLOSIONS
Severe collisions and explosions have the potential of causing the release of activated NaK,
meltdown of the core, disassembly of the power module and premature R/S reentry.
Release of activated NaK can occur by puncture of the primary loop at the intermediate heat
exchanger or other vulnerable location. The release of the primary coolant is an immediate
hazard to the crew, since, the radioactive NaK is not behind the radiation shield, but can be
injected directly to space.
Another consequence of coolant loss is an overtemperature condition within the core. The
possible effects of this situation have been presented in Section 3. 2.1. Overtemperature of
the core can also occur if the PCS is damaged during the accident.
Complete disassembly of the reactor core by a collision would constitute a severe hazard to
the crew due to the release of radioactive fission products and activated materials. A de-
tailed discussion of this potential problem is contained in the Space Base Preliminary Safety
Analysis Report (Volume II).
The hazard posed to the terrestrial population by an orbital collision or explosion is due to
the possibility of a premature reentry. Disorientation of the Space Base and/or the power
module may result in tumbling and earth orbital decay of the entire vehicle. The lower
ballistic coefficient of the entire Space Base would shorten the orbital lifetime of the power
module. A collision which causes severance of the R/S or power module from the Space
Base also has the potential of initiating a premature reentry. The expected characteristics
of a R/S earth orbital decay and premature reentry have been discussed in Section 3. 3.
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SECTION 4
SOURCE TERM ANALYSIS
Radiation source terms from the Reactor/Shield result from radioactive fission products
and activated structure within, or in close proximity to, the reactor core. In order to re-
late the magnitude of these terms to various mission phases and accident situations identified
in Section 5, the following evaluations were performed:
1. Fission product inventories as a function of time and release fraction.
2. Radiation fields and associated dose rates for various normal and accident type
situations.
Examples of the situations examined include: normal undamaged reactor operation, reactor
radiation following normal shutdown, nuclear excursions and radiation from distributed
fission product-bearing fuel elements.
4.1 ASSUMPTIONS
Source terms associated with steady state operation were based upon two operating histories,
i.e., a power level of 100 watts for 12 days (preoperational condition) and a power level of
330 kWt for 5 years (post operational condition). In the case of a reactor excursion, a 100
MW-sec energy release was assumed. This is probably on the conservative side but for the
qualitative reasons discussed below, it would appear to be the order of magnitude for a
maximum credible accident.
The series of SNAPTRAN reactor tests resulted in the conclusion that the response of the
SNAP 10A/2 reactor to large, rapid increases of reactivity depends almost completely on fuel
behavior (see Reference 4-1). The major fuel effects are the negative temperature coeffi-
cient of the fuel and the zirconum hydride dissociation resulting in pressure buildup with
consequent core expansion and disassembly. Disassembly is the ultimate shutdown mecha-
nism.
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During the type of excursions being considered here, the bulk of the energy release takes
place within a time interval on the order of a few milliseconds. Hence, temperature changes
during the excursion are restricted to the fuel itself. Assuming that similar pressures and
temperatures are required to disassemble both the SNAP-10A/2 and the reference reactor
cores, it follows that similar fission densities are also required. Since the reference reactor
core contains nearly twice the fuel contained in the SNAP-10A/2 core, the energy release
necessary to reproduce the disassembly pressures would be greater by roughly a factor of
2. However, the reference reactor core is enclosed within a pressure vessel. This struc-
ture, not present in the SNAPTRAN tests, would tend to retard disassembly, permitting
greater energy build-up before final shutdown and destruction.
The energy release from the SNAPTRAN destructive test in air was determined to be 54 MW-
sec ±10 MW-sec (see Reference 4-2). Hence, based upon the above reasoning, a 100 MW-sec
excursion appears conceivable in the case of the reference zirconium hydride re actor.
4.2 FISSION PRODUCT INVENTORIES
Fission product inventories were established for the pre-startup, quasi-steady state, full
power operation and excursion cases. The fission product inventory assumed to be present
prior to startup (lOOw operation for 12 days), is insignificant compared to that produced by
an excursion or during and after normal operation. However, the total fission product in-
ventory of the reactor after operation for 5 years at 330 kWt is much greater than that pro-
duced by an excursion.
As would be expected, the concentration of fission products with half-lives of about one
minute or less is negligible after 5 year operation. A reactor excursion would produce a
higher concentration of short lived fission products than existed from normal operation.
A summary of the accumulated inventories for the two operating histories is given in Table
4-1. In addition, the table contains the peak values of the inventories generated by the 100
MW-sec excursion and the time after the excursion at which the peak values are reached.
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4.2.1 NORMAL OPERATION AND SHUTDOWN
The fission product inventories as a result of normal operation were determined from the
data of Reference 4-3. The inventories of several specific isotopes of particular interest
as a function of operating time and shutdown time are given in Appendix A. A summary of
this data, presenting the decay of the five significant "long lived" isotopes after 5 year
operation at 330 kWt is shown in Figure 4-1.
10, ooo
1000
100
REACTOR OPERATING HISTORY
POWER LEVEL: 300 kWt
OPERATING TIME: 5 YEARS
ff
w
i
u
< 0.1 -
0.01 -
0.001
100 200 300 400
TIME AFTER SHUTDOWN (YEARS)
500 600
Figure 4-1. Decay of Long Lived Fission Products
Following Reactor Shutdown
4.2.2 REACTOR EXCURSIONS
The inventories of several isotopes generated during a 100 MW-sec excursion were calculated
as a function of time after the excursion. Equations were developed for each decay chain of
interest describing the inventories of each member of the chain as a function of time. The
basic assumption underlying the equations consisted of assuming that no decay of directly
formed fission products occurred during the excursion. Burnup of the fission products was
assumed to be negligible.
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These assumptions result in inventories which are directly proportional to the excursion
energy release for all isotopes in each decay chain. All parameters such as fields, half-
lives and branching ratios were taken from Reference 4-3. The results of the calculations
i are provided in Appendix B.
4.3 FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE FRACTIONS
During a reactor excursion, greatly increased temperatures within the fuel result in destruc-
1
 tive forces which permit the excape of gaseous and volatile fission products. A relatively
small amount of solid fission products will also escape. Should the excursion take place in
water, a significant portion of the fission products may be trapped within the water and con-
sequently not be released to the atmosphere.
In the event of earth impact with no excursion, but, with reactor disassembly, gaseous fis-
! sion products may be released over a period of time depending upon the extent of the fuel
element damage.
\
I
The selection of fission product release fractions for the purposes of this report are dis-
I cussed below.
J 4.3.1 EXPERIMENTAL DATA
The fission product release fractions were based upon the experimental data presented in
\
I References 4-4 and4-5. -These references reported the analysis of the experimental data re-
corded for the SNAPTRAN tests consisting of destructive excursions of a modified SNAP-10A/2
| reactor in air and a SNAP-10A/2 reactor core in water. A summary of experimentally ob-
tained fission product release fractions is given in Table 4-2 and compared with those appliedI
in this study.
4.3.2 ASSUMED REACTOR RELEASE FRACTIONS
For this study, it was assumed that the excursion energy release could be greater than that
' observed during the SNAPTRAN tests, (as discussed in Section 4.1). The greater energy re-
lease, plus the greater fuel surface area in the case of the zirconium hydride reference reac-
tor, implies the possibility of greater fission product release fractions for this system.
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Consequently, in the case of reactor excursions in air where the atmospheric contamination
is most significant, it was assumed that release fractions were somewhat greater than those
observed in the SNAPTRAN test. In the case of an excursion in water, a slightly greater in-
crease over the test data was assumed for the release of noble gases to the atmosphere and
a significant increase was assumed for the solids, i.e., a 4% release as compared with the
observed value of 1% or less in the SNAPTRAN test.
For accidents other than destructive excursions, such as temperature excursions or earth
impact, the release fractions of Table 4-2 were also used. Use of this data will result in an
overestimate of the radiological hazards for the non-destructive cases.
4.4 RADIATION FIELDS. GROUND LEVEL
Neutron and gamma ray dose rates were calculated for several configurations of the reactor
during operation, excursions and after shutdown. Each of the cases considered, models
employed, and calculated results are discussed below.
4. 4.1 QUASI-STEADY STATE OPERATION DOSE
Neutron and gamma ray dose rates for the zirconium hydride reactor with and without a
shield were calculated at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). In the case of the
bare reactor, dose rates were calculated at a distance of 46 m (150 ft) from the reac-
tor center. In the case of the shielded reactor, the separation distance was 61 m. In
order to estimate the dose rates at distances other than those stated above, it was assumed
that the dose rates varied inversely with the square of the separation distance. The effects
of air scattering were neglected. The results are given in Table 4-^3 for a reactor power
level of 1 kWt. In the case of the bare reactor, the difference in dose rates at various posi-
tions around the vessel is negligible.
In the case of the shielded reactor, the dose rates vary significantly with direction; conse-
quently, the directional variation is indicated in the Table.
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Table 4-3. Quasi-Steady State Operation Dose Rates
(Power Level - 1 kWt )
Distance from
Reactor Center
(Meters)
1
3
10
100
BARE
Dose
Neutron
7.7 x 103
8.6 x 102
7.7 x 101
7.7 x 10'1
REACTOR
REACTOR |
Rate (rem/hr)
Gamma
2.09xl02
2.33X101
2.09x 10°
2.09x 10 ~2
WITH SHIELD |
f
"*~B~**T
*
(Along the reactor axis through maximum shield)
1
3
10
100
1.75X10'1
1. 94 x 10 ~2
1.75 x 10-3
1.75x 10-5
5.9 x 10"1
6.5xlO-2
5.9 x 10 ~3
5.9x 10~5
/M\/ • \
t"^
(In the radial direction)
1
3
10
100
1.44x10°
1.61 x 10
1.44 x 10"2
1.44x ID"4
3.8x 10°
4.2 x 10'1
3.8x 10~2
3.8X10"4
^ lm\
V__J
(Along the reactor axis through minimum shield)
1
3
10
100
1.56 x 101
1.74x10°
1.56 x 10"1
1. 56 x 10~3
5.4 x 101
6.1 x 10°
5.4 x 10"1
5.4xlO~ 3
|
/•x/ ™ \
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The gamma dose rate calculations did not include fission product gamma sources. The fis-
sion product gamma dose rates are given in Table 4-4 for the preoperational and post-
operational cases (12 days lOOw and 5 years at 330 kWt).
4.4.2 REACTOR EXCURSION DOSE
Neutron and prompt gamma ray integrated doses were calculated for the reference design
reactor excursions. In addition, dose rates due to decay of fission products generated
during the excursion were established as a function of time after the excursion.
4.4.2.1 Integrated Dose Calculations
For unshielded reactor excursions, integrated doses were based upon the SNAPTRAN test
data of Reference 4-4. In applying the test data it was assumed that the integrated doses
were proportional to the excursion energy release. This follows from the observation that
the total neutron, prompt gammas and secondary gammas are all proportional to the total
number of fissions. The integrated doses were assumed to vary inversely with the square
of the separation distance. The effects of air scattering were neglected.
An alternative method was also used to estimate the excursion integrated doses. This
method was based upon steady state dose rates of the bare reactor as calculated by ORNL.
The calculated dose rates were integrated over the time interval during which the energy
release would be equivalent to that assumed for the excursion. This approach is fairly ac-
curate in the case of the neutron dose since both modes of operation, steady state and tran-
sient, will give rise to the same numbers of neutrons. The neutron energy spectra would
probably differ, as would the leakage fluxes, due to temperature differences in the fuel, but
this effect would be small. In the case of gamma rays, however, one might expect significant
differences in the two methods. While gamma sources due to neutron capture and inelastic
scattering have the same integrated effect, except for the small temperature differences
noted above, short-lived fission products tend to increase the gamma dose in the excursion
case but not in the steady state case.
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The two methods were applied to calculation of integrated doses at a separation distance of
46 meters from the reactor center, the distance used in the ORNL calculation. The results
of both approaches are given in Table 4. 5. The neutron doses differ by a factor of 2, and
the gamma doses by a factor of about 4.
Table 4. 5. Integrated Neutron and Prompt Gamma Ray Doses from a
100 MW - Sec Excursion
Unshielded
Reactor
Dose at 46 Meters (rem)
Based on
SNAPTRAN
Test Data
Based on
Steady State Operation
Dose Rate Calculations
Neutrons
Gammas
200.0
13.0
100.0
3.1
The integrated doses based upon the SNAPTRAN test data are larger and are used in the
evaluation of radiological hazards. The calculations of integrated doses, as a function of
distance from the reactor, are given in Figure 4-2.
4.4.2.2 Fission Product Decay Dose Calculations
Estimates of gamma dose rates due to fission products generated during a reactor excursion
were also based on SNAPTRAN test data. The test data consisted of gamma dose rate
measurements, made near the center of the distributed reactor debris, as a function of time
after excursion (2 hours to ~2 days). Dose rates were assumed to be proportional to the
excursion energy release. The data provides the magnitude of the excursion generated
fission product decay gamma dose rates for a given fuel distribution and decay time.
For times less than 2 hours and greater than 100 seconds after the excursion, the dose rate
was assumed to follow the time dependence suggested by Way and Wigner (Reference 4-6)
—1 2i. e., use of a t * time dependence where t is the time since fission. This time de-
pendence actually refers to the total energy of the gamma radiation emitted per unit time
since fission.
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If the gamma energy spectrum does not change too rapidly during the first 2 hours, this
time dependence will also represent the dose rate variation with time. The SNAPTRAN
—1 2test data follows the t ' law, within about + 20%, suggesting that this time dependence
is a fair representation of the dose rate time dependence for times between 100 seconds
and 2 hours since fission.
For times less than 100 seconds, the dose rate time dependence was assumed to follow
the measured dose rate time dependence after short reactor excursions reported in
Reference 4-7. The data used in this report were measurements taken near an unshielded
SNAPTRAN-1 reactor following transients of less than 300 milliseconds duration.
The dose rate results, obtained by applying this data as a function of time after a destructive
excursion, are shown in Figure 4-3. The curve in this figure represents the dose rate due
to fission products generated during a 100 MW-sec destructive excursion. Fission products
generated during normal operation are not included. The receiver point for which the dose
rate is given is located one meter above the ground and at the center of the fuel distribution
brought about by the destructive excursion.
The analytical model used to establish the spatial variation of the fission product decay
dose rate will be described later in the section dealing with the dose rate due to fission
products generated during normal reactor operation.
The dose rate from a single fuel element containing excursion generated fission products
only was also established. Results of the calculation are shown in Figure 4-4. In this case,
no experimental data was available.
In order to make some estimate of the dose rate, the following approach was taken. Fission
product gross gamma emission rates can be fairly well established for a given operating
history and time after shutdown. The gamma source terms for the post operational case of
330 kWt for 5 years were determined using the data of Reference 4-3. Using these source
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terms and the fuel distribution reported in Reference 4-4, resulting from the destructive
excursion, the fission product decay gamma dose rate was calculated as a function of time
after shutdown. The same receiver point as in the case of the excursion generated fission
products was selected, i. e., one meter above the ground at the center of the distributed
fuel elements. Since the measured excursion data included the effect of air scattering, the
calculation for the normal operation fission products also included this effect.
Dose rates were determined as a function of time for both the excursion and normal operation
generated fission product cases. The material and source distribution for both cases were
identical and differences in the dose rates were due to differences in the gamma ray source
magnitudes and time dependencies.
The ratio of the integrated doses from each of the fission product components for the first
day was assumed to be independent of such factors as geometry and material distributions
as long as no significant shielding was introduced. For instance, the single fuel element in
air should exhibit the same gamma ray spectra, time dependencies and relative contribution
to the dose as the fuel distributed about the site after a destructive excursion.
The first day's integrated dose from fission products due to the normal operation was cal-
culated for a single fuel element at a separation distance of one meter. The gamma source
terms were taken from Reference 4-3. Using the integrated dose ratio determined for the
distributed fuel case, the excursion fission product integrated dose was estimated. By use
of the integrated dose and also the time dependence of the dose rate, the magnitude of the
dose rate was established.
4.4. 3 FISSION PRODUCT DOSE RATES - NORMAL OPERATION
The dose rates from fission products generated during normal reactor operation were cal-
culated for four material geometries.
1. Intact Bare Reactor Core
2. Shielded Reactor Core
4-15
3. Single Fuel Element
4. Scattered/Distributed Fuel Elements
The same two reactor operating histories were considered: (1) operation at 100 watts thermal
for 12 days, and (2) operation at 330 kWt for 5 years. In all cases, the fission product in-
ventories were based upon the data of Reference 4-3 . "
4.4.3.1 Intact Bare Reactor Core
The analytical model adopted here consisted of initially determining the uncollided gamma
fluxes at the core surface. This was done through the use of the method presented in
Reference 4-8, Chapter 11. The method consists of using the simple exponential attenuation
kernel and integrating over the volume of the core. This gives an exact result for the un-
collided flux. The surface flux was then converted to a surface dose rate through the use of
flux-to-dose conversion factors and buildup factors. The buildup factors were evaluated for
a number of mean free paths contained within the core radius, a choice which can lead to an
overestimate of the dose rate by no more than a factor of about 2.
The surface dose rate was then converted into a surface source assuming a cosine angular
distribution for the gamma rays independent of the gamma ray energy. Dose rates at points
exterior to the core were then determined by a surface integration of the core.
The results indicated that for points about one meter or greater from the core surface, the
dose rate would decrease as the inverse square of the distance from the core surface. Con-
sequently, the dose rate as a function of time after shutdown was specified for a separation
distance of one meter only. The results for the two operating histories are given in Figures
4-5 and 4-6. The dose rates for other separation distances can be easily calculated using
the inverse square law.
4.4.3.2 Shielded Reactor Core
In the case of a shielded reactor with an operating history of 100 watts thermal for 12 days,
the dose rate at one meter from the shield surface in the direction of the minimum shield
4-16
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Figure 4-5. Fission Product Decay Gamma Dose Rate at One Meter from Surface
of Bare Core-Operating History: 100 Watts for 12 Days
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Figure 4-6. Fission Product Decay Gamma Dose Rate at One Meter from
Surface of Bare Core-Operating History: 330 kWt for 5 Years
4-18
thickness has an order of magnitude of 10 mr/hr. This dose rate would decrease to about
1. 0 mr/hr in four days and to about 0.1 mr/hr in two months.
4.4.3.3 Single Fuel Element Dose Rates
Dose rates for the two operating histories were also calculated for the case of a single fuel
element. A simple point source model was used, ignoring the effects of air scattering and
self-shielding within the fuel element. The dose rates calculated for a one meter separation
distance are given in Figures 4-7 and 4-8. The fission product gamma sources were based
upon the assumption that the fuel elements had been located within the core in a region of
peak power density.
4.4.3.4 Scattered/Distributed Fuel Elements
In the event of a destructive excursion, fuel elements and fuel particles may be distributed
over a considerable land area. In addition to the gamma dose rate resulting from fission
products generated during the excursion, one must add the dose rate due to fission products
accumulated during any previous normal reactor operation. The fuel element distribution
and operating history used were the same as those used for the case of excursion generated
fission products.
Figures 4-9 and 4-10 provide dose rates for the two operating histories at a receiver point
one meter above the ground at the center of the fuel distribution as a function of time
after reactor shutdown. In order to establish dose rates at other positions, the relative
dose rate one meter above the ground and for varying distances from the center of the fuel
distribution is shown in Figure 4-11. This spatial dependence also applies to the case of
the dose rate due to excursion generated fission products. The relative dose rate as a
function of time after shutdown can be obtained from Figure 4-12. This time dependence
applies only to fission products as a result of the indicated reactor operating histories and
is independent of position.
As mentioned previously, the effect of air scattering was included in these calculations.
This was effected by using the data presented in Reference 4-8, Chapter 15. The technique
4-19
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Figure 4-7. Fission Product Decay Gamma Dose Rate One Meter from a Single Fuel
Element-Reactor Operating History: 100 Watts for 12 Days
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Figure 4-8. Fission Product Decay Gamma Dose Rate One Meter from a Single
Fuel Element-Reactor Operating History: 330 kWt for 5 Years
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Figure 4-9. Fission Product Decay Gamma Dose Rate One Meter Above the
Ground at the Center of Distributed Fuel-Reactor Operating
History: 100 Watts for 12 Days
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Figure 4-10. Fission Product Decay Gamma Dose Rate One Meter Above the
Ground at the Center of Distributed Fuel-Reactor Operating
History: 330 kWt for 5 Years
4-23
as
w
w
< H
W 3
1!
u to
05
U.
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0 I
20 40 60 80 100 120
DISTANCE FROM CENTER OF FUEL DISTRIBUTION (METERS)
140 160
Figure 4-11. Spatial Dependence of Dose Rate for Distributed Fuel. All
Points One Meter Above Ground
10
1.0
H
it
ac O
u O
u5 H
10-1
05
b.
10-2
10 -3
10
4-24
10
10
OPERATING HISTORY
CURVE A — 100 WATTS FOR 12 DAYS
CURVE B — 330 kWt FOR 5 YEARS
,,8 1010 10
TIME AFTER SHUTDOWN (SECONDS)
Figure 4-12. Time Dependence of Fission Product Decay Gamma
Dose Rate
1010
consisted of fitting curves to the data of Reference 4-8 and incorporating the results in a
computer program designed to integrate over the chosen fuel distribution. The data of
Reference 4-8 is the result of Monte Carlo calculations for the case of monodirectional
point sources. The calculations were performed for a series of angles between the direc-
tion of gamma ray emission and the source-detector axis and for a series of initial gamma
ray energies. Curve fits to these data were used to determine expressions for gamma
ray fluxes which were continuous functions of the direction of the gamma ray emission and
source-detector distance. The energy dependence of the gamma flux was averaged over
each of the four gamma ray energy groups used in Reference 4-3 for the total fission
product gamma ray source strength.
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SECTION 5
MISSION ACCIDENT ANALYSES
The results of the accident analyses indicate that a probability of 88 percent exists in
achieving "complete" Reactor Power Module (PM) success in the mission. "Complete"
success is defined as the PM being successfully launched, completing the required opera-
tional lifetime, and being successfully placed in the planned 990 km, 1167 year disposal orbit. .
i
A vast majority of the accidents (prelaunch through disposal) which prevent "complete"
success lead to no discernible hazards to the earth's populace and ecology (e. g., random re-
entry of the reactor in a deep ocean area). However, in some potential situations terrestrial
hazards can result. It is the intent of this analysis to define the modes and probability of
occurrence of these key accidents.
In Section 3 various types of nuclear system associated accidents were defined for the zirco-
nium hydride/Brayton power conversion system. Section 4 evaluated the importance of these
accidents, defining the amount and type of radiation hazard presented to the terrestrial popu-
lation. This discussion relates these accidents to the Space Base mission and by means of
abort sequence trees, evaluates their probability of occurrence. By combining the results
of Sections 3 and 4 within the framework of the abort sequence trees, the key mission acci-
dents are identified.
The complete evaluation of the nuclear reactor response to all accident environments is com-
plicated by the variety of initial conditions possible and the unpredictable sequence of events
which can follow a mission failure. Development of the abort sequence trees provides an
orderly and logical procedure for identifying and estimating the probability of particular
accident occurrences.
Key mission phases used in the mission accident analyses are shown in Figure 5-1; a detailed
discussion of each phase is given in Volume III, Part I.
5-1
4.0 REACTOR DISPOSAL (EON)
• Shutdown
• Separation/Stabilization
• Transfer Burn
• Coast to Apogee
• Circularization Burn
3.0 ORBITAL OPERATIONS
• Check-out
• Start-up
• Operation
• Emergency Operation
2.0 LAUNCH/ASCENT
• Launch
• S-IC Boost
• S-II Boost
• Rendezvous and Docking
1.0 PRELAUNCH
• Transportation
• Receipt, Inspection, storage
• Checkout and assembly
• Integration and test
• Countdown
Figure 5-1. Mission Phases for Mission Accident Analysis
5-2
5.1 ABORT SEQUENCE TREE CONSTRUCTION
Abort sequence trees for the reference zirconium hydride reactor powerplant have been
generated for each phase of the reference Space Base Program mission. These trees are
graphical representations of causal sequences. Each tree begins with the phase identifi-
cation and the dichotomy between success and failure. The success branch shows the mis-
sion phase objective as being achieved. The failure branch is subdivided, as conditions
require, into various primary initiating abort conditions. From each of these initiating
events, the causal chain is followed through to either (1) a nuclear hazard, (2) a condition
that results in "no discernible hazard", or (3) a successful repair or correction that leads
back to the success branch. In this manner, the sequence trees show how the particular
events and their "relative probabilities" are determined. Terminology used in the accident
analysis and abort sequence trees is defined in the Glossary of Terms.
The abort sequence trees were generated without considering probabilities; all events that
seemed even remotely possible were considered. Only upon completion of the trees were
probabilities considered. The probability of a given accident occurring in any phase of the
mission was derived from experimental data where available, and from engineering judge-
ment where such data was lacking.
The abort sequence trees are presented by mission phase in Appendix D of this volume.
These trees use five graphical symbols as shown in Figure 5-2.
1. The Oval. Used for initiating events and for intermediate and terminal events
in which a nuclear hazard has not occurred.
2. The Diamond. Used for intermediate and terminal events in which a nuclear
hazard is the direct result or to indicate a nuclear hazard itself (indicated by
a large dot placed next to the diamond).
3. The Circle. Used for terminal events which result in "no discernible hazard"
to the populace.
4. The Triangle. Used for indicating where a sequence is to be continued.
5. The Pentagon. Used for the beginning of a mission phase sequence.
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"Relative probability" is defined as the probability of a particular event to occur given a
defined set of choices; cumulative probability (sometimes referred to as "mission proba-
bility") is the overall probability of a sequence of events occurring (product of relative
probabilities of the individual events along the path) during the mission (starting from
prelaunch). The relative probability of a particular event occurring is placed in the lower
section of the event box. If the relative probability of an event is 1.0, no probability is
shown in the event box. The cumulative probability of a particular sequence of events is
shown to the right of an event box.
Parallel events in the sequence trees are taken as mutually exclusive. Therefore, the sum
of the relative probabilities of parallel events is one. It is assumed event probabilities of
—12
<10 have a negligible effect on risk and hence individual branches of the abort sequence
trees are terminated and deemed "non-credible".
"CUMULATIVE
PROBABILITY
BEGINNING
OF A MISSION
PHASE SEQUENCE
Figure 5-2. Example Tree Structure
5.2 IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
Throughout the mission abort analyses important assumptions have been made where per-
tinent data was not available. In all cases, these assumptions (Table 5-1) were based on
engineering judgement and with the aid of similar analyses and experience obtained from
other nuclear system studies. In general, these assumptions are believed to be conservative.
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Table 5-1. Basic Assumptions Used in
the Accident Analysis
| Reactor Power Histories |
For all cases where the reactor has been operated at power, it is conservatively
assumed that the reactor has been at 330 kWt for 5 years.
Prior to initial reactor startup in orbit, it is assumed that the reactor power
history consists of low power criticality testing (100 watts for 12 days) at the
reactor manufacturer's facility approximately 60 days prior to launch.
Land Impact of Reactor at Low Velocities (Can Occur During Prelaunch and Early In
Launch/Ascent Phase)
I Land Impact of Reactor at Terminal Velocities |
Reactor Survives Impact
• Quasi-steady state critical operation is assumed for worst case. This results
from the burial of a relatively intact reactor which presents a configuration that
is susceptible to water flooding and reflection. This is a conservative assumption
since the reactor may not go critical and it also simplifies the analysis.
• 1 kWt power operation assumed during quasi-steady state for dose rate calculations.
• Reactor assumed to be unshielded for dose rate calculations.
Disassembly and Excursion on Impact
• All fuel elements are ruptured by the impact and excursion.
• Scattered debris distributed over 50 meter radius. This is based on results from
the SNAPTRAN-2 destructive test, which indicated that most of the scattered debris
,was located within 50 meters of the test site (Reference 5-1).
• 100 MW-sec energy release assumed for excursion fission product calculations and
prompt radiation dose rates (see Paragraph 4.2.2) (References 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3).
• Reactor assumed to be unshielded for prompt radiation dose rates.
Disassembly on Impact. No Excursion
• All fuel elements are ruptured by impact.
t Scattered debris is distributed over 50 meter radius.
Radiation Shield Damaged
• Unshielded reactor assumed for dose rate calculations.
Destructive Reactor Excursion
• All fuel elements ruptured by excursion.
• Scattered debris distributed over 50 meter radius.
• 100 MW-sec energy release assumed for excursion fission product calculations
and prompt radiation dose rates.
• Reactor assumed to be unshielded for prompt radiation dose rate calculations.
Non-Destructive Reactor Excursion
• 100 MW-sec energy release conservatively assumed for prompt radiation dose
rate calculations.
• Reactor assumed to be unshielded for prompt radiation dose rate calculations.
This may appear to be an overly conservative assumption, but in most of the
accidents leading to a non-destructive excursion, the radiation shield may be
severely damaged or distorted by impact forces.
Reactor Disassembly
• Reactor disassembly due to impact loads on low velocity land impact assumed
"non-credible".
Water Impact of Reactor at Low Velocities (Can Occur During Prelaunch and Early In!
Launch/Ascent Phase) '
[ Water Impact of Reactor at Terminal Velocities |
Reactor Survives jropact
• Quasi-steady state critical operation is assumed (see Paragraph 3.1.2).
• 1 kWt power operation assumed during quasi-steady state for dose rate calcula-
tions.
• Reactor assumed to be completely submerged and unshielded (i.e., bare core)
for dose rate calculations. Water shielding is assumed.
Disassembly and Excursion on Impact
• All fuel elements are ruptured by impact and excursion
• 100 MW-sec energy release assumed for excursion fission product calculations
(see Paragraph 4.2.2).
Disassembly on Impact, No Excursion
• All fuel elements ruptured by impact.
Deep Ocean Impact
• Reactor impacting in deep ocean (i.e., beyond the continental shelf) assumed
to presenf'No Discernible Hazard" to the populace. This assumption sim-
plifies the accident analysis and appears to be valid in that any possible con-
tamination is located where no fishing is done, hence, the probability of
contaminating the food chain is extremely remote.
Radiation Shield Damaged
• Reactor assumed to be completely submerged and unshielded (i.e., bare core)
for dose rate calculations. Water shielding is assumed.
Destructive Reactor Excursion
• All fuel elements ruptured by excursion.
• 100 MW-sec energy release assumed for excursion fission product calculations
and prompt radiation dose rates.
• Reactor assumed to be completely submerged and unshielded for dose rate
calculations.
Quasi-Steady State Critical Operation
• 1 kWt operation assumed for prompt radiation dose rate calculations.
o Reactor assumed to be completely submerged and unshielded for dose rate
calculations.
Reactor Disassembly
• Reactor disassembly due to impact loads on low velocity water impact assumed
"no n-credible".
Shallow Water Immersion
t Following immersion In deluge waters on launch pad andin shallow waters (~1 meter
depths) near the launch pad, reactor is not assumed to be shielded by water for
dose rate calculations following a water criticality accident.
[orbital Operations and Reactor Disposal]
• Reactor always assumed to be shut down prior to normal separation from the
Space Base for disposal. This appears to be a valid assumption, since mere are
several ways by which the reactor powerplant can be shut down if the normal
reactor shutdown procedure fails (due to frozen control drums, for instance).
Coolant circulation can be reduced by slowing down the coolant pumps, thereby
causing a temperature excursion due to loss of reactor cooling. It Is shown in
[Section 3 that a temperature rise of 355° K from the normal clad temperature
of 940°K can cause the fuel cladding to rupture due to hydrogen dissociation
pressure buildup within the fuel elements. Once the fuel elements are ruptured
and the hydrogen forced out, the reactor will shut itself down. This is a method
of an "abnormal" or "emergency" reactor powerplant shutdown.
• If an emergency situation arises during the Orbital Operations Phase, necessitating
a rapid, emergency reactor powerplant shutdown, it Is assumed that because no
fission product decay heat removal system is present in the Reference ZrH Reactor
system, the fuel cladding will be ruptured due to the decay heat, and fission product
gases and hydrogen moderator will be released to the primary coolant (see
Section 3).
• If fuel cladding is ruptured by hydrogen dissociation pressure buildup within the
fuel elements, the gaseous fission products are assumed to be released to the
primary coolant while the solid fission products remain In the fuel elements.
• It is assumed that a critical configuration cannot be formed by core meltdown
compaction. (See Section 3.)
• If the reactor power module is damaged during the Orbital Operations Phase, early
disposal will be attempted unless the damage can be repaired and normal operation
continued. However, if the accident causing the damage is so catastrophic that
it necessitates abandoning the base, repair is not attempted and disposal of the
damaged PM proceeds.
• During reactor disposal, it Is assumed that repair of a faulty disposal package
'component is always attempted prior to firing of the rockets for the transfer
burn. If an abnormal situation arises subsequent to the transfer burn, repair
is assumed to be "non-credible".
• If one rocket falls to ignite for the transfer burn, It Is assumed that no capability
exists for immediately firing a backup rocket In an attempt to achieve the required
AV for transfer. This assumption is conservative and It also simplifies the analysis.
[Reentry of Shutdown Reactor]
I
• Due to the uncertainties surrounding the performance of the LiH reentry shield,
jthe probability of reactor survival during reentry is assumed to be 50 percent
regardless of the type of reentry (i. e., orbital decay or Immediate) or the state
'{or condition) of the primary reactor system and shield (see Paragraph 3.4.1).
• If the LiH shield falls during reentry, complete reactor disassembly is assumed,
releasing all the fuel elements to the reentry environments. The following proba-
bilities are assumed for fuel element ablation:
All fuel elements ablate
(Total fission product release)
None of the fuel elements ablate
(No fission product release)
Some (50/50) of the fuel elements ablate
(Partial fission product release)
0.01
0.01
0.98
|Prelaunch and Launch/Ascent]
• During the Prelaunch and Launch/Ascent Phases, it is assumed that an accidental
reactor criticality event due to an Inadvertent reactor startup signal or a reactor
control system malfunction Is "non-credible". This should be a valid assumption
since the computer that controls the startup, shutdown, and normal operation of
the reactors during the orbital mission is launched prior to the PM, and at the time
of PM launching, the computer Is onboard the Space Base In orbit. Therefore, an
electrical failure or human error onboard the Space Base causing the computer
to initiate the reactor startup sequence and successful trans ml ttance of a signal
to the reactor is not considered credible. Similarly, an Inadvertent reactor
startup signal occurring during the launch vehicle payload Integration and testing
subphase of prelaunch is assumed non-credible, since the reactor startup signal
is very complex compared to the normal electrical continuity and functional checks
that are conducted as part of the integration and testing.
If the reactor is disassembled by a non-nuclear explosion and fire or some
other equally catastrophic accident, all fuel elements are assumed to be ruptured.
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As a means of characterizing the probabilities for the various failures and accidents the
definitions shown in Figure 5-3 are used. This classification guide defines the range of
probabilities covered by each probability class or group.
5.3 MISSION ACCIDENTS AND PROBABILITIES
The postulated mission accidents involving the reactor power module and their probabilities
of occurrence are presented in this section. A definition of the mission phases with the
estimated abort probability for each segment of the mission is presented in Table 5-2. The
postulated mission accidents derived from a system fault analysis are identified for each
mission phase in Table 5-3. As a consequence, each of these accidents affect the operation
of the nuclear system. The manner in which the reactor responds to the accident, the
resultant hazard source, and the areas potentially affected are shown in Table 5-4.
1.0
A total phase abort probability has been determined for each phase of the reference mission.
This probability together with the cumulative mission probability of successfully reaching
a particular phase of the mission are very
significant. The sum of the individual
cumulative abort probabilities for a parti-
cular mission phase must add up to the
total phase abort probability multiplied by
the cumulative mission probability of
successfully reaching that phase.
During the following discussion of the possible
mission accidents, reference to the abort
sequence trees will be useful in clarifying
the significance of the individual probabili-
ties selected.
Tables summarizing the mission accidents
and their respective probabilities as de-
termined from the abort sequence trees
may be found in Paragraph 5. 3. 5.
IMPOSSIBLE
Figure 5-3. Classification of Accident and
Failure Probabilities
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Table 5-4. Nuclear Hazards and Contaminated Areas
Hazard Situation
Failure Event
Launch vehicle
Explosion and
Fire
Liquid Metal
Fire
Reactor Impacts
on Land, at
Low Velocity
Reactor Impacts
on Water, at
l>ow Velocity
Reactor Dis-
assembly in
Orbit
Excessive
Reentry
Heating
Land Impact of
Reactor at
Terminal
Velocities
Water Impact of
Reactor at
Terminal
Velocities
Reactor Response
Reactor Disassembly
Ruptured Fuel Elements
and Primary System
Damaged Radiation
Shield
Ruptured Fuel Elements
and Primary System
Damaged Radiation
Shield
Nondestructive
Excursion on Impact
Destructive Excursion
on Impact
Impact, Damaged
Radiation Shield
Quasi Steady--Siate
Critical Operation
Destructive Excursion
on Impact
No Excursion on
Impact, Damaged
Radiation Shield
Ruptured Fut ' l Kk'mcnts
Released In Orbit
Failure of Heat Shield,
Melting of He-actor,
Release of Individual
Fuel Elements
Survives Intact, Quasi-
Steady State Critical
Operation
Disassembly on Impact,
No Excursion
Disassembly and
Excursion on Impact
Survives Intact, Quasi-
Steady State Critical
Operation
Disassembly on Impact,
No Excursion
Disassembly and
Excursion on Impact
Radiation Hazard Source
• Airborne Fission Products
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Contaminated Edible Marine
Life
• Airborne Fission Products
• Reactor Gamma Radiation
• Reactor Gamma Radiation
• Airborne Fission Products
• Reactor Gamma Radiation
• Reactor Gamma Radiation
• Prompt Radiation from
Excursion
• Reactor Gamma Radiation
• Prompt Radiation from
Excursion
• Airborne Fission Products
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Reactor Gamma Radiation
• Continuous Prompt Radiation
• Prompt Radiation from
Excursion
• Airborne Fission Products
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Contaminated Edible Marine
Life
• Reactor Gamma Radiation
• Airborne Fission Products
(High Altitude)
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Contaminated Food Crops
• Airborne Fission Products
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Contaminated Food Crops
• Continuous Prompt
Radiation
• Airborne Fission Products
• Contaminated Crops
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Prompt Radiation from
Reactor Excursion
• Airborne Fission Products
• Contaminated Crops
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Continuous Prompt
Radiation
• Airborne Fission Products
• Contaminated Drinking Water
• Contaminated Edible Marine
Life
• Scattered Activated Debris
• Prompt Radiation from
Reactor Excursion
• Airborne Fission Products
• Contaminated Drinking Water
• Contaminated Edible Marine
Life
• Scattered Activated Debris
Mission Phases
Pre-
Launch
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
--
"
—
"
"
—
--
-
Launch an
Launch
KSC
KSC
KSC
-
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC
"
-
—
"
"
—
"
"
S-1C Boost
KSC,
Continental
Shelf
KSC.
Continental
Shelf
KSC
-
KSC
KSC
KSC
KSC,
Continental
Shelf
KSC,
Continental
Shelf
KSC,
Continental
Shelf
-
-
—
-
"
"Deep Ocean,
No Discern-
ible Hazard
Deep (X;ean,
No Discern-
ible Hazard
Deep Ocean,
No Discern-
ible Hazard
Ascent
S-II Boost
-
Eurasia,
W
Eurasia,
»'
-
-
—
"
-
-
-
-
-
Eurasia,
\V
Eurasia,
W
Eurasia.
W
Eurasia,
W
Eurasia,
W
Eurasia,
W
Docking
-
--'
--
—
—
—
-
-:
-
-
\v
W
W
«
\v
W
W
Orbital
Operations
--
--
Reactor
Disposal
-
-
W " Worldwide.
+ 550 latitude _
—
--
--
\v
vv
W
\v
W
W
W .
W
—
"
"
"
"
\v
W
\v
\v
W
W
W
\v
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5.3.1 PRELAUNCH (Abort Sequence Trees, Volume HI, Part 2A, Figures D-l
and D-2)
The Prelaunch Phase begins with the installation of the two ZrH reference reactor power
modules on the launch vehicle (INT-21) and ends with ignition of the S-IC booster engines
at launch. Figure 5-4 shows the various stages (subphases) involved in prelaunch and the
accidents that are considered. The accident analysis presented in this study does not con-
cern itself with the ground handling and storage portion of prelaunch; however, Figure 5-5
shows typical accidents that can occur during this subphase. No further reference to this
portion of prelaunch will be made.
-3The total abort probability defined for the Prelaunch Phase is 7 x 10 . This includes a
-3 —3LV abort probability of 6 x 10 and a non-related LV abort probability of 10 (see Figure
5-6). The LV abort probabilities were obtained from the SNAP-27 accident analyses which
assumed a Saturn V launch vehicle (Reference 5-4). Since the INT-21 is a modified Saturn
V vehicle, the Saturn V launch vehicle abort probabilities are assumed to remain valid.
The "non-related1' LV abort is defined as an abort which results from an accident which
directly affects the nuclear power system and is not caused by a LV failure. Due to the
—3
absence of relevant data, this abort probability (10 ) is an estimate based on engineering
judgement. The nuclear hazards which can result from the LV and non-related LV aborts
during prelaunch are discussed below.
5.3.1.1 Reactor Dropped During Installation Atop Launch Vehicle
The ZrH reactor power modules are mated to the INT-21 launch vehicle in the Vehicle
Assembly Building (VAB) a minimum of 27 days prior to launch. During this process it is
possible that a crane operator error, technician error, or crane malfunction can result in
the reactor being dropped (110 meters) to the floor of the VAB. The probability of this
-4
accident occurring is estimated to be 2. 5 x 10 ; possible failure modes are shown in
Figure 5-7. Although impact velocities for this accident are relatively low, it is con-
servatively assumed that one percent of the impacts cause rotation of some of the control
drums towards their most reactive position, resulting in a nuclear excursion. This assump-
tion is made because of the absence of control drum lock-out devices in the present design.
5-11
MATING OF THE REACTOR
POWER MODULE TO THE
INT-21
TRANSPORT OF THE
REACTOR/LV ASSEMBLY
TO THE LAUNCH PAD
• REACTOR DROPPED WHILE • TIP OVER OF THE
BEING MATED TO THE LV REACTOR/LV
FUELING OF THE
LV & COUNTDOWN
• LV EXPLOSION
AND FIRE
• LIQUID METAL FIRE • LIQUID METAL FIRE • LIQUID METAL
FIRE
Figure 5-4. Potential Accidents During Prelaunch
REMOVAL FROM
CARRIER AT KSC
TRANSPORT TO NUCLEAR
ASSEMBLY BUILDING STORAGE
• REACTOR DROPPED
TRANSPORT TO VERTICAL
ASSEMBLY BUILDING (VAB)
• ACCIDENTAL COLLISION
« LIQUID METAL FIRE
• ACCIDENTAL COLLISION
ASSEMBLY IN
LAUNCH ADAPTER
• REACTOR DROPPED
• LIQUID METAL FIRE
• EXPLOSION
• LIQUID METAL
FIRE
Figure 5-5. Potential Accidents During Ground Handling and Storage at KSC
A more likely (98%) result of a low velocity impact is damage to the gamma shield which
can present a hazard during the accident clean-up operations. The gamma ray source at
this time, however, is limited to that induced by low power criticality testing — 100 watts
for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch.
A one percent probability is estimated for the reactor being completely undamaged following
the low velocity impact.
Note that for this accident, reactor disassembly due to impact and an excursion due to core
compaction are considered non-credible.
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EXPLOSION
AND
FIRE
PRELAUNCH
ABORT ^^\
WHICH DOESN'T \
LEAD TO EXPLOSION ]
AND FIRE J
INADVERTENT
STARTUP
SIGNAL
CRITICALITY
REACTOR ^\
DROPPED WHILE \
BEING MATED )
TO LV J
NON-RELATED
LV ABORT
TIP OVER
OF RE ACT OR/LV
DURING TRANSPORT
TO LAUNCH PAD
LIQUID
METAL
FIRE
Figure 5-6. Accident Probabilities During Prelaunch
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DISASSEMBLY
ON IMPACT,
NO EXCURSION
DESTRUCTIVE
'REACTOR EXCURSION.
CONTROL DRUM
MOTION
NON-
DESTRUCTIVE
REACTOR EXCURSION,
CONTROL DRUM
MfYTinN
REACTOR/
SHIELD
UNDAMAGED
REACTOR
EXCURSION,
CORE COMPACTION
» NO DISCERNIBLE HAZARD
Figure 5-7. Reactor Response Probabilities for Land Impact at Low Velocities
5.3.1.2 Tip-Over of the Reactor/LV During Transport to Launch Pad
Several days prior to launch, the INT-21, complete with reactor power modules", is transported
to Launch Complex 39 via the Mobile Launcher (ML) Crawler. During this transportation
-4phase, a nuclear hazard can arise if the crawler transporter falls (2 .5x10 ). Since the
crawlerway passes over a small body of water (West Creek), and because the Banana Creek
approaches within almost 120 meters of the crawlerway over the last half of the distance
between the VAB and the launch pad, a water criticality accident appears to be possible
— fi(2.2 x 10 ). The impact forces will probably be high enough to rupture the primary NaK
loop, resulting in water flooding the core. However, most likely the reactor will fall to the
ground surface (assumed 99 percent of the time). If the reactor falls in water (one percent),
the relative probabilities of the failure modes are shown in Figure 5-8. The failure modes
for impact on land are the same as those discussed in the previous section.
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5.3.1.3 Explosion and Fire
Fueling of the INT-21 is initiated approximately 16 hours prior to launch. During this
period, up to T-l hours, conditions are most favorable for a launch pad booster explosion
and fire. No abort hardware is presently defined for ejection of the reactor power module,
Based on the SNAP-27 accident analyses, the probability for a launch vehicle explosion and
-4fire during prelaunch is 6. 6 x 10 . The possible consequences of a launch pad explosion and
fire are shown in Figure 5-9; accident models are contained in the appendix.
Over moderation of the core must be considered a possibility since the reactor may fall
in the flume while the emergency water deluge system is operating. The presence of hydrog-
enous liquid propellants is another possible reactivity source. As mentioned in previous
sections, control drum motion resulting in criticality accidents is another event to be con-
sidered for this type of accident.
In addition, fragmentation and/or the fireball following the launch vehicle explosion may
disassemble the reactor core, releasing fission products and scattered debris in the launch
pad area.
The most probable (94 percent) consequence of the explosion and fire is simply damage to the
radiation shield with little or no damage to the reactor system itself.
5.3.1.4 Liquid Metal Fire
The reference ZrH reactor uses NaK as the coolant in the primary loop, intermediate loop,
and the primary heat rejection loop. Since NaK undergoes a highly exothermic reaction when
brought in contact with oxygen, a manufacturing defect in the piping, a weld failure, or a
breach in the piping resulting from a handling accident can result in a liquid metal fire during
-4
any phase of prelaunch. The probability of this occurring is estimated to be 5 x 10 . As
a result of this fire, the most probable (80 percent) damage will be to the neutron shield
surrounding the core. Although protected by a stainless steel clad, sufficiently high tem-
peratures could result in rupture of the casing. If the fire reaches the internal areas of the
reactor, damage to the fuel element cladding is also possible. In this instance, small
amounts of fission products may be released to the immediate area.
5-15
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The relative probabilities of these reactor responses is shown in Figure 5-10. (The proba-
bility of a liquid metal fire would be significantly reduced if a non-liquid metal intermediate
loop and/or heat rejection loop were to be used.)
* * * * *
Because of the small fission product inventory generated during low power acceptance test
operation, the only nuclear hazard of any real significance during prelaunch (and launch/
ascent) is that which results from an inadvertent reactor criticality. This can occur during
prelaunch as a result of:
1. Inadvertent control drum rotation (1.2 x 10 )
2. Immersion in hydrogenous medium (2.2 x 10 ).
-3However, the most probable (1. 5 x 10 ) reactor response to a prelaunch accident at KSC
is a damaged reactor radiation shield, resulting in a radiation field around the reactor
caused by gamma radiation from fission product decay.
FUEL CLADDING
BREACHED, PRIMARY
SYSTEM RUPTURED
LIQUID
METAL
FIRE
RADIATION
SHIELD
DAMAGED
REACTOR/
SHIELD
UNDAMAGED • NO DISCERNIBLEHAZARD
Figure 10. Liquid Metal Fire
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5.3.2 LAUNCH/ASCENT
The Launch/Ascent Phase begins with igni-
tion of the S-IC booster engines and termi-
nates with the successful docking of the
power module to the Space Base. Figure
5-11 shows the ground trace of the INT-21
launch trajectory for the reference 55 de-
gree, 500 km circular orbit. The total
abort probability for this phase is estimated
_2
to be 6. 89 x 10 (based on the SNAP-27
accident analyses).
Four distinct subphases appear in the Launch/
Ascent Phase:
1. Launch
2. S-IC boost
3. S-H boost
4. Rendezvous and docking.
Figure 5-11. INT-21 Launch Trajectory
Ground Trace (55°, 500 km
Circular Orbit)
The definition of these subphases has been presented in Table 5-2. Figure 5-12 summarizes
the potential launch/ascent aborts identified in the accident analysis. The following paragraphs
discuss the key mission accidents that may occur during launch/ascent, the reactor responses
to the accidents, and the overall mission abort probabilities.
5.3.2.1 Launch. -9 to 0 Sec (Abort Sequence Trees, Volume III. Part 2A, Figure D-3)
The Launch Phase begins with ignition of the S-IC booster engines and ends at liftoff, nine
_3
seconds later. The overall launch abort probability is 1. 62 x 10 and is the sum of two
-4
events: launch vehicle explosion and fire (2. 2 x 10 ) and other types of aborts prior to lift-off
5-18
_(1.4 x 10 ). A nuclear accident is considered to be non-credible with the latter type of
.abort. The response of the nuclear system to the environments caused by an S-IC/S-II ex-
plosion is considered to be identical to that discussed in Paragraph 5.3.1. 3.
LAUNCH
(-9st SO SEC)
S-IC BOOST
( O s t 4160 SEC)
s-n BOOST
(160 st s 550 SEC)
RENDEZVOUS AND
DOCKING
(550* t~ ± 15. 000 SEC)
• s-ic/s-n EXPLOSION
• INADVERTENT COMMAND
DESTRUCT
• LV STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
• S-lC/S-n EXPLOSION
• COMMAND DESTRUCT
• PREMATURE S-IC THRUST
TERMINATION
• GUIDANCE & CONTROL
FAILURE
• LV STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
• S-IC/S-II SEPARATION
FAILURE
• S-n EXPLOSION
• COMMAND DESTRUCT
• PREMATURE S-H
THRUST TERMINATION
• FAILURE TO START
S-H ENGINE
• GUIDANCE fc CONTROL
FAILURE
• LV STRUCTURAL FAILURE
• ACCIDENTAL COLLISION
WHILE ATTEMPTING '
TO DOCK
• FAILURE TO DOCK WITH
SPACE BASE
• FAILURE TO REMOVE
THERMAL SHROUD
• FAILURE TO RENDEZ-
VOUS WITH SPACE BASE
Figure 5-12. Potential Accidents During Launch/Ascent
5.3.2.2 S-IC Boost. 0 to 160 Sec (Abort Sequence Trees. Volume III. Part 2A, Figures D-4
and D-5)
The S-IC Boost Phase starts with the initial motion of the launch vehicle at liftoff and termi-
nates at separation of the S-IC and S-II stages at an altitude of 92 km and 83 km downrange
from KSC. The total abort probability during this phase is:
Explosion and fire
Other
3. 7 x 10-3
2.26 x 10-2
Total abort probability 2. 63 x 10-2
5-19
During the first 40 seconds of S-IC burn following liftoff, all impacts resulting from aborts
will be on the launch site. After this time, all abort impacts will be in the ocean. Assuming
a linear variation in probability, the probability of abort during the first 40 seconds is:
P. (explosion and fire) = 3. 7 x 10~ x (TTT) = 9.3 x 10~
P4Q (other) = 2. 26 x 10~2 x(~) = 5. 65 x 10~3
where 160 seconds is the S-IC total burn time from liftoff. If an abort occurs during the first
40 seconds of flight, it is assumed that the ratio of KSC land impact to KSC water impact is
30/70. The accident analysis assumes that during the remaining 120 seconds of S-IC burn
time when all abort impacts will be in the ocean, 25 percent of the impacts will occur on
the U.S. continental shelf and may cause contamination of fishing waters. Figure 5-13 shows
the S-IC booster vacuum impact points down range from KSC. Note that the spent S-IC booster
stage impacts in the ocean at about 74 degrees longitude.
The aborts considered during the S-IC Boost
Phase are shown in Figure 5-12 and are
divided into two main categories: explosion
and fire (at altitude) and no explosion and
fire (at altitude). It is assumed that an ex-
plosion and fire during the S-IC Boost Phase
involves both the S-IC and the S-II fuel tanks.
The potentially hazardous consequences and
their relative probabilities are as follows:
Explosion and Fire at Altitude (0.14)
0 Reactor remains intact (0. 99)
• Reactor Disassembles (0.01)
LONGITUDE-DEGREES
77 76 75 74
S-IC IMPACT CONTAINMENT AREA
S-II INTERSTAGE IMPACT CONTAINMENT
» ' AREA
V 29°
No Explosion and Fire at Altitude (0. 86)
• Reactor remains intact (1.0) Figure 5-13. INT-21 Down Range Impact Points
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If the reactor remains intact, the following possibilities and associated probabilities are:
• KSC land impact of reactor 0. 08
• KSC water impact of reactor 0.17
• Reactor impacts on U. S. continental shelf 0.19
• Reactor impacts in deep ocean 0. 56
V
The impact forces resulting from land or water impact early in the S-IC Boost Phase are not
considered high enough to cause a reactor disassembly or core compaction. Therefore, the
possible reactor responses are similar to those of low velocity land and water impacts shown
in Figures 5-14 and 5-15, respectively. Deep ocean impacts that occur during approximately
the last half of the S-IC boost are assumed to be at terminal velocities, and the resulting re-
actor responses will be discussed in later sections.
REACTOR
DISASSEMBLY
DESTRUCTIVE
EACTOR EXCURSION
CONTROL DRUM
MOTION
• LV EXPLOSION AND
FIRE ON IMPACT
LAND IMPACT
OF
REACTOR/LV
NON-DESTRUCTIVE
REACTOR EXCURSION
CONTROL DRUM
MOTION
RADIATION
SHIELD
DAMAGED
NO
DAMAGE TO
RADIATION
SHIELD
Figure 5-14. Reactor Response Probabilities for Land Impact of Reactor/Launch Vehicle
*
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REACTOR
DISASSEMBLY
DESTRUCTIVE
REACTOR EXCURSION
OVER
MODERATION
• LV EXPLOSION AND
FIRE ON IMPACT
WATER IMPACT
OF
REACTOR/LV
QUASI-STEADY
STATE CRITICAL
OPERATION, OVER
MODERATION
RADIATION
SHIELD
DAMAGED
NO
DAMAGE TO
RADIATION
SHIELD
Figure 5-15. Reactor Response Probabilities for Water Impact of Reactor/Launch Vehicle
It should be emphasized that during the S-IC Boost Phase. >99 percent of the launch vehicle
aborts lead to either a land or water impact of an intact reactor, of which 56 percent lead to
a deep ocean impact which is assumed to represent no discernible hazard to the populace.
Therefore, it is expected that during this phase of the mission less than one percent of the
aborts will lead to reactor disassembly. Disassembly will cause the release of fission pro-
ducts and activated debris (fuel elements and core structure) over the accident area. The
following probabilities of contamination are accorded each area:
KSC
• U.S. continental shelf
• Deep ocean
0.25
0.19
0.56
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Depending on when the abort occurs during S-IC boost, the release altitudes for the fission
product gases are assumed to be:
• 0 to 40 sec - - - - - - - 1 km
• 40 to 70 sec - - - - - - - 5 km
• 70 to 160 sec - - - - - - - 40 km
5.3.2.3 S-II Boost. 160 to 550 Sec (Abort Sequence Trees, Volume III, Part 2A. Figures
D-6 and D-7)
The S-II Boost Phase begins with ignition of the S-II engines and terminates at insertion into
the Reference 55 degree, 500 km circular orbit. The total abort probability for this phase
is 0. 03 (Reference 5-4).
The S-II Boost Phase is of significance during this phase of launch/ascent, prior to orbit
insertion, since the ZNT-21's launch trajectory ground trace passes over the Eurasian land
mass (see Figure 5-11). An abort during this phase can result in the reactor payload im-
pacting in Europe or the Middle East. Since both the total S-II burn time (~ 390 sec) and the
Eurasian overfly time (~32 sec) are known, the probability of land impact in Eurasia can
readily be determined. Similarly, the probability of deep ocean impact can be obtained.
Thus, the abort impacts can be subdivided as follows:
• Deep ocean impact (Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean) 0. 89
• Land impact (Eurasia) 0. 08
e Impact in Waters Containing Edible Marine Life 0. 03
(European Continental Shelf, Adriatic Sea, Aegean
Sea, Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Sea; lakes, rivers,
streams, etc. in Eurasia)
-5
o Reservoir Impact (Eurasia) 8 x 10
5-23
The relative probability of reservoir impact
is obtained by the following assumption:
P = P
reservoir land x 10
-3
impact impact
Figure 5-16 shows the possible abort impact
points in Eurasia. An analysis in Reference
5-5 shows that the Instantaneous Impact
Points (HP's) for a SKYLAB launch are very
similar to the ENT-21 case of Figure 5-16;
therefore, it is assumed that the residence
time over each country, as given in Ref-
erence 5-5, applies to the INT-21 launch.
The countries in which impacts can result
from S-II stage aborts and the probabilities
of impact are as follows: Figure 5-16. S-II Stage HP's in Eurasia
France
Italy
Albania
Greece
Israel
Jordan
Saudi Arabia
Aden
tE
(sec)
505
520
526.5
527.8
530. 1
530.8
531.8
536.6
Residence Time
(sec)
15.0
6.5
1.3
2.3
0.7
1.0
4.8
0.4
P
-21. 18 x 10
1.21x 10~2
1.22 x 10~2
1.23 x 10~2
1. 28 x 10~2
1.29x 10~2
1. 30 x 10~2
1. 31 x 10~2
In the chart, t is the mission abort time at which the IIP just begins to enter the country
SLi
shown.
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The residence time is the time interval over which the abort times yield impacts in the indi-
cated countries, and the parameter P is the average probability of an abort which will yield
an impact in the indicated country. The probabilities shown for impact in the individual
countries are not used in the accident analysis, but are shown merely for interest and for
possible reference in further studies.
The aborts considered during the S-II Boost Phase are listed in Figure 5-12 and are catego-
rized as either explosion and fire at altitude (0. 08) or no explosion and fire at altitude (0. 92).
The analysis assumes that the only possible consequence of an S-II explosion in flight is that
the reactor may be damaged (ruptured primary system and/or damaged radiation shield), but
remains intact. It is assumed that disassembly of the reactor will not occur. This is based
on a combination of (1) high altitude flight, where the thin atmosphere does not propagate
shock and blast waves as well as in the lower atmosphere, and (2) a relatively smaller explo-
sion as compared to a combined S-IC/S-II fuel tank explosion which is possible during the
S-IC Boost Phase.
Therefore, all aborts that occur during the S-II Boost Phase result in the reentry of a shut-
down reactor. It is assumed that during this boost phase, the reentry conditions are such
that the reactor will survive reentry and experience either a land or water impact at terminal
velocities. The corresponding reactor response probabilities are shown in Figures 5-17 and
5-18, and are summarized in Table 5-5.
Quite probably, the reactor will be totally disassembled by the high energy loads generated
by earth impact at terminal velocities. This will probably involve separation of the control
drums from the reactor at impact and massive destruction of the core vessel and associated
components; debris will be scattered about the point of impact.
In the present design, drum rotation on impact at terminal velocities is considered possible.
Therefore, a one percent probability of an excursion due a combination drum rotation/com-
paction situation has been assumed. A 10 percent probability of an excursion due to over
moderation has been assigned to a water impact. A small probability is given, however, to
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the reactor remaining intact following earth impact. If this occurs, it is assumed as a
worst case that the reactor will undergo quasi-steady state critical operation. In the case
of water impact and subsequent immersion, the quasi-steady operation is caused by water
surging in and out of the reactor core. Following land impact, it is assumed that the re-
actor may periodically be immersed in water which floods the core, resulting in quasi-steady
state critical operation. This is a conservative assumption, since the radiation hazard
associated with quasi-steady state operation is greater than that caused by a distorted bare
core partially burled in the ground.
Table 5-5. Summary of Key Relative Occurrence Probabilities
for Reactor Surviving Reentry
Reactor Remains Intact on Impact
• Non-destructive excursion
• Destructive excursion
• No excursion
• Quasi-steady state critical
Disassembly and Excursion on Impact
• Core compaction and drum rotation
• Water immersion
Disassembly and No Excursion on Impact
Land
Impact
(27)
(1)
0
0
0
1
(1)
1
0
98
Water
Impact
(73)
(10)
0
0
0
10
(10)
0
10
80
(Probabilities Given in %)
It is believed that the large majority of terminal velocity impacts will result in disassembly
of the reactor without an excursion.
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5.3.2.4 Rendezvous and Docking. 550 to ~ 15. OOP Sec (Abort Sequence Trees. Volume III,
Part 2A. Figures D-8. D-9 and D-10)
The Rendezvous and Docking Phase starts with successful insertion of the nuclear payload
into the reference 55 degree, 500 km circular orbit and terminates with successful docking
of the PM with the Space Base. The abort probability for this phase is conservatively as-
-2
sumed to be 1 x 10 .
The accidents considered during the Rendezvous and Docking Phase and their assumed acci-
dent probabilities are:
• Accidental collision while attempting to dock 2. 5 x 10
_3
• Failure to dock with Space Base 2. 5 x 10
• Failure to remove thermal shroud 2. 5 x 10
• Failure to rendezvous with Space Base 2. 5 x 10
The analysis assumes that the S-II stage inserts the nuclear payload directly into the refer-
ence 55 degree, 500 km circular orbit. Once in the reference orbit, the rendezvous and
docking of the PM is performed by a space tug or by the S-II/IU kick stage. A guidance and
control failure or a propulsion failure during this phase might prevent successful rendezvous
of the PM with the Space Base.
Upon successful Space Base rendezvous, the thermal shroud that encloses the reactor PM
and provides thermal protection during ascent, must be jettisoned. If for some reason,
successful removal of the thermal shroud cannot be accomplished, the reactor PM will
not be able to dock with the Space Base. Removal of the thermal shroud, however, is a
relatively simple operation utilizing pyrotechnics and explosive bolts to rupture the seams
on the shroud and jettison it away from the PM. Thus, failure to remove the thermal shroud
is accounted for in the accident analysis although it should be accomplished with relative
ease.
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Maximum docking velocity requirements specified by NAR indicate a closing velocity at the
Space Base/PM interface of 1. 5 m/sec (Reference 5-6). If this closing velocity is too fast
or if an inadvertant collision occurs during the docking sequence, it is assumed that irrep-
arable damage to the PM is possible. This damage would be in the form of a damaged
radiation shield or damaged PM components; the probability of which damage occurs being
50/50.
There is also a possibility that a mechanical or electrical failure may prevent a successful
docking of the PM with the Space Base.
For the purposes of the analysis, it is assumed that if any of the accidents just discussed do
occur, the PM will encounter "premature reentry" (any reentry of the reactor from Earth
orbit with orbital lifetime less than the planned 1167 year decay time of the 990 km disposal
orbit). Since the reactor has not been operated at power (330 kWt), the small inventory of
fission products generated during the acceptance testing should present a relatively minor
terrestrial hazard when the reactor reenters following orbital decay or recovery by the Space
Shuttle. Therefore, it is conservatively assumed that all of the accidents considered in the
Rendezvous and Docking Phase lead to a premature random reentry of a shutdown reactor
from the reference 500 km circular orbit, whereas in actuality Shuttle disposal or boost to
a higher earth orbit would be planned. Based on the satellite lifetime model discussed in the
RDD, a five year orbital decay time is assumed.
Given a random reentry, the probability breakdown between land and water impact of an in-
tact reactor (or debris) is assumed to be:
• Land impact 0.27
• Deep ocean impact 0.70
• Impact in waters containing edible 0. 03
marine life (continental shelf, lakes,
rivers, streams, etc.)
-4
• Reservoir impact 2.7 x 10
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The probabilities shown are based on data in References 5-7 and 5-8. The probability of
-3 -4
reservoir impact is assumed to be P :x 10 ( = 2 . 7 x 1 0 ).
The reactor reentry analysis indicates that the performance of the lithium hydride (LiH) re-
entry shield is in question. For this reason, a high failure rate of 50 percent is assumed for
the reentry of a reactor/shield. The fact that the shield may be damaged prior to reentry is
assumed not to affect this probability.
The reactor response probabilities following a land or water impact of an intact reactor at
terminal velocities were discussed in the preceding section and are shown in Figure 5-17 and
5-18, respectively.
In those cases where it is predicted that the LiH shield fails during reentry, it is assumed
that all the fuel elements are released from the core and are exposed directly to the reentry
environments. Of importance is the number of fuel elements that ablate, and the altitude at
which the ablation occurs. During this portion of the mission, prior to initial reactor startup
in orbit, it is assumed that either all of the fuel elements completely ablate and release the
total fission product inventory at altitude, or none ablate. Whether all or none of the fuel
elements ablate is assumed to be 50/50. If the fuel elements ablate, it is anticipated that a
high altitude (> 40 km) release of fission products will spread airborne contamination over the
hemisphere in which the release occurs. Based on the reentry analyses, it is assumed that
a high altitude release occurs 25 percent of the time, while a low altitude (< 40 km) release
is assigned a 75 percent relative probability of occurring.
If none of the fuel elements ablate during reentry, their random distribution on land or in
water presents a nuclear hazard to the populace. Once an individual fuel element impacts
land, the analysis assumes a 50/50 chance of being buried and covered with soil. If buried
on impact, a 10 percent probability is assumed for the fuel element to become uncovered at
some later time resulting in a direct exposure hazard. If the fuel element remains buried,
it is assumed to present no discernible terrestrial hazard.
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If the fuel element is not buried following earth impact, the analysis assumes that the forces
generated by the high velocity impact rupture the fuel element, releasing fission products to
the environment. Thus, the resultant nuclear hazard involves possible fission product con-
tamination and direct radiation exposure to a bare fuel element.
The analysis treats water impact of individual fuel elements in a manner similar to land im-
pact with no fuel element burial. The resultant hazard arises from the fission products re-
leased on impact and from direct human exposure to scattered fuel elements in shallow waters.
The preceding discussion of the reactor failing to survive reentry is summarized in Figure
5-19.
* * * * *
The only significant nuclear hazard during the Launch/Ascent Phase of the mission is that
resulting from an inadvertent reactor criticality. This can occur as a result of:
1. Inadvertent control drum rotation (2. 3 x 10 )
_3
2. Reactor immersion in hydrogenous medium (8. 6 x 10 )
3. Core compaction/control drum rotation following land impact at terminal
velocities (3. 6 x 10~5)
_2
The most credible (2. 7 x 1 0 ) mission accident that can occur during the Launch/Ascent
Phase is estimated to be an INT-21 S-II stage abort with no explosion and fire at altitude.
Abortive land impacts of an intact reactor in Eurasia are considered possible during the S-II
Boost Phase. The cumulative mission probability for a Eurasian impact is estimated to be
2.3x 10~3.
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5. 3. 3 ORBITAL OPERATIONS (Abort Sequence Trees, Volume III, Part 2A, Figures D-ll
through D-49)
The Orbital Operations Phase begins with initial startup of the reactor and terminates just
prior to End of Life (EOL) reactor shutdown, after five years of power operation. Based on
—2previous studies, a total abort probability of 5 x 10 is assumed for this phase (Reference
5.9).
The accidents considered and their assumed relative occurrence probabilities are shown in
Figure 5-20. All of the accidents postulated during orbital operations result either in a
I successful disposal and eventual reentry of the reactor, a premature reentry, or total dis-
assembly in orbit of a reactor. With the exception of a reactor start-up failure, all cases
I assume reactor operation for five years at 330 kWt. Figure 5-21 qualitatively shows the
possible sequence of events resulting from an in-orbit abort.
\
A discussion of the potential accidents identified during the Orbital Operations Phase and the
k
 possible consequences of each is provided in the following paragraphs.
I
[' 5. 3. 3.1 In-Orbit Accidents
i 5.3.3.1.1 Accidental Collision
Five basic sources of accidental collision with the PM and/or Space Base have been identified:
i
I
1. Orbital debris
i
, 2. Logistic vehicles
3. Detached modules
I
4. Meteors
I
5. Spent or damaged PM during disposal (misaligned thrust vector during transfer
burn).
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The probability of accidental collision depends primarily on (1) spacecraft size, (2) mission
duration, and (3) the number (or density) of objects in the vicinity of the spacecraft orbit.
Statistical predictions (Reference 5-10) indicate that for each 100 missions of ten years
duration in a 55 degree/500 km circular orbit, a Space Base can expect to experience two
or possibly more collisions with other objects in orbit (orbital debris).
An accidental collision with a logistic vehicle can result from the activities during the re-
supply period, as well as during the reactor replacement operations.
A collision with a detached module is possible if the module is operating near the base. Such
a collision can arise as a result of a guidance and control failure during flight or while
attempting to dock.
Meteoroids represent a constant source of potential collisions. It is assumed that meteor
damage is limited to radiator, piping, and shield punctures (Paragraph 3.3.1. 3). If not
reparable, early reactor disposal is initiated.
A final source of collisions involves a PM that is either spent or damaged and is being dis-
posed of. If an undetected guidance and control failure misaligns the PM for the orbit trans-
fer burn, a collision with the Space Base can result.
_3
Based on best engineering estimates from available data, a relative probability of 2. 5 x 10
is estimated for accidental collisions with the PM. * Figure 5-22 shows the possible conse-
quences of an accidental in-orbit collision.
-2
*Recent data appearing in Reference 5-11 indicates a probability of 1.18 x 10 may be ex-
pected for accidental collision with the base during the Space Base Mission. This, probability
represents a summation of the probability of collision with a piece of debris, a rocket body,
or a payload.
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5.3.3.1.2 Explosion
Throughout the five year operational lifetime of the reference ZrH reactor PM, in-orbit ex-
plosions that may result in permanent damage to the reactor PM are assumed possible.
The various explosion or fragmentation sources that have been identified are:
1. Gas management system aboard the PM
2. PM disposal propulsion system
3. Turbine-Alternator-Compressor (TAG) assembly aboard PM
4. ECLS tanks and propulsion system on the Space Base
5. Propellant tanks aboard logistic vehicles.
With the exception of the TAG, all of the above systems contain stored gases or propellants
under high pressures which are considered to be possible explosion sources. The TAG is
considered to be a source of fragmentation in that any sudden loss of load on the rotating shaft
may result in a dramatic increase in shaft rpm and cause the TAG to literally "fly apart" and
disintegrate.
-4The accident analysis estimates a relative probability of an in-orbit explosion to be 5 x 10 .
Figure 5-23 shows the various possible consequences if an explosion should occur.
5. 3. 3.1. 3 Reactor Control System Malfunction/Reactor Operational Procedure Error
During the operational life of the reactor, various reactor control system malfunctions or
operational procedure errors are considered credible. Typical of these are:
1. Automatic controller fails
2. Stuck drums
3. Sensor errors
4. Human errors.
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Figure 5-24 shows the various consequences of this class of accidents. It is assumed that
the majority of the time, the reactor will experience a non-destructive excursion which rup-
tures the fuel elements, releasing fission products and dissociated hydrogen to the coolant.
The reactor then shuts itself down due to the loss of hydrogen moderator from the fuel matrix.
Due to the temperature excursion, a 50 percent probability of rupturing the primary system is
assumed, releasing fission products and activated NaK to the space environment.
If a reactor control system malfunction causes an inadvertent shutdown of the reactor PM, it
is assumed that 90 percent of the time the fission product decay heat cannot effectively be re-
moved, resulting in increased core temperatures that rupture the fuel elements and possibly
the primary system. This 90 percent probability of failure of removing decay heat is based
on the assumption that the control system malfunction results in a rapid accidental PM shut-
down. If shutdown is slow, the decay heat can effectively be removed from the core.
If a component failure prevents the initial Beginning of Life (BOL) startup of the reactor PM,
it is conservatively assumed that the PM is separated from the base and reenters by orbital
decay. In actual operational situations, it is expected the reactor would be boosted to a high
earth orbit, or recovered by the Shuttle, even though the fission product inventory is negligi-
ble at reentry, five years hence.
-2The accident analysis estimates a relative probability of 2.15 x 10 for a reactor control
system malfunction or reactor operational procedure error to occur.
5.3.3.1.4 Loss of Critical Electrical Power System Components
The Electrical Power System (EPS) is divided into four major subsystems:
1. Reactor primary NaK loop
2. Reactor intermediate NaK loop
3. Brayton power conversion loop
4. Brayton heat rejection loop.
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The following pages summarize the accidents and component failures occurring in or to the
EPS, exclusive of the reactor, which can conceivably result in a nuclear hazard to the Space
Base. If such an accident occurs and repair is not possible, the PM will be separated from
the base and early reactor disposal to high earth orbit is attempted.
Two general types of single failure accidents in the EPS present a potential nuclear hazard to
the Space Base and with the possible consequences, can present eventual terrestrial hazards.
They are:
1. A loss of reactor cooling—resulting from a failure or rupture of the reactor coolant
loop.
2. Reduction in nuclear radiation shielding effectiveness-resulting from a fracture or
cleavage in the shield assembly or release of activated materials outside the shield
zone.
In all accidents except the two identified in the previous paragraph, multiple failures are
necessary to create a nuclear hazard. The potential hazards can be prevented if (1) the
accident or its effects can be detected early, (2) the reactor can be shut down,and (3) the re-
actor afterheat can be rejected.
5. 3. 3.1.4.1 Loss of Reactor Cooling. Table 5-6 summarizes the causes, immediate ef-
fects, and consequences of a loss of reactor cooling capability. The analysis assumes that
following an equipment failure that results in the loss of (or reduction in) reactor cooling, the
reactor can successfully be shut dovn. Following shutdown, a 50 percent probability is as-
sumed for the successful removal of decay heat. If the decay heat is successfully removed,
a 90 percent probability is assumed for successful repair. If the temperatures in the reactor
core increase (due to failure to remove decay heat) enough to rupture the fuel elements, it is
assumed that there is a 50 percent probability of breaching the primary system, releasing
fission products and activated NaK to the environment.
5. 3. 3.1.4. 2 Rupture of Coolant Loops. The rupture of the reactor coolant loop is identi-
fied as an immediate nuclear hazard because of the release of activated coolant. If the re-
actor cavity and the gallery can be provided with vapor-tight containment, the danger of an
immediate nuclear hazard is greatly diminished.
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Table 5-6. Loss of Reactor Cooling
Causes
• Loss of flow in primary system (rupture, pump failure, flow blockage, etc.)
• Sudden loss of PCS*.
• Flow blockage of coolant channels.
Immediate Effects
• Over temperature of core.
• Rupture of fuel elements due to H2 and fission product pressure buildup and decrease
in clad strength.
• Possible rupture of primary system due to high temperature levels (causing material
strength decreases and higher internal pressures).
Consequences
• Reactor permanently shutdown - excursions are not possible.
• Fission product gases released to primary coolant.
• Release of fission product gases and activated NaK in orbit if primary system
ruptures.
^Includes reactor intermediate loop, Brayton power conversion loop, and Brayton
heat rejection loop.
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Any rupture of the reactor loop or any other loop in the power system that eliminates the
ability to remove the generated heat in the reactor, makes immediate shutdown of the re-
actor mandatory to prevent overtemperture and physical damage to the reactor fuel elements.
If a leak occurs in the primary-to-intermediate loop heat exchanger, activated reactor cool-
ant can be introducted into the intermediate loop. Since the intermediate loop extends out-
side the shield to the power conversion systems located at the interface of the Space Base
and main radiator, a source of unshielded nuclear radiation is brought close to the Space
Base. The quantity of activated coolant introduced into the intermediate loop can be limited
by balancing the loop pressure levels to eliminate a pressure difference across the fracture
in the heat exchanger.
5. 3. 3.1.4. 3 Coolant Loop Blockage. The reactor coolant flow passages in any part of the
reactor loop may become partially blocked because of accidental contamination, solidification
of coolant contaminants or dissolved containment materials, etc. If design coolant flow rates
cannot be maintained, a reduction in reactor power level may be necessary to prevent delete-
rious temperature levels in the reactor fuel elements.
5.3.3.1.4.4 Loss of Power Conversion System. Two standby Power Conversion Systems
(PCS) are provided for each reactor in the baseline power generating system, so any failure
in an operating Brayton loop need only be a temporary loss of power until a redundant PCS
is activated. If the Brayton system failure causes immediate and total loss of reactor cool-
ing, then the reactor must be shut down or at least set back in power level until the redundant
PCS is activated, which may take 2-4 hours. If the Brayton failure is one that allows con-
tinued operation of the Brayton loop for a limited time (e. g., loss of cooling to the TAG
bearings), then the redundant PCS may be activated while the power system is still operating.
5. 3. 3.1.4. 5 Alternator Electrical Failure. In the event that a failure within the electrical
circuit of the alternator removes the alternator mechanical load from the TAC shaft, it is as-
sumed that a turbine bypass valve and/or a cut-off valve is present in the Brayton loop to pre-
vent drastic overspeed and possible physical breakup of the TAC unit.
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5. 3. 3.1.4.6 Thermal Radiation Degradation. Accidental removal of the thermal emissivity
coatings on the power system radiators can seriously limit the safe operating power level of
the power system if the emissivity of the substrate radiator fin material is very low.
5. 3. 3.1.4. 7 Lithium Hydride Shield Failure. A puncture or rupture of the outer surface
of the lithium hydride (LiH) shield may result in the local dissociation of the LiH and escape
of the released hydrogen, dependent on the local shield temperature. The resultant "hole"
in the hydride shield is a source of an abnormally high neutron flux, thus increasing the neu-
tron radiation dose rate in the direction of the "hole. " The release of metallic lithium which
accompanies the dissociation of LiH may gradually corrode the containment walls of adjacent
sections of LiH if temperatures are as high as 920°K (1200°F),thus propagating the failure
and increasing the size of the shield "hole. " Conceivably this procedure could continue until
the entire LiH shield section was disintegrated. These possibilities suggest design guide-
lines which would insure protection of the outer surface of the shield and/or limit the tem-
perature in the outer shield regions to some low level to preclude or severely limit the dis-
sociation of LiH in the event of a puncture. Also, the assurance of shield cooling through
redundancy of components and subsystems is another potential design guideline.
5. 3. 3.1.4. 8 Engine Control Component Failure. Failure of most of the components in the
engine control and electrical control subsystems will not have a drastic effect on the opera-
tion of the power system. The two exceptions are:
1. Failure of the voltage control component results in either a very low or a very high
field excitation current to the alternator. The resultant drastic overspeed or under-
speed of the TAC unit will necessitate shutdown of the power system.
2. Fracture of all parasitic load resistors resulting in overspeeding of the TAG unit.
5.3. 3.1.4. 9 Emergency Shutdown. The analysis assumes that during a normal reactor
shutdown, the fission product decay heat can effectively be removed with the baseline system
design. However, an emergency shutdown may result in overheating of the reactor core with
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failure of the fuel elements and possibly rupture of the primary system. It is estimated that
following an emergency shutdown, a 50 percent probability exists for failure to successfully
remove the decay heat. The addition of a decay heat removal system can prevent this
situation.
* * . * * *
Based on best engineering estimates, failure of a critical EPS component is assigned a 2. 5
percent relative probability of occurring. Given the failure, the relative probability break-
down is assumed to be:
1. Loss of reactor cooling 99%
2. Reduction in nuclear radiation shielding effectiveness 1%
5. 3. 3.1. 5 Equipment Failure Aboard Space Base
Various system, subsystem, or component failures aboard the Space Base may occur during
the Orbital Operations Phase of the mission. The majority of these failures will be repairable
or contingency operational modes will be available such that the reference Space Base mission
-4
can be successfully completed. However, it is possible (5 x 10 ) that some equipment fail-
ures may result in early abandonment of the Space Base. Three such failures have been
identified:
1. Loss of Space Base guidance and control system
2. Loss of Space Base thermal control system
3. Loss of Space Base environmental control and life support system.
The loss of the above systems will prevent the mission from being carried to completion and,
if possible, disposal of the reactor PM will be attempted. However, it is considered possible
that a failure or loss of the above identified systems may preclude reactor disposal. If the
base is tumbling out of control in orbit, it will be impossible to properly align the PM (follow-
ing separation from the Space Base) for the orbit transfer burn. If an emergency abandon-
ment of the Space Base is required, the necessary time may not be available for reactor shut-
down and separation. Thus, the following relative occurrence probabilities are assumed:
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1. Equipment failure aboard Space Base precludes reactor 10%
disposal (separation from Space Base achieved).
2. Equipment failure aboard Space Base precludes PM 1%
separation and disposal.
3. Equipment failure aboard Space Base does not effect 89%
reactor disposal.
5. 3. 3. 2 Assumed Accident Consequences
As shown in Figure 5-21, all in-orbit accidents result in one or more of the following
immediate consequences:
1. Disassembly in orbit
2. PM "torn" from Space Base
3. Reactor/Shield (R/S) configuration "torn" from PM
4. PM remains attached to Space Base.
The following paragraphs discuss the possible events that are assumed to happen when the
above occur.
5. 3. 3. 2.1 Reactor Disassembly in Orbit
A reactor disassembly in orbit is considered to be possible as a result of (1) an in-orbit
non-nuclear explosion, (2) an accidental collision, or (3) a destructive reactor excursion
(caused by control drum rotation from a collision or a reactor control system malfunction or
operational error). The cumulative mission probability of a reactor disassembly in orbit is
_4
estimated to be 2. 35 x 10 . The result is an in-orbit release ol
NaK, and activated debris (fuel elements and structural debris).
of fission products, activated
Figure 5-25 summarizes the key occurrence probabilities for the reentry of fuel elements
from orbit. The analysis assumes that all the fuel elements are damaged prior to reentry,
having been violently removed from the core. The estimates of fuel element ablation prob-
abilities are based on fuel element ablation analyses performed by Atomics International
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(Reference 5-10). It is estimated that 8 percent of the time no fuel elements ablate, 90 per-
cent of the time all the fuel elements completely ablate, and 2 percent of the time some of
the fuel elements ablate (90 percent of the fuel elements completely ablate, 10 percent do not
undergo any ablation). A 2. 5 year orbital decay time is assumed for fuel elements and struc-
tural debris. This is based on the most conservative W/CjyA (cross axial spinning) (Reference
5-9).
5. 3. 3. 2. 2 PM Separated from Space Base by Explosion/Collision
If the PM is "torn" from the Space* Base by an in-orbit explosion or collision, it is assumed
that no in-orbit recovery will be made, and the result is an uncontrolled random reentry.
Although the reactor is assumed to be operating at full power (330 kWt) at the time of the
accident, analyses based on the present design indicate that, if undamaged, the reactor will
not continue to operate indefinitely, but will shut itself down within a few months. Thus, a
reentry of an operating reactor is not considered credible. It is assumed that the shutdown
mechanism is loss of hydrogen from the fuel elements without compensating control drum
reactivity insertion. This assumption is based on hydrogen release rates from SNAP-8 ER
and DR tests (Reference 5-10).
However, 80 percent of the time it is assumed that damage to the reactor leads to a sudden
loss of core cooling capability. This results in breaching of the fuel elements and possibly
the primary system; hence, resulting in a permanent reactor shutdown.
A five-year orbital decay time is assumed for the non-desired random PM reentry from the
reference 500 km circular orbit. The relative probability of PM separation from the Space
Base resulting from an explosion or collision is estimated to be 3 x 10 .
5.3. 3. 2.3 Reactor Shield (R/S) Configuration Separated from PM by Explosion/Collision
It is considered possible that a violent explosion or collision in the vicinity of the reactor
may result in the R/S configuration being torn from the PM. If this occurs, it is assumed
that a sudden loss of reactor cooling results, causing fuel elements to rupture, hence effect-
ing a permanent reactor shutdown. The end result is an uncontrolled random reentry of a
shutdown reactor.
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A 44 year orbital decay time is conservatively assumed for random reentry of the R/S con-
figuration from the reference 500 km circular orbit. The increase in orbit lifetime over the
five year lifetime of the entire PM is attributed to the increased ballistic coefficient.
The relative probability of a R/S configuration separation from the PM is estimated to be
—52.4 x 10 for the situation just discussed.
5.3.3. 2.4 PM Remains Attached to Space Base
The vast majority of the time (>99 percent), it is expected that the PM will remain attached
to the Space Base immediately following an in-orbit accident.
Following an in-orbit explosion or collision, if the reactor system is not damaged, the
necessary repairs to the Space Base or related systems may be made and the mission
continued. It is estimated that a one percent probability exists for failure to repair. The
Space Base is then abandoned and early reactor disposal attempted.
However, it is estimated that 80 percent of the time, the reactor system will experience
some type of damage from an explosion or collision. This damage is assumed to result in
the loss of a critical PM function as indicated below along with the estimated relative occur-
rence probabilities:
1. Loss of heat removal ~ 65%
2. Loss of reactor control ~34%
3. Reduction in nuclear radiation shielding ~ 1%
The accident analysis assumes that the occurrence of the loss of heat removal and the loss of
reactor control are mutually exclusive. However, reduction in radiation shielding can occur
in combination with the two or by itself.
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The loss of- reactor cooling accident was previously summarized in Table 5-6. Table 5-7
outlines the loss of reactor control accident. It is assumed that this type of accident can
occur if the reactor control system or electrical system is damaged in such a way that pre-
vents any kind of control of the reactor PM. If this occurs, it is assumed that the result will
be a non-destructive reactor excursion («100 MW-sec) or an inadvertent reactor shutdown.
Table 5-7. Loss of Reactor Control
Loss of Reactor Control Can Result In:
I Inadvertent Reactor Excursion (50%)
1. Destructive excursion ~ 100 MW-sec (Non-credible)
2. Non-destructive excursion «100 MW-sec
• Rupture of fuel cladding due to H2 and fission product pressure buildup
and decrease in clad strength (temperature excursion).
Possible rupture of primary system due to high temperature levels
(causing material strength decreases and higher internal pressures).
Reactor is permanently shut down due to loss of H2.
Consequences ^ • Fission product gases released to primary coolant.
Release of fission product gases and activated NaK in orbit, if primary
system ruptures.
Reactor Remains at Constant Power (Non-credible) |
| Inadvertent Reactor Shutdown (50%) {
1. Successful removal of decay heat (50%)
Consequence —• Attempt repair.
2. Failure to remove decay heat (50%)
Rupture of fuel cladding due to H£ and fission product pressure buildup
and decrease in clad strength.
Possible rupture of primary system due to high temperature levels
(causing material strength decreases and higher internal pressures).
Consequences^ • Fission product gases released to primary coolant.
Release of fission products and activated NaK in orbit, if primary
system ruptures.
Note: Numbers shown in parenthesis are relative occurrence probabilities
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It is considered possible that damage to the disposal system resulting from an in-orbit ex-
plosion or collision can preclude successful reactor disposal as shown below with the as-
sumed relative occurrence probabilities:
1. No damage to disposal system 89%
2. Damage to disposal system precludes reactor disposal 10%
(successful separation from Space Base achieved).
3. Damage to separation system precludes PM separation 1%
from Space Base.
If the accident damages the separation system preventing separation of the PM from the
Space Base, it is assumed that the reactor will reenter by orbital decay with the Space Base.
Based on the reentry analysis (Section 3.4), a 3. 5 year orbital decay time is assumed.
5.3.3.3 Reentry Situations Resulting from In-Orbit Accidents
Various in-orbit accidents that lead to a premature reactor reentry from the reference 55
-4degree, 500 km circular orbit are considered possible (P = 3.4 x 10 ) during the Orbital
Operations Phase. All reentry cases arising from an in-orbit accident involve either (1) the
PM, (2) the R/S configuration, or (3) the reactor/Space Base configuration (if the separation
system is permanently damaged by the accident). Regardless of the reentry configuration,
the reentering reactor can be described by one of the following:
_g
1. Reactor system intact, radiation shield possibly damaged (9. 2 x 1 0 ).
2. Fission products in primary coolant, radiation shield possibly damaged (7.3 x 10 ).
3. Fuel cladding and primary NaK loop breached, radiation shield possibly damaged
(1. 7 x 10~4).
The analysis assumes that the 50 percent probability estimate on reentry survival of an in-
tact reactor is not affected by the "state" (or condition) of the reactor upon reentry.
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It is important to note that upon earth impact of an intact reactor, the analysis assumes that
no excursions are possible if the fuel elements have been breached prior to reentry, thereby
releasing all the hydrogen moderator. The effect of this assumption is seen in Figure 5-26
which shows the assumed reactor responses following a high velocity earth impact.
HIGH
VELOCITY
EARTH
IMPACT
• FUEL ELEMENTS
BREACHED PRIOR
TO REENTRY
V
REACTOR
REMAINS INTACT,
QUASI-STEADY
STATE OPERATION
REACTOR
DISASSEMBLY
WITH
EXCURSION
REACTOR
DISASSEMBLY,
NO EXCURSION
Figure 5-26. Reactor Response Probabilities for High Velocity
Earth Impact of a Damaged Reactor
(Fuel Elements Breached Prior to Reentry)
Figure 5-27 summarizes the key relative occurrence probabilities for the reactor failing to
survive reentry. Note that the fuel element ablation estimates differ from those shown in
Figure 5-19. Prior to initial reactor startup in orbit, it is assumed (for worst case) that if
the reactor fails during reentry, releasing all the fuel elements to the reentry environments,
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that either all or none of the fuel elements ablate. However, because of the possible large
fission product inventory present upon reentry of the reactor following power operation and
orbital decay, this worst case assumption (shown in Figure 5-19, reentry of "non-operated re-
actor") of either all or none of the fuel elements ablating is unrealistic. In order to model a
more probable situation, it is estimated that one percent of the time no fuel elements ablate,
one percent of the time all the fuel elements completely ablate, and 98 percent of the time
some of the fuel elements ablate (50 percent completely ablate - 50 percent do not undergo
any ablation).
The cases that lead to early reactor disposal will be discussed in the next section as part of
End of Life (EOL) reactor disposal.
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5.3.4 REACTOR DISPOSAL (Abort Sequence Trees, Volume III, Part 2A, Figures D-50
through D-127)
The reference Space Base Program Mission defines that at the end of the normal lifetime
of the reactor, or after any accident which permanently damages the reactor or power con-
version system, the reactor PM will be boosted to a 990 km circular orbit where the fission
product inventories will be allowed to decay to acceptable levels prior to eventual reentry.
The selection of a 990 km orbit is based on the desire to achieve a minimum 100 year orbit
accounting for possible failures of disposal system rocket motors. This boost to high earth
orbit is to be accomplished utilizing a self-contained disposal system that is integrated into
the PM. The reactor disposal sequence begins with reactor shutdown and terminates with
successful insertion of the reactor PM into the 990 km circular orbit. The accident analysis
_2
estimates the total phase abort probability to be 1. 35 x 10 .
Figure 5-28 illustrates the maneuver used to place the reactor PM in the disposal orbit.
Basically, the disposal propulsion system performs an orbit transfer burn, A V = 128 m/sec
(422 ft/sec), that places the PM in a highly elliptical earth orbit. The PM coasts to apogee at
which point a second burn, A V = 126 m/sec (415 ft/sec), is performed that circularizes the
&
orbit. Figure 5-29 shows the nominal sequence of events required for checkout, separation,
orbit transfer, and circularization.
Failures during the disposal sequence have been identified, and their effect on decay re-
entry time determined. Both single and multiple failures have been considered, and typical
failures, key assumptions, and key results are shown in Figure 5-30.
It has been assumed that the reactor can be shut down prior to separation from the Space
Base in all cases. It appears that failure to shut down prior to separation is not credible
since various methods of shutdown are possible. For example, if the control drums be-
come inoperative, the reactor can be permanently shut down by increasing core temperatures
sufficiently to induce fuel clad failures which release the hydrogen moderator to the primary
coolant as discussed in Section 4.4.2. Fission products are also released to the primary
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DISPOSAL
ORBIT
(990 KM)
Figure 5-28. Orbital Transfer Maneuver
system; however, this factor is not considered in this phase of the accident analysis since
-4it is estimated that the probability of having to resort to a contingency shutdown mode is 10
and, thus, if an accident occurs, it is accorded a much reduced hazard (four orders of magni-
tude less) as compared to that which is possible if the reactor is shut down normally. In
addition, the more credible accidents of this type (fission products released to primary
coolant) occur during the Orbital Operational Phase, and these are factored into the safety
analysis.
The analysis estimates the probability of failure of the PM/Space Base separation system
-._ .
to be 4 x 10 (Reference 5-13). If the separation system fails to function, repair is attempted;
the probability of successfully repairing the system is taken to be 0. 999. If repair of the
separation system fails, the reactor is assumed to decay in with the base (3.5 year orbital
decay time).
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The analysis estimates the probability of a disposal system guidance and control failure
(i.e., Sun/horizon sensor failure, gyro failure, electronics failure, or RCS failure) occur-
ring during the disposal sequence to be 10 However, if such a failure occurs, it is
estimated that a one percent probability exists that it will go undetected; this probability is
assumed to decrease by one order of magnitude for every multiple failure. If the Guidance
and Control (G&C) failure is detected (0.99), the analysis estimates the probability of success-
ful repair to be 0. 99 prior to PM separation from the Space Base, and 0.75 after separation.
If the G&C failure is detected prior to separation and cannot be repaired, the analysis assumes
that separation is attempted and the reactor is allowed to decay in from the reference 500 km
circular orbit. After separation, if a G&C equipment failure is detected and is not reparable',
the disposal sequence is terminated and the reactor is left in the particular orbit and allowed
to reenter by orbital decay. After the transfer burn has been performed, repair of any faulty
system is assumed to be non-credible.
The baseline disposal system contains four solid propellant rockets; two to be used for the
orbit transfer burn, and two for circularization. The following success/failure probabilities
for the disposal propulsion system are based on reliability data shown in Reference 5-13:
1. Successful two rocket burn . 0.99599
_3
2. Failure of one rocket 4. 01 x 10
-63. Failure of both rockets 4. 03 x 10
The analysis assumes that upon ignition of the propulsion system for the transfer burn, if
one rocket fails to ignite, no capability exists for kicking in a back-up rocket in an attempt
to successfully obtain the required A V for transfer.
If one rocket fails during the orbit transfer burn, the disposal sequence is continued in hopes
of successfully placing the reactor power module in a 985 x 743 km elliptical orbit, thereby
increasing the orbital decay time to > 106 years.
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Following either a one rocket or two rocket transfer burn and prior to the circularization,
a detected G&C equipment failure is assumed to force the disposal sequence to be terminated,
rather than raise the possibility of an "immediate reentry" due to a misaligned thrust vector
at circularization. If the disposal sequence is terminated, the reactor is assumed to decay
in from the particular orbit it is in.
If a disposal package G&C equipment failure goes undetected and the propulsion system is
ignited for the orbit transfer burn, five independent events are considered possible:
1. Accidental collision with Space Base 10 ,
or detached module (1 or 2 rocket burn)
-42. Immediate reentry of PM (2 rocket 10
burn, retrograde)
PM placed in off-n
km elliptical orbit (2 rocket burn)
PM placed in 305 by 500 km short-
elliptical orbit (1 rocket burn, retrograde)
PM placed in off-nominal 670 I
elliptical orbit (1 rocket burn)
3. ominal 890 by 455 9. 95 x 10
_7
4. lived 4 x 10
_Q
5.   by 455 km 4 x 10
_
The analysis assumes a 10 probability of accidental collision with the Space Base or
detached module because of a misaligned thrust vector following ignition of either one or
two rockets. Figure 5-31 shows the assumed consequences following the collision. If the
reactor/shield configuration is "torn" from the PM by the collision (0. 27), it is assumed
that the R/S configuration decays in from the 500 km circular orbit. This, however, is
actually advantageous since the orbital decay time is increased to 44 years due to the
2
higher weight-to-drag ratio of the R/S configuration (16, 900 Newton/m ) as compared to
2
that of the PM (1910 Newton/m ). If the R/S configuration remains attached to the PM
following the collision (0.72), two events are considered possible:
1. Decay reentry from 500 km circular orbit 0. 9999
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2. Immediate reentry (2 rockets fire) or
decay reentry from 305 x 500 km short
lived elliptical orbit (1 rocket fires)
10-4
RE LEAS
TESION PRODUCTS
NaK, AND
ACTIVATED DEB
IN ORBIT
REACTOR
DISASSEMBLE
RE LEAS
ISSION PRODUCTS,
NaK, AND
ACTIVATED DEB
IN ORBIT
DESTRUCTIVE
REACTOR EXCURSION
CONTROL DRUM MOTION)
CCIDENTAL
COLLISION wrrH
SPACE BASE
OH
RELATED SYSTEMS
1 OR 2 ROCKET
TRANSFER BURN
R/S
CONFIGURATION
SEPARATED
FROM PM
RANDOM
REENTRY
MISALIGNED THRUST
VECTOR
R/S
REMAINS
FKED TO PM
IMMEDIATE OR
RANDOM REENTRY
Figure 5-31. Key Event Probabilities Following Accidental Collision
with Space Base or Related Systems During Reactor Disposal
If thrust is terminated upon collision with the base, the PM is assumed to decay in from
the reference 500 km circular orbit. However, if thrusting is not terminated, it is assumed
(for conservatism) that the result is the same as if the propulsion system were fired retro-
grade for the transfer burn.
It is assumed that an accidental collision caused by a misaligned thrust vector involves
enough energy (momentum) that a reactor disassembly or reactor excursion (control drum
motion) is possible. Both cases involve the release of fission products, activated NaK,
and activated debris in orbit. The key occurrence probabilities for reentry of fuel elements
from orbit have previously been shown in Figure 5-25.
5-60
It is assumed that an undetected disposal system G&C failure can result in an inadvertent
-4
retrograde firing at the transfer burn (10 ). For the case of a two rocket retrograde firing
at 500 km altitude, the A V (128 m/sec) required to boost the PM to the reference disposal
altitude is enough to cause an immediate reentry (reentry time ~ one day) of the reactor PM,
thereby, reducing the fission product decay time to a matter of a few days. If one rocket
fails to ignite, resulting in a one rocket retrograde firing, the A V (64 m/sec) is not enough
to cause an immediate reentry; however, the PM is placed in a short-lived 305 by 500 km
elliptical orbit with a one-year orbit decay time.
The analysis assumes that the majority of the time (0. 9989) if a G&C failure goes undetected,
the result will be a small thrust vector error (as opposed to the large thrust vector error,
i. e., retrograde firing), causing the PM to be placed in some off-nominal elliptical orbit.
For purposes of orbit decay time calculations, the resultant elliptical orbit caused by a
small thrust vector error is obtained by reducing the nominal apogee and perigee altitudes
by 10 percent. For example, a successful two-rocket transfer burn places the reactor
PM in a 990 km by 500 km elliptical orbit. A small thrust vector error is assumed to result
in the reactor being placed in an 890 by 455 km elliptical orbit.
If an undetected G&C failure results in a small thrust vector error at the transfer burn,
the disposal sequence is assumed to be terminated and the reactor is allowed to decay in
from that particular "off-nominal" elliptical orbit (no attempt is made to circularize).
Assuming a disposal package G&C failure goes undetected and the propulsion system is
ignited for the circularization burn, the resultant misaligned thrust vector results in either
a large thrust vector error (i.e., retrograde firing), or a small thrust vector error placing
the PM in an "off-nominal" orbit. Table 5-8 shows the results of a misaligned thrust vector
at circularization. The relative probability of a small thrust vector error is assumed to be
0. 9999. Notice that even at altitudes of 743 km and 990 km, a two rocket retrograde firing
results in an immediate reentry. For orbit decay calculations, the orbit resulting from a
small thrust vector error at circularization is obtained by reducing the nominal orbit para-
meters, obtained by a "successfully aligned" one or two rocket burn, by 10 percent.
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Table 5-8. Reentry Cases Following a Misaligned Thrust
Vector at Circularization
Initial Burn
Circularization
Burn
Minimum
Orbit
Decay
Time
Successful
2 Rocket
Transfer Burn
PM placed in 890 km
circular orbit
Rocket Burn Immediate reentry of PM
from 990 km, AV = 126
m/sec (retrograde firing)
Rocket Burn
PM placed in 890 x 670 km
elliptical orbit
PM placed in 305 x 990 km
short-lived elliptical orbit
(retrograde firing)
377 Yr
2 Days
48 Yr
6 Yr
1 Rocket
Transfer Burn
PM placed in 887 x 670 km
elliptical orbit
Rocket Burn Immediate reentry of PM
from 743 km, AV = 126
m/sec (retrograde firing)
PM placed in 670 x 667 km
orbit
Rocket Burn PM placed in 305 x 743 km
short-lived elliptical orbit
(retrograde firing)
48 Yr
1 Day
30 Yr
5 Yr
All of the accidents which can occur during the Reactor Disposal Phase, and which lead to
premature reentry of the reactor, are shown in Table 5-9.
In the accident analysis, a very conservative model is used to determine decay reentry
times from the various orbits. The values shown, therefore, represent minimums, and
very likely the time to reenter will be longer. Because of the significance of decay time
on the source term at earth impact, the decay reentry time should be treated on a probability
basis. This, however, is beyond the scope of this study.
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Table 5-9. Accidents Leading to Premature Reentry
(Reactor Disposal)
Case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Orbit (km)
500
990 x 500
743 x 500
Immediate
Reentry
500 km
985 x 743
743 x 740
743 x 500
890 x 455
670 x 455
305 x 500
305 x 500
305 x 500
990 x 743
990 x 500
891
Immediate
Reentry
from 990 km
890 x 670
305 x 990
887 x 670
Immediate
Reentry
from 743 km
670 x 667
305 x 743
Reentry
Configuration
and Minimum
Reentry Time
PM, 5 Years
R/S, 44 Years
Base, 3. 5 Years
PM, 21 Years
PM, 11 Years
PM, - 1 Day
PM, 106 Years
PM, 70 Years
PM, 11 Years
PM, 12 Years
PM, 6 Years
PM, ~ 1 Year
PM, - 1 Year
PM, - 1 Year
PM, 108 Years
PM, 21 Years
PM, 377 Years
PM, - 2 Days
PM, 48 Years
PM, 6 Years
PM, 48 Years
PM, - 1 Day
PM, 30 Years
PM, 5 Years
Primary Accident Sequence of Events
Both rockets fail at transfer, repair not possible,
terminate sequence
Both rockets fire at transfer, collision with base,
primary loop and/or shield damaged
Both rockets fire at transfer, collision with base,
no damage
One rocket fires at transfer, collision with base,
primary loop and/or shield damaged
One rocket fires at transfer, collision with base,
no damage
G&C failure detected prior to transfer, repair
not possible, terminate sequence
Ail collisions above, reactor/shield configuration
torn from PM, recovery not possible
Failure to separate from base, repair not possible
Successful transfer burn, G&C failure detected prior
to apogee, repair not possible, terminate sequence
One rocket fires at transfer, G&C failure detected
prior to apogee, repair not possible, terminate sequence
Two rockets fire retrograde at transfer (undetected
G&C failure)
Two rockets fire at transfer, collision with base,
primary loop and/or shield damaged (Immediate reentry
orbit)
Two rockets fire at transfer, collision with base, no
damage (immediate reentry orbit)
One rocket fails at transfer and both rockets fire at
apogee (743 km)
One rocket fails at transfer and one rocket fires at
apogee (743 km)
One rocket fails at transfer and both rockets fail at
apogee (743 km)
Undetected G&C failure, two rockets fire at transfer,
sequence terminated
Undetected G&C failure, one rocket fires at transfer,
sequence terminated
Undetected G6C failure, one rocket fires retrograde
at transfer
One rocket fires at transfer, collision with base,
primary loop and/or shield damaged (minimum time of
reentry)
One rocket fires at transfer, collision with base, no
damage (minimum time of reentry)
Successful transfer, one rocket fails at apogee (990 km)
• Successful transfer, both rockets fail at apogee (990 km)
Successful transfer burn, undetected G&C failure, both
rockets fired at apogee (990 km)
Successful transfer burn, undetected G&C failure, both
rockets fired retrograde at apogee (990 km)
Successful transfer burn, undetected G&C failure, one
rocket fires at apogee (990 km)
Successful transfer burn, undetected G&C failure, one
rocket fires retrograde at apogee (990 km)
One rocket fires at transfer, undetected G&C failure,
both rockets fire at apogee (743 km)
One rocket fires at transfer, undetected G&C failure,
both rockets fire retrograde at apogee (743 km)
One rocket fires at transfer, undetected G&C failure,
one rocket fires at apogee (743 km)
One rocket fires at transfer, undetected G&C failure,
one rocket fires retrograde at apogee (743 km)
Probability*
of
Reentry
Unlikely
Very Remote
Very Remote
Non-credible
Extremely Remote
Plausible
Very Remote
Remote
Plausible
Unlikely
Very Remote
Non -credible
Non-credible
Plausible
Unlikely
Remote
Unlikely
Remote
Non-credible
Non-credible
Non -credible
Plausible
Unlikely
Unlikely
Very Remote
Remote
Extremely Remote
Remote
Extremely Remote
Very Remote
Non-credible
PM Reactor Power Module, Including Disposal Package
R/S - Reactor and Shield Only
Base - Entire Space Base
*Refer to Figure 5-3
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Events associated with reactor disposal lead to four general possibilities. The four
possibilities and their cumulative mission probabilities are:
1. Successful boost to desired disposal orbit (0. 88).
-22. Subnominal boost to intermediate (or lesser) orbit (1.1 x 10 ).
_9
3. Immediate reentry (4.5 x 10 ).
-44. No orbit altitude change from reference 500 km orbit (4.5 x 10 ).
Of the potential accidents identified during disposal of the reactor PM to high earth orbit,
four are considered plausible having a mission probability of occurrence of approximately
_3
10 . These are:
1. G&C failure detected prior to transfer, repair not possible; terminate disposal
sequence and reenter by orbital decay from 500 km circular orbit (five year
orbital decay time).
2. Successful transfer burn, G&C failure detected prior to circularization, repair
not possible; terminate disposal sequence and reenter by orbital decay from 990
by 500 km elliptical orbit (> 21 year orbital decay time).
3. One rocket fails at transfer, both rockets fire at apogee; reenter by orbital decay
from 985 by 743 km elliptical orbit (> 106 year orbital decay time).
4. Successful transfer burn, one rocket fails at apogee; reenter by orbital decay
from 990 by 743 km circular orbit (> 108 year orbital decay time).
In general, the high probability reentries tend to have long decay times, and the short,
most hazardous reentries tend to have very low probabilities.
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5.4 SUMMARY OF KEY MISSION ACCIDENTS
5.4.1 SUMMARY
Because of the small fission product inventory generated during low power acceptance test-
ing, the only significant nuclear hazard during the Prelaunch and Launch/Ascent Phases is
that which results from an inadvertent reactor criticality. Three possibilities for reactor
criticality occur during this portion of the mission:
1. Immersion in hydrogenous medium-water, liquid propellants (probability of occur-
rence = 8. 6 x 10~3).
2. Control drum rotation following high energy impact or collision (probability of
occurrence = 3. 5 x 10~5).
3. Core compaction/drum rotation following land impact at terminal velocities
(probability of occurrence = 3. 6 x 10~5).
-3The most probable (4.2x10 ) reactor response to an accident at KSC does not involve
core criticality, but results in a relatively high radiation field around the reactor due to a
damaged radiation shield. The radiation field is caused by gamma radiation from fission
product decay resulting from acceptance testing.
Since the baseline INT-21 launch trajectory overflies the European land mass, abortive land
impacts of an intact reactor in Europe or the Middle East are considered possible. The
-3probabilities for Eurasian land impact are estimated to be 2.3 x 10 during this portion of
the mission. Assuming land impact of an intact reactor at terminal velocities, the following
options are possible:
1. Quasi-steady state critical operation (0.01 relative probability).
2. Reactor disassembly with excursion (core compaction/control drum motion)
(0.01 relative probability).
3. Reactor disassembly, no excursion (0. 98 relative probability).
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Boost failures which result in reactor deep ocean impacts are assumed to lead to "No
Discernible Hazard" to the populace. The probability of occurrence for this accident is
_2
estimated to be 4.4 x 10 .
The most credible mission accident that can occur during the Launch/Ascent Phase is an
abort involving the INT-21 S-n stage with no explosion and fire at altitude. The estimated
_2probability of this occurrence is 2.7 x 10 . Results of this mishap are divided into the follow-
ing cases:
1. Deep ocean impact (0. 89 relative probability).
2. Eurasian land impact (0. 08 relative probability).
3. Shallow water impact (0. 03 relative probability).
Various in-orbit accidents that lead to a premature reactor reentry from the reference
55 degree. 500 km circular orbit are considered possible. The cumulative probability of
-4in-orbit nuclear reactor accidents is estimated to be 3.4 x 10 . The majority of these
accidents are manifested by a loss of reactor cooling which induces fuel cladding failures
-4
and possible rupture of the primary loop (2.4 x 10 probability of occurrence). Release of
hydrogen moderator and fission product gases will be characteristic of these accidents.
Therefore, the reactor reentries resulting from in-orbit accidents involve either an intact
reactor capable of undergoing an excursion on impact, or a damaged reactor (i.e., rup-
tured primary system and/or breached fuel cladding) that cannot experience an excursion
on impact due to the loss of hydrogen moderator from the fuel elements. On the basis of
various investigations, it is assumed that the LiH shield has a 50 percent probability of sur-
viving reentry.
If the LiH shield fails during reentry, it is assumed that all the fuel elements are released
from the reactor core and exposed directly to the reentry environments. This can lead to
widespread atmospheric, water, and ground contamination due to fuel element ablation and
fission product dispersion.
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If the reactor survives reentry, the resultant earth impact is separated into four basic
categories:
1. Land impact (relative probability = 0.27).
2. Deep ocean impact (relative probability = 0. 70).
-43. Impact in reservoir (relative probability = 2.7 x 10 ).
4. Impact in waters containing edible marine life (relative probability = 0. 03).
These possibilities present several potential hazards. Land impact may lead to a direct
exposure hazard if the R/S disassembles. Inhalation of radioactive particulates and con-
tamination of food crops can also occur. Burial of an intact reactor presents a configura-
tion which is susceptible to water flooding and reflection. This situation would probably re-
sult in quasi-steady state operation. Impact in a reservoir or water containing edible
marine life may constitute an ingestion hazard. In addition, due to a lack of evidence to the
contrary, a small probability has been accorded to the possibility of an excursion at impact
prompted by core compaction and drum rotation.
It is conservatively assumed that all accidents occurring during the Orbital Operations
Phase involve a reactor that has been operating for five years at 330 kWt.
At the end of its useful life, the reactor PM is to be placed in a high earth orbit. The
reference disposal altitude selected for this study is 990 km, circular. Events associated
with reactor disposal lead to four general possibilities:
1. Successful boost to desired disposal orbit (probability of occurrence = 0. 88).
2. Subnominal boost to intermediate (or lesser) orbit (probability of occurrence =
1.1x10-2).
_g
3. Immediate reentry (probability of occurrence = 4. 5 x 10 ).
4. No orbit altitude change from reference 500 km orbit (probability of occurrence =
4.5 x 10-4).
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The probability for a successful boost to the desired disposal orbit (0. 88) represents the
probability of no nuclear accident occurring during the mission.
It was assumed for the analysis that orbital decay, from whichever orbit is achieved, is
followed by reentry through the earth's atmosphere with the reactor either burning up in
the atmosphere (0. 50 relative probability) or surviving (0. 50 relative probability) and im-
pacting randomly on the earth's surface. In actual operations, subsequent recovery or re-
boost to high orbit is recommended, even though the fission product inventory may be
negligible.
Of the potential accidents identified during disposal of the reactor PM to high earth orbit,
four are considered plausible, having a mission probability of occurrence of approximately
_2
10 . These are:
1. G&C failure detected prior to transfer, repair not possible; terminate disposal
sequence and reenter by orbital decay from 500 km circular orbit (>5 year orbital
decay time).
2. Successful transfer burn, G&C failure detected prior to circularization, repair
not possible; terminate disposal sequence and reenter by orbital decay from 990 by
500 km elliptical orbit ( >21 year orbital decay time).
3. One rocket fails at transfer, both rockets fire at apogee; reenter by orbital decay
from 985 by 743 km elliptical orbit (>106 year orbital decay time).
4. Successful transfer burn, one rocket fails at apogee; reenter by orbital decay from
990 by 743 km circular orbit (>108 year orbital decay time).
The accident analysis has identified the most probable accidents involving the nuclear reactor
PM that are postulated to occur during the Reference Space Base Program Mission. However,
the most probable accident may not present the highest risk (i.e., source term multiplied
by release probability) to the earth's populace since the corresponding source terms may be
low. The risk analysis, described in the Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD), identifies
those mission accidents that present the greatest terrestrial hazard in terms of risk. The re -
fore, the accidents that are of most concern are those having both a high probability of occur-
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rence and large source terms. The association of the accidents with their respective source
terms and probabilities is presented in Section 5. 5.
5.4. 2 MISSION ACCIDENT SUMMARY TABLES
Tables 5-10 through 5-14 summarize the mission accidents and their respective mission
probabilities as determined from the abort sequence trees. The following listing shows
\diich tables are identified with the particular mission phases.
Table 5-10 Prelaunch
Table 5-11 Launch/Ascent
Table 5-12 Orbital Operations
Table 5-13 Normal Reactor Disposal
Table 5-14 Early Reactor Disposal (Fission Products in Primary Coolant)
It is important to note that Table 5-14 combines two events caused by an in-orbit accident
or failure (during the Orbital Operational Phase) that results in the early disposal of a
damaged reactor. These two events (or accident discriptions) are:
1. Early disposal - fission products in primary system, shield damaged in some cases
2. Early disposal - fission product gases and activated NaK released in orbit (primary
system ruptured), shield damaged in some cases.
Since both of these cases result in the permanent shutdown of the reactor due to the loss of
hydrogen moderator from within the fuel elements, the reactor response on earth impact is
considered to be the same (i.e., reactor excursions on impact are not possible). It is as-
sumed that the probability of burn-up during reentry is not affected by the extent of damage
to the reactor. In addition, the fission product gases and the activated NaK are no longer
radioactive following orbital decay due to the short half-lives. Immediate reentries are
-12
non-credible because the cumulative mission probabilities are <10 . Thus, the case of
the reactor primary NaK loop remaining intact and the case of gaseous fission products and/
or activated NaK released in orbit appear to yield the same source terms.
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The hazard sources, corresponding source terms and probabilities for the mission acci-
dents described in Tables 5-10 through 5-14 are presented in Section 5. 5.
5.5 APPLICATION OF SOURCE TERMS TO ACCIDENT CASES
To support the radiological analysis presented in the NSAD, it is not only important to
identify the probability of the nuclear hazard, but also to completely characterize the hazard
with regard to (1) fission product inventory and/or intensity of radiation, and (2) exposure
mode (i.e., direct exposure to radiation field, ingestion, or inhalation). These "source
terms" (whose derivations were presented in Section 4), in conjunction with their respective
probabilities of occurrence, are used as inputs to the radiological calculations to evaluate
the extent of the hazard and are identified on the abort sequence trees as diamonds with a
large dot placed next to each one. The source term probability is defined as the cumulative
probability associated with each source term that arises from a mission abort or hazard
situation.
Tables 5-15 through 5-29 list the various source term probabilities estimated for the
identified Space Base Mission accident cases. The values shown have been rounded off to
the nearest order of magnitude.
Tables 5-30 and 5-31 show the fission product inventories and the magnitude of the source
terms for various reactor shutdown times and power histories. Table 5-30 is for accidents
occurring prior to initial reactor startup in orbit; hence, the fission product inventory is
based on the low power criticality testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch).
Table 5-31 is for accidents occurring during the operational phase and the reactor disposal
sequence where the reactor is assumed to have been operating at 330 kWt for five years.
The excursion generated fission products and source terms not shown in Tables 5-30 and
5-31 have been calculated and appear in Section 4. Tables 5-32 and 5-33 show the source
term probabilities for the decay reentry following a successful boost to the selected disposal
altitude (990 km). The fission product inventory has decayed to an insignificant amount
(Table 5-34) that represents no terrestrial hazard upon reentry (1167 year decay time).
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Table 5-15. Source Term Probabilities*
(Prelaunch)
Destructive
Reactor Excursion
(Control Drum
Motion)
Nondestructive
Reactor Excursion
(Control Drum
Motion)
Destructive
Reactor Excursion
(Over Moderation)
Quasi-Steady State
Operation (Over
Moderation)
Radiation Shield
Damaged
Fuel Cladding
Breached, Primary
System Ruptured
Reactor Disassembly,
No Excursion
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements
Prompt Radiation
High Radiation Field
Around Reactor,
Ground Level
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements in Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
Prompt Radiation,
No Water Shielding
Continuous Prompt Radiation,
No Water Shielding
High Radiation Field
Around Reactor,
Ground Level
Airborne Fission Products
High Radiation Field Around
Reactor, Ground Level
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission
Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements
1.1
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
-
-
-
"
-
-
—
-
-
-
-
—
1.2
-
-
-
-
E-6
-
-
-
"
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
—
1.3
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
"
-
-
E-4
_
-
-
-
—
1.4
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
-
-
-
"
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
~
1.5
-
-
-
-
E-6
-
-
-
"
-
-
—
-
-
-
-
"
1.6
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
"
-
-
E-4
-
-
-
-
"
1.7
_
-
-
-
E-7
-
-
E-7
E-7
E-7
-
-
••
-
-
"
1.8
_
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
E-6
-
-
-
-
'
1.9
_
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
E-5
E-5
E-5
1.10
_
-
-
-
E-6
E-6
E-6
"
E-6
-
-
-
-
-
"
1.11
_
-
I
-
'
_
1
t
1
"
;.
,
E-5
<
-
-
-
-
~"
1.12
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
_
-
-
"
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
1.13
_
-
-
-
E-5
_
-
-
*"
-
-
-
-
-
• -
—
1.14
_
-
-
-
_
-
-
~
-
-
E-3
-
-
-
-
—
1.15
_
-
-
-
_
-
-
~
-
-
E-5
E-5
-
-
—
1.16
„
-
-
-
_
-
-
"*
-
-
E-4
-
-
-
-
—
"Reactor Power History: Low Power Criticality Testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch)
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Table 5-16. Source Term Probabilities*
(Launch/Ascent, Launch Pad Aborts)
Destructive
Reactor Excursion
(Control Drum
Motion)
Nondestructive
Reactor Excursion
(Control Drum
Motion)
Destructive
Reactor Excursion
(Over Moderation)
Quasi-Steady State
Operation (Over
Moderation)
Radiation Shield
Damaged
Reactor Disassembly,
No Excursion
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements
Prompt Radiation
High Radiation Field
Around Reactor,
Ground Level
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements In Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
Prompt Radiation,
No Water Shielding
Continuous Prompt Radiation,
No Water Shielding
High Radiation Field
Around Reactor,
Ground Level
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission
Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements
2.1
-
•
.
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E-6
E-6
E-6
2.2
-
-
_
_
-
E-6
E-6
E-6
-
-
E-6
-
-
-
-
-
2.3
-
-
_
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E-5
-
-
-
2.4
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2.5
-
-
_
_
E-6
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
2.6
-
-
_
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E-4
-
-
-
* Reactor Power History: Low Power Criticality Testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch)
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Table 5-17. Source Term Probabilities*
(Launch/Ascent, Aborts During S-IC Boost Phase)
Accident Occurs at 1 km,
Debris Falls on KSC
(Explosion and Fire)
Accident Occurs at 5 km,
Debris Falls on U. S.
Continental Shelf
(Explosion and Fire)
Accident Occurs Above 40 km,
Debris Falls In Deep Ocean
(Explosion and Fire)
KSC
Land
Impact
of
Reactor
Destructive Reactor
Excursion (Control
Drum Motion)
Nondestructive Reactor
Excursion (Control
Drum Motion)
Radiation Shield
Damaged
Reactor Disassembly
(LV Explosion and
Fire on Impact)
Airborne Fission Products
(Release at 1 km)'
Ground Deposited Fission
Products
Scattered and Breached Fuel
' Elements, Ground
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements In Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
High Radiation Field Around
Unshielded Reactor, Ground
Level
Airborne Fission Products
(Release at 5 km)
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements In Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
High Radiation Field Around
Unshielded Submerged
Reactor
Airborne Fission Products
(Release > 40 km)
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission
Products
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements
Prompt Radiation
High Radiation Field Around
Unshielded Reactor, Ground
Level
High Radiation Field Around
Unshielded Reactor, Ground
Level
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission
Products
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements
2.7
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
™
E-5
E-5
E-5
—
E-5
-
-
-
-
—
-
-
-
—
2.8
-
-
-
™
™
""
' -
-
"•
~
-
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-6
E-4
-
- •
—
2.10
-
-
—
"
-
-
mr
"*
-
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-5
E-3
E-5
E-5
E-5
*Reactor Power History: Low Power Criticality Testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch)
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Table 5-18. Source Term Probabilities*
(Launch/Ascent, Aborts During S-IC Boost Phase)
Case No. ^
KSC
Water
Impact
of
Reactor
Reactor
Impacts
on
U.S.
Continental
Shelf
Destructive Reactor
Excursion
(Over Moderation)
Quasi-Steady State
Operation (Over Moderation)
Radiation Shield
Damaged
Reactor Disassembly
(LV Explosion and Fire
on Impact)
Destructive Reactor
Excursion
(Over Moderation)
Quasi-Steady State
Operation (Over Moderation)
Radiation Shield Damaged
Reactor Disassembly
(LV Explosion and Fire
on Impact)
Airborne Fission Products
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Prompt Radiation, No
Water Shielding
Continuous Prompt Radiation,
No Water Shielding
High Radiation Field Around
Reactor, No Water Shielding
Airborne Fission Products
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Continuous Prompt Radiation,
Unshielded Submerged Reactor
High Radiation Field Around
Submerged Reactor
Airborne Fission Products
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
2.9
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-4
E-5
_
_
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-3
E-4
_
_
2.11
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-3
E-4
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-3
E-4
E-5
E-5
E-5
*Reactor Power History: Low Power Criticality Testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch)
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Table 5-19. Source Term Probabilities*
(Launch/Ascent; S-II Boost, Rendezvous & Docking),
Reactor Survives Reentry
Land Impact* *
Impact in
Reservoir**
Impact in Waters
Containing Edible
Marine Life**
Case No.
(Orbital Decay Time)
Disassembly on Impact,
No Excursion
Disassembly and
Excursion on Impact
(Core Compaction and
Control Drum Motion)
Reactor Remains Intact,
Quasi-Steady State Operation
(Over Moderation)
Disassembly on impact.
No Excursion
Disassembly and
Excursion on Impact
(Over Moderation)
Reactor Remains Intact,
Quasi-Steady State Operation
(Over Moderation)
Disassembly on Impact
No Excursion
Disassembly and
Excursion on Impact
(Over Moderation)
Reactor Remains Intact,
Quasi-Steady State Operation
(Over Moderation)
Fission Product Gases Released > 40 km
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements
Prompt Radiation
Continuous Prompt Radiation,
Unshielded Reactor
Airborne Fission Produces
Fission Products in
Drinking Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Airborne Fission Products
Fission Products in
Drinking Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Continuous Prompt Radiation,
Unshielded Submerged Reactor
Airborne Fission Products
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing -
Edible Marine Life
Continuous Prompt Radiation,
Unshielded Submerged Reactor
Airborne Fission Products
2.12
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-0
E-G
_
-
-
. .
-
-
-
-
-
**
-
-
""
-
-
2.13
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
- .
2.14
E-3
. E-3
E-3
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-!>
r
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
.
-
'
-
-
2.15
.
-
_
-
-
-
-
E-G
E-0
E-6
E-7
K-7
E-7
E-7
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
-
2.16
(5 Vr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
-
2.17
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
-
2.18
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
-
2.19
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-5
E-5
E-5-
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
-
•Reactor Power History: Low power critlcality testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch)
••Cases 2.12 - 2.15: Reactor impacts in Eurasia
(Cases 2.16 - 2. 19: Reactor Impacts randomly on earth)
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Table 5-20. Source Term Probabilities* (Launch/Ascent, Rendezvous & Docking),
Reactor Fails to Survive Reentry
No Fuel Elements Ablate
During Reentry
(No Fission Product
Release at Altitude)
All Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry.
(Complete
Fission
Product
Release at
Altitude)
Release at
High Altitude
(>40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
Casfi No. ^^
(Orbital Decay Time)
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission
Products (From Scattered and
Breached Fuel Elements,
Ground Level)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements, Land
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission
Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission
Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine
Life
2.16
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-7
E-5
E-5
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-5
2.17
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-7
E-5
E-5
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-5
2.18
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-7
E-5
E-5
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-5
2.19
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-7
E-5
E-5
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-7
E-5
*Reactor Power History: Low Power Crittcality Testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch)
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Table 5-21. Source Term Probabilities*
(Orbital Operations) Reactor
Survives Reentry
Case No.
(Orbital Decay Time) -"
Land Impact
Impact
in
Reservoir
Impact in Waters
Containing Edible
Marine Life
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(core compaction and
control drum motion)
Reactor remains intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(over moderation)
Reactor remains intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(over moderation)
Reactor remains intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Fission Product Gases Released >40 km
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated debris
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated debris
Prompt radiation
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded reactor
Airborn fission products
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Airborne fission products
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
Fission products in waters
containing edible marine life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in waters containing
edible marine life
Airborne fission products
Fission products in waters
containing edible marine
life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in waters containing
edible marine life
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
3.2
(5Yr)
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
-
3.3
(3.5 Yr)
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
-
3.5(5 YD
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
NC4
NC
NC
NC
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
-
3.6
(3.5 Yr)
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
-
3.8
<s YD
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
-
3,9l
(5 Yr)
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
0
E-9
E-9
E-9
0
0
0
0
E-7
E-7
E-7
0
0
0
0
E-6
3. 102
(5Yr)
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
0
E-9
E-9
E-9
0
0
0
0
E-7
E-7
E-7
0
0
0
0
-
3. II1
(44 Yr)
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
0
E-9
E-9
E-9
0
0
0
0
E-7
E-7
E-7
0
0
0
0
E-6
3. 122
(44 Yr)
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
0
E-9
E-9
E-9
0
0
0
0
E-7
E-7
E-7
0
0
0
0
-
3. 142
(5 Yr)
E-5
E-5
E-5
0
0
0
0
0
E-8
E-8
E-8
0
0
0
0
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
-
3.152
, (3.5Yr)
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
i o
1
E-9
E-9
E-9
0
0
0
0
1
 E-7
E-7
E-7
0
0
'• 0
0
-
3.171
(5 YD
E-5
E-5
E-5
0
0
0
0
0
E-8
E-8
E-8
0
0
0
0
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
E-5
3.181
(3. 5 Yr)
E-6
E-6
E-6
0
0
0
0
0
E-9
E-9
E-9
0
0
0
0
E-7
E-7
E-7
0
0
0
0
E-6
3.20
(5 YD
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-7
-
3.21
(3.5 Yr)
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-9
E-10
E-10
E-10
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
- -
3.27
(5 Yr)
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-7
E-7
E-7
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-8
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-6
E-6
E-6
E-6
-
*Reactor Power History: 5 year power operation at 330 KW
(Normal Shutdown)
Fission Product Gases Released During Reentry (> 40 km); No Fission Product Gases in Inventory at Earth Impact
o
Fission Product Gases Released in Orbit; No Fission Product Gases in Inventory at Earth Impact
O
Reactor Power History = Low Power Criticality Testing (100 watts for 12 days, 60 days prior to launch)
4
"NC" = Non-Credible
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Table 5-22. Source Term Probabilities*
(Orbital Operations) Reactor Fails to
Survive Reentry/Fuel Elements
Released From Core
Case Number ^
(Orbital Decay Time)
No Fuel Elements Ab
During Reentry
(No Fission Product I
During Reentry)
All Fuel Elements
Ablate During
Reentry
(Complete Fission
Product Release
During Reentry)
Some of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
(Partial
Fission
Product
Release
During
Reentry)
ate
lelease
Release at
High Altitude
( >40km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40km)
50% of the Fuel
Elements Remain
Intact During Reentry
50% of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry)
Release at
High Altitude
(>40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
( <40 km)
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
{From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Ufe
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
3.2
(5 Yr)
E-8
'
"
E-10
"
E-8
E-7
"
"
"
E-8
E-ll
E-8
E-6
"
E-8
"
E-6
E-5
"
"
'
"
E-6
E-9
E-7
3.3
(3.5 Yr)
E-9
"
"
NC
"
E-9
"
E-8
"
"
"
11
E-9
NC
E-9
E-7
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
"
"
"
E-7
E-10
E-8
3.5
(5Yr)
E-10
"
"
NC
"
E-10
"
"
"
"
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
E-8
"
E-ll
"
E-8
t.
"
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
3.6
(3.5Yr)
E-ll
"
"
NC
"
"
.11
E-ll
"
"
"
E-10
E-ll
NC
"
E-9
"
NC
11
E-9
i,
"
"
"
E-8
E-9
NC
E-10
3.8
(5 Yr)
E-ll
"
"
NC
"
"
"
E-10
"
"
"
"
NC
E-9
"
NC
"
E-9
E-8
«
"
"
"
"
NC
E-9
3.9»*»
(5 Yr)
E-9
"
"
NC
E-9
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
"
NC
E-9
E-7
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
"
"
E-6
E-6
E-9
E-7
3.10*"
(5 Yr)
E-8
"
E-ll
"
E-9
;
E-8
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
3. 11«*»
(44 Yr)
E-9
"
NC
"
E-9
"
E-8
"
"
11
"
NC
E-9
E-7
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
11
"
"
"
E-9
E-7
3.12**»
(44 Yr)
E-8
"
"
E-ll
"
E-9
"
E-8
"
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
3.14*'
(5 Yr)
E-7
"
E-10
"
E-8
'
E-7
"
"
"
"
E-10
E-8
E-5
"
E-8
"
E-6
E-5
"
"
"
"
"
E-8
E-6
3.15**
(3.5'Yr)
E-8
"
E-ll
n V
E-!
1
E-8
" 1
11
"
"
"
E-l1
E-9
E-6
l
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
II 1
"
"
E-9|
E-7
3.17»*
(5 Yr)
E-8
"
E-10
E-8
'
E-7
"
"
"
"
E-10
E-8
E-6
11
E-8
"
E-6
E-5
"
"
"
"
"
E-8
E-6
3.18"
(3.5Yr)
E-9
"
NC
"
E-9
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
"
NC
E-9
E-7
11
E-9
11
E-7
E-6
"
"
"
"
"
E-9
E-7
3.20
(5 Yr)
E-8
"
E-10
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
"
E-9
"
E-6
"
"
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
3.21
(3.5Yr)
E-9
"
NC
"
E-9
"
"
"
"
"
E-8
E-9
NC
E-10
E-7
E-10
"
E-7
"
"
"
"
E-6
E-7
E-10
E-8
3. 27"*
(5 Yr)
E-4
"
E-7
"
E-5
"
E-4
"
"
"
"
"
E-8
E-6
"
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
*Reactor Power History: 5 Year Power Operation at 330 kWt (Reactor Shutdown Prior to Reentry)
**No Fission Product Gases In Inventory >
***Reactor Power History: Low Power Criticality Testing (100 Watts for 12 Days, 60 Days Prior to Launch)
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Table 5-24. Source Term Probabilities*
(Reactor Dispbsal), Reactor
Survives Reentry
c
(Orbita
Land Impact
in
Reservoir
Impact in Waters
Containing Edible
Marine Life
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on Impact
(core compaction and
control drum motion)
Reactor remains Intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on Impact
(over moderation)
Reactor remains Intact,
Quasi-steady. state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(over moderation)
Reactor remains Intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Fission product Gases Released >40 km
1 Decay Time)
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated debris
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated debris
Prompt radiation
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded reactor
Alrborn fission products .
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Airborne fission products
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
Fission products in waters
containing edible marine life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements In waters containing
edible marine life
Airborne fission products
Fission products in waters
containing edible marine
life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in waters containing
edible marine life
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
4.2
(5Yr)
E-6
"
"
E-8
"
»
"
"
E-9
"
11
E-10
"
"
"
E-7
"
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
4.3
(3.5Yr)
E-7
"
E-9
11
"
"
E-ll
"
11
NC
"
"
"
E-9
"
"
"
"
"
"
4.4
(5Yr)
E-4
"
"
E-6
"
"
"
E-7
"
11
E-8
11
11
"
E-5
"
"
E-6
"
"
"
4.5
(12 Yr)
E-6
"
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
E-9
"
"
E-10
"
"
E-7
"
"
E-8
"
"
--
4.6
(1 Day)
E-10
"
NC
"
"
"
»
"
"
»
"
11
"
E-ll
"
NC
"
"
-
4.7
(6 Yr)
E-8
"
"
E-10
"
"
"
"
NC
11
"
-
"
"
"
E-9
11
E-10
"
--
4.9
(5 Yr)
E-7
"
E-9
"
"
"
E-10
"
"
E-ll
"
"
"
E-8
"
"
E-9
"
"
--
4.12
(5Yr)
E-10
"
"
NC
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
E-ll
NC
-
4.13
(5 Yr)
E-9
11
"
E-ll
11
"
"
"
NC
11
"
..
"
"
"
E-10
"
"
E-ll
"
--
4.19
(5Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
,.
"
"
"
11
"
"
"
"
"
--
4.22
(44 Yr)
E-10
"
NC
"
"
"
11
"
"
E-ll
NC
"
--
4.23
(44 Yr)
E-10
"
"
NC
"
"
"
"
,.
"
"
"
"
"
"
E-ll
"
NC
"
"
"
--
4.26
(21 Yr)
E-3
"
"
E-5
"
"
E-7
11
"
"
"
E-5
..
"
"
"
-
4.27
(11 Yr)
E-6
"
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
E-9
"
"
E-10
"
"
"
E-7
"
"
E-8
"
11
-
4.28
(108 Yr)
E-3
"
E-5
"
"
"
"
E-7
"
"
'.
"
"
"
E-5
"
"
.,
"
"
-
4.29
(21 Yl )
I ;
E-elj
" .,
"
E-8'
i.
"
"
" 1
!
E-10
"
11
" 1
"
" •
I
E-8
1. i
"
it i
" i'
n
"
-
4.30
(377 Yr)
E-6
"
"
E-8
"
"
"
11
E-9
"
11
E-10
"
"
E-7
11
"
E-8
"
"
-
4.31
(1 Day)
E-10
"
"
NC
"
..
"
"
..
"
"
..
"
"
E-ll
"
"
NC
11
"
"
—
4.32
(48 Yr)
E-8
"
"
E-10
"
..
"
"
E-ll
"
"
NC
"
"
E-9
"
"
E-10
"
"
"
—
4.34
(70 Yr)
E-6
"
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
E-9
"
"
E-10
"
"
11
E-7
"
'
E-8
"
"
"
—
4.35
(11 Yr)
E-9
"
"
E-ll
"
..
"
"
NC
"
..
"
"
"
E-10
"
"
E-ll
"
"
"
—
4.36
(48 Yr)
E-8
"
E-10
"
.1
"
"
E-ll
"
NC
"
"
E-9
"
"
E-10
"
"
-
4.38
(30 Yr)
E-10
"
NC
"
..
"
"
"
"
..
"
"
11
"
"
"
..
"
"
"
-
4.40
(106 Yr)
E-3
"
"
E-5
"
"
"
11
E-7
"
..
"
"
E-5
"
"
M
"
"
"
-
•Reactor Power History: 5 year power operation at 330 KW
(Normal Shutdown)
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Table 5-25. Source Term Probabilities*
(Reactor Disposal), Reactor
Fails To Survive Reentry/Fuel
Elements Released From Core
Case Number ^^
(Orbital Decay Time)
No Fuel Elements Ab
During Reentry
(No Fission Product
During Reentry
All Fuel E
Ablate Du
Reentry
(Complete
Product R
During Re
Some of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
(Partial
Fission
Product
Release
During
Reentry)
lements
ring
Fission
entry)
late
Release
Release at
High Altitude
( >40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
50% of the Fuel
Elements Remain
Intact During Reentry
50% of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
Release at
High Altitude
(>40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
. Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements In Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements In Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
4.2
(5 Yr)
E-8
E-ll
"
E-9
E-8
"
"
"
"
E-ll
E-9
E-6
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
"
"
"
"
E-9
E-7
4.3
(3. 5 Yr)
E-10
NC
"
"
E-9
"
"
"
"
E-10
NC
E-ll
. E-8
"
E-10
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
4.4
(5 Yr)
E-7
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
11
"
»
"
E-9
E-7
E-5
"
E-7
"
E-5
E-4
"
"
"
11
E-5
E-8
E-5
4.5
(12 Yr)
E-8
E-ll
11
E-9
E-8
"
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
4.6
(1 Day)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
E-10
"
NC
11
E-ll
E-10
"
11
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
4.7
(6 Yr)
E-10
"
NC
"
E-ll
E-10
"
"
"
..
..
NC
11
E-8
"
"
E-ll
11
E-9
E-8
"
11
"
" ,
"
NC
E-9
4.9
(5Yr)
E-9
NC
"
E-10
E-9
"
11
"
..
NC
E-10
E-7
"
"
E-10
"
E-8
E-7
"
"
"
"
"
E-10
E-8
4.12
(5 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
„ •
«
"
"
E-10
"
"
NC
"
E-ll
E-10
"
11
 ;
" :
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
4.13
(5Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
E-ll
"
"
.1
„
NC
11
E-9
"
NC
,..
E-10
E-9
"
"
"
E-9
"
NC
E-10
4.19
(5 Yr)
NC
"
11
"
"
..
"
"
"
.,
„
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
..
..
"
"
E-ll
NC
"
"
4.22
(44 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
,.
..
"
"
„
„
"
"
E-10
"
"
NC
"
E-ll
E-10
..
"
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
4.23
(44 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
..
"
"
"
E-ll
NC
"
"
E-10
"
11
NC
"
E-ll
E-10
..
"
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
4.26
(21 Yr)
E-6
"
E-8
"
E-6
..
"
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
E-4
"
E-6
11
E-4
..
"
"
"
E-3
E-4
E-7
E-5
4.27
(11 Yr)
E-8
"
E-ll
"
E-9
E-8
..
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
11
E-9
11
E-7
E-6
..
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
4.28
(108 Yr)
E-6
"
E-8
"
E-6
"
"
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
E-4
"
E-6
"
E-4
"
"
"
"
E-3
E-4
E-7
E-5
4.29
(21 Yr)
E-9
"
NC
"
E-9
.1
11
"
E-8
E-9
NC
E-10
E-7
"
E-9
"
E-7
..
"
"
"
E-6
E-7
E-10
E-8
4.30'
(377 Yr)
E-8 |
" ;
E-ll
"
E-9 ;
E-8 '
" ;
"
11
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
" 1
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
4.31
(IDay)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
•'
11
"
"
..
11
"
E-ll
"
NC
"
"
E-10
"
"
"
•'
"
NC
"
4.32
(48 Yr)
E-10
"
NC
"
E-ll
E-10
.1
"
"
„
NC
E-ll
E-8
"
E-ll
"
E-9
E-8
"
11
"
"
"
E-ll
E-9
4.34
(70 Yr)
E-8
"
E-ll
"
E-9
E-8
"
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
"
E-9
"
E-7
E-6
"
11
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
4.35
(11 Yr)
E-ll
NC
"
"
E-ll
"
"
E-10
E-ll
NC
"
E-9
"
NC
"
E-10
E-9
"
"
"
E-8
E-9
NC
E-10
4.36
(48 Yr)
E-10
"
NC
"
E-ll
E-10
"
"
"
"
„
NC
E-ll
E-8
E-ll
"
E-9
E-8
"
"
"
"
"
E-ll
E-9
4.38
(30 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
E-ll
"
NC
"
"
E-10
"
"
"
"
E-ll
NC
11
4.40
(106 Yr)
E-6
"
E-8
"
E-6
E-6
"
"
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
E-4
"
E-6
"
E-4
"
"
"
"
E-3
E-4
E-7
E-5
*Beactor Power History: 5 Year Power Operation at 330 kWt
(Normal Shutdown)
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Table 5-26. Source Term Probabilities (Release of Fission Products and
Damaged Fuel Elements in Orbit)
Case Number ^^
(Orbital Decay Time) ^
No Fuel Elements Ablate
During Reentry
(No Fission Product Release
During Reentry)
All Fuel El
Ablate Dur
Reentry
(Complete
Product Re
During Itcc
Some of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate "
During
Reentry
(Partial
Fission
Product
Release
During
Reentry)
ements
ng
Fission
ntry)
Release at
High Altitude
( >40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
10% of the Fuel
Elements Remain
Intact During Reentry
90% of
the Fuel
Elementc
Ablate
During
Reentry
Release at
High Altitude
(>40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements. Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements In Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements In Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Fission Product Release In Orbit
4.10
(2. 5 Yr)
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
XC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
E-10
4.11
(2. 5 Yr)
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
E-ll
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
NC
E-10
4.1
(2. 5 Yr)
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-8
E-8
E-6
E-6
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-4 •
E-7
E-5
E-6
E-fi
E-0
E-8
E-8
E-0
E-6
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
E-3
5-123/124
Table 5-27. Source Term Probabilities*
(Early Reactor Disposal), Reactor
Survives Reentry
Case No. ^
(Orbital Decay Time)
Land Impact**
Impact in
Reservoir**
Impact in Waters
Containing Edible
Marine Life**
Disassembly on impact,
no excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(Core compaction and
control drum motion)
Reactor remains intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on impact,
no excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(over moderation)
Reactor remains intact.
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on impact,
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
Reactor remains Intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Fission Product Gases Released > 40 km
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated
debris
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated
debris
Prompt radiation
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded reactor
Airborn fission products
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Airborne fission products
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
Fission products in waters
containing edible marine life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in waters containing
edible marine life
Airborne fission products
Fission products in water
containing edible marine life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in waters containing
edible marine life
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
5.2
(5 Yr)
E-8
"
0
11
E-ll
"
0
"
11
11
E-9
0
"
"
E-7
5.3
(3. 5 Yr)
E-9
11
"
0
"
"
"
NC
"
"
0
"
"
E-10
"
0
"
E-8
5.4
<5Yr)
E-6
"
0
"
"
"
E-9
0
"
"
E-7
"
0
E-5
5.5
(12 Yr)
E-7
"
0
"
E-10
0
"
"
E-8
"
0
"
"
E-7
5.6
(1 Day)
NC
"
"
0
"
"
NC
0
"
NC
"
0
"
"
E-ll
5.7
(6 Yr)
E-10
"
11
0
"
."
11
NC
"
0
"
E-ll
"
0
11
"
E-9 :
5.9
(5 Yr)
E-9
"
"
0
"
"
11
NC
"
0
11
E-10 .
"
0
11
E-8
5.12
(5Yr)
E-ll
"
"
0
"
"
"
"
NC
"
"
0
"
"
NC
0
"
"
--
5.13
(5 Yr)
E-ll
"
"
0
"
"
NC
11
"
0
"
"
NC
"
0
"
"
E-10
5.22
(44 Yr)
E-ll
"
"
0
"
"
"
"
NC
11
0
"
"
NC
"
0
"
11
"
5.23
(44 Yr)
E-ll
"
"
0
11
"
"
"
NC
"
11
0
"
NC
"
0
"
E-ll
5.26
(21 Yr)
E-5
"
0
"
"
E-8
"
0
"
"
E-6
0
E-4
5.27
(11 Yr)
E-7
"
0
"
"
E-10
"
"
0
"
"
E-8
"
0
"
"
E-7
5.28
(108 Yr)
E-5
"
"
0
"
"
E-8
0
"
E-6
0
"
E-4
5.29
(21 Yr)
E-8
"
0
1 "
"
E-ll
f"
0
"
"
E-9
'"
0
"
E-7
5.30
((377 Yr)
E-7
"
0
"
"
E-10
"
"
0
"
"
E-8
"
0
"
"
E-7
5.31
(1 Day)
E-ll
"
0
"
"
"
"
NC
"
"
0
11
11
NC
"
0
"
E-ll
5.32
(4. 8 Yr)
E-10
"
"
0
"
"
"
NC
"
0
"
11
E-10
"
0
"
"
E-9
5.34
(70 Yr)
E-7
11
"
0
"
"
E-10
0
"
"
"
E-8
"
0
"
"
E-7
5.35
(11 Yr)
E-10
"
"
0
"
"
"
NC
"
0
"
"
"
NC
11
0
"
"
E-10
5.36
(48 Yr)
E-10
"
"
0
"
"
NC
"
"
0
"
"
"
E-10
"
0
11
"
E-9
5.40
(106 Yr)
E-5
11
"
0
"
"
"
E-8
11
"
0
"
11
"
E-6
"
0
"
"
E-4
*Reactor Power History: 5 Year Power Operation at 330 kWt
(Reactor Permanently Shutdown Prior to Reentry/Fission Products in Primary Coolant)
**No Fission Product Gases In Inventory At Earth Impact
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Table 5-28. Source Term Probabilities*
(Early Reactor Disposal), Reactor Fails to
Survive Reentry/Fuel Elements
Released from Core
Case Number
(Orbital Decay Time)
No Fuel Elements Ablate
During Reentry
(No Fission Product E
At Altitude)**
All Fuel Elements
Ablate During
Reentry
(Complete Fission
Product Release
At Altitude)**
Some of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
(Partial
Fission
Product
Release
At
Altitude**
elease
Release at
High Altitude
( >40km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40km)
50% of the Fuel
Elements Remain
Intact During Re-entry
50% of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Re-entry
Release at
High Altitude
(>40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
5.2
(5 Yr)
E-10
"
NC
11
E-ll
E-10
"
"
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
E-8
"
E-ll
"
E-9
"
E-8
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
5.3
(3. 5 Yr)
NO
"
"
"
E-ll
11
"
"
"
NC
"
E-9
NC
"
E-10
"
E-9
"
"
"
"
"
NC
E-10
5.4
(5Yr)
E-8
"
"
E-ll
"
E-9
E-8
"
"
E-7
E-8
E-ll
E-9
E-6
"
11
E-9
"
E-7
"
E-6
"
11
"
E-5
E-6
E-9
E-7
5.5
(12 Yr)
E-10
"
NC
11
E-10
E-9
"
"
"
i.
"
NC
E-10
E-8
"
E-10
"
E-8
11
E-7
"
"
"
.'
"
E-10
E-8
5.6
(1 Day)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
..
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
11
"
"
11
"
E-ll
NC
11
11
5.7
(6 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
E-10
"
"
NC
"
E-ll
"
E-10
.1
"
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
5.9
(5Yr)
E-ll
"
11
NC
"
11
E-ll
"
"
"
E-10
E-ll
NC
"
E-9
"
"
NC
"
E-10
"
E-9
"
"
"
E-8
E-9
NC
E-10
5.12
(5 Yr)
NC
"
"
11
11
11
'
"
..
"
"
..
"
"
"
11
"
"
"
"
"
"
..
..
"
"
E-ll
NC
"
"
5.13
(5 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
11
"
"
..
"
n
"
"
"
E-ll
"
NC
"
"
"
E-ll
ii
"
"
E-10
E-ll
NC
"
5.22
(44 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
"
'
..
,.
"
"
i,
"
"
ii
"
"
"
"
"
"
11
ii
M
"
"
E-ll
NC
"
"
5.23
(44 Yr)
NC
"
11
"
"
11
'
..
M
"
"
,
.'
11
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
E-ll
..
"
"
i.
NC
"
"
5.26
(21 Yr)
E-7
•'
E-10
"
' E-8
'
E-7
„
..
E-10
E-8
E-5
"
"
E-8
"
E-6
"
E-5
-
"
'i
..
'.
E-8
E-6
5.27
(11 Yr)
E-10
n
NC
"
E-10
E-9
"
"
"
..
E-10
NC
E-10
E-8
"
'i
E-10
"
E-8
"
E-7
"
"
"
"
E-8
E-ll
E-8
5.28
(108 Yr)
E-7
"
11
E-10
11
E-8
"
E-7
"
"
"
.,
..
E-10
E-8.
E-5
"
"
E-8
"
E-6
E-5
"
'•
"
.i
'i
E-8
E-6
5.29
(21 Yr)
E-10
'i
"
NC
"
E-ll
E-10
"
"
"
• i
.i
NC
E-ll
E-8
"
"
E-ll
"
E-9
"
E-8
"
"
"
"
"
E-ll
E-9
5.30
(377 Yr)
E-9
"
"
NC
11
E-10
"
E-9
"
"
ii
i.
NC
E-10
E-7
"
"
E-10
"
E-8
"
E-7
"
"
"
..
"
E-10
E-8
5.31
(IDay)
NC
i i ' ,
"'
.1
n
"
"
" I
"
"
it
I.
"
"
1
"
11
"
'" ,
"
it 1
" 1
11
"
..
|| *
" ' •
ii
5.32
(48 Yr)
NC
11
11
ii
11
"
"
"
"
"
E-ll
NC
"
"
E-10
"
NC
"
E-10
"
"
"
•i
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
5.34
C70 Yr)
E-10
'i
11
NC
"
E-10
E-9
"
"
"
ii
.i
NC
E-10
E-8
"
E-10
"
E-8
"
E-7
"
"
"
.i
E-8
E-ll
E-10
5.35
(11 Yr)
NC
"
"
"
11
"
"
"
"
"
"
n
..
"
"
E-ll
"
"
NC
"
"
"
E-10
"
it
"
'i
E-ll
NC
"
5.36
(48 Yr)
NC
"
11
"
'i
11
"
"
"
"
E-ll
NC
n
'•
E-10
"
"
NC
"
E-10
'i
"
I F
"
E-9
E-10
NC
E-ll
5.40
(106 Yr)
E-7
11
"
E-10
"
E-8
E-7
"
"
"
.i
E-10
E-8
E-5
"
"
E-8
"
E-6
E-5
"
'•
"
.i
"
E-8
E-6
*Reactor Power History: 5 Year Power Operation at 330 kwt
(Reactor Permanently Shutdown Prior to Reentry/Fission Products In Primary Coolant)
+No Fission Product Gases In Inventory
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Table 5-29. Source Term Probabilities* (Early Reactor Disposal)
Release of Damaged Fuel Elements and/or
Fission Products in Orbit ^
Case Number ^^
(Orbital Decay Time)
No Fuel Elemema Ablate
During Reentry
(No Fission Product Release
During Reentry)
All Fuel Elementa
Ablate During
Reentry
(Complete Fission
Product Release
During Reentry)
Some of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
(Partial
Fusion
Product
Release
During
Reentry)
10% of the
Elements
Intact Dur
90% of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
Release at
High Altitude
( >40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40km)
Fuel
Remain
Ing Reentry
Release at
High Altitude
(>40km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40km)
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products in Drinking
Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elementa, Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission Products
(From Scattered and Breached
Fuel Elements)
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements (Land)
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements la Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered and Breached Fuel
Elements In Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited Fission Products
Fission Products In Drinking
Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
FlsaloD Product Gases Released in Orbit
5.12
-
-
• -
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
E-9
5.22
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- -
-
-
-
-
-
-
E-9
Fission 1'roduct
Gases Released
in Orbit
•Reactor Power History: 5 Year Power Operation at 330 kwt
(Reactor Permanently Shutdown Prior to Reentry/Fission Products in Primary Coolant)
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Table 5-32. Source Term Probabilities* (Reactor Survives
Reentry) Successful Boost to 990 km Circular Disposal
Orbit (Orbital Decay From Circular Orbit)
(
Land Impact
Impact
in
Reservoir
Impact in Waters
Containing Edible
Marine Life
•
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(core compaction and
control drum motion)
Reactor remains intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(over moderation)
Reactor remains intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Disassembly on
impact, no
excursion
Disassembly and
excursion on impact
(over moderation)
Reactor remains intact,
Quasi-steady state operation
(over moderation)
Fission Product Gases Released >40 km
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated debris
Airborne fission products
Ground deposited
fission products
Scattered activated debris
Prompt radiation
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded reactor
Alrborn fission products
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Airborne fiesion products
Fission products in
drinking water
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in drinking water
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
Fission products in waters
containing edible marine life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in waters containing
edible marine life
Airborne fission products
Fission products in waters
containing edible marine
life
Scattered and breached fuel
elements in waters containing
edible marine life
Continuous prompt radiation,
unshielded submerged reactor
Airborne fission products
1167 Year
E-l
E-l
E-l
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-4
E-4
E-4
E-5
E-5
. E-5
E-5
E-2
E-2
E-2
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-3
-
*Reactor Power History: 5 year power operation at 330 KW(
(Normal Shutdown) 5-133
Table 5-33. Source Term Probabilities* (Reactor Fails to Survive Reentry)
Successful Boost to 990 km Circular Orbit
(Orbital Decay from Circular Orbit)
No Fuel Elements Ablate
During Reentry (No Fission
Product Release at Altitude)
All Fuel Elements
Ablate During
Reentry
(Complete Fission
Product Release
at Altitude)
Some of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
(Partial
Fission
Product
Release
at
Altitude)
Release at
High Altitude
(>40kml
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
50 % of the Fuel
Elements Remain Intact
During Reentry
50% of
the Fuel
Elements
Ablate
During
Reentry
Release at
High Altitude
(>40 km)
Release at
Low Altitude
(<40 km)
Airborne Fission Products
(from Scattered & Breached Fuel
Elements. Ground Level)
Ground Deposited Fission
Products (from Scattered &
Breached Fuel Elements)
Scattered & Breached
Fuel Elements, Land
Fission Products In
Drinkine Water
Scattered & Breached Fuel
Elements In Drinking Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered & Breached Fuel
Elements In Waters Containing
Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Fission Products in
Drinkine Water
Fission Products In Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Fission Products in
Drinking. Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
(from Scattered & Breached
Ground Deposited Fission
Products (from Scattered &
Breached Fuel Elements)
Scattered & Breached
Fuel Elements. Land
Fission Products in
Drinkine Water
Scattered 6 Breached Fuel
Elements in Drinking Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Scattered & Breached Fuel
Elements in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Fission Products in
Drinkine Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
Airborne Fission Products
Ground Deposited
Fission Products
Fission Products in
Drinkine Water
Fission Products in Waters
Containing Edible Marine Life
1167 Years
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-6
E-6
E-4
E-4
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-3
E-6
E-4
E-l
E-l
E-l
E-4
E-l
E-2
E-l
E-l
E-l
E-l
E-l
E-l
E-l
E-4
E-2
•Reactor Power History: 5 Year Power Operation at 330 KW
(Normal Shutdown)
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However, reactor excursions are still assumed possible following impact, thus, a potential
terrestrial hazard exists even if the reactor is boosted to the high earth orbit. This points
out the advantage of having a permanent shutdown mechanism integrated into the reactor
and/or the recovery of the reactor by the Space Shuttle.
Source terms have been calculated for the release of activated core structural materials,
activated particulates, and activated NaK, and are discussed in Section 4; however, these
are not factored into the risk analysis, because of the small radiological hazard associated
with most of them.
The source terms and their respective mission probabilities of occurrence will be used to
determine the mission "risk" discussed in the NSAD.
5.6 ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE
An example of how one uses the "Characteristics of Key Mission Accidents" tables pre-
sented in Section 5.4.2 (Tables 5-10 through 5-14) and the source term tables presented
in Section 5.5 (Tables 5-15 through 5-34), is provided here.
For purposes of illustration, Case 4.4 is examined. This is a decay reentry of the PM
from the reference 500 km circular orbit; the desired disposal orbit has not been achieved.
The reactor has operated at 330 kWt for five years and experienced a normal shutdown.
Table 5-13 indicates that the location of the potential nuclear hazard cannot be determined
due to the uncontrolled random reentry. Tables 5-24 and 5-25 show the resultant source
term probabilities arising from the reentry of the PM into the atmosphere (Table 5-24 is
for earth impact of an intact reactor, and Table 5-25 is for the case where the LiH shield
fails during reentry, releasing fuel elements to the reentry environments). Table 5-31
indicates the fission product inventory at time of reentry for Case 4.4 (five year shutdown
time) and the source terms based on the assumed fission product release fractions (Section
4). For example, Table 5-24 shows that the probability of a reactor disassembly (no ex-
-4
cursion) on land impact is 10 and results in the following hazard sources:
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1. Airborne fission products.
2. Ground deposited fission products.
3. Scattered activated debris.
Table 5-31 shows the following source terms are a result of reactor disassembly on land
impact:
Isotope
Kr-85
Sr-90
Cs-137
Ba-137m
Ce-144
Pr-144
Curies
175
88
86
78
11
11
These are based on the release fractions shown in Section 4. Table 5-31 also shows the
source term for scattered debris (radioactive fuel elements and structural debris) surround-
ing the impact point to be 0.35 r/hr. If the reactor impacts in water, fission product source
terms are shown for release to air and release to water.
In addition, Table 5-31 shows the source terms for (1) fission product release at altitude,
(2) fission product release to air from a single fuel element, and (3) radiation fields sur-
rounding single fuel elements on land and in water which result from the reactor failing to
survive reentry.
5-137
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Fission Product Inventories (Xe-131m, 133, 133m; 1-131, 132)
Power Level = 330 kWt
A-l
Fission Product Inventories (1-133,135; Xe-135,,135m)
Power Level = 330 kWt
A-2
Sr-90 Inventory
Power Level = 330 kWt
A-3
Fission Product Inventories (Ba-137m, Cs-137)
Power Level = 330 kWt
A-4
Fission Product Inventories (Ce-144, Pr-144)
Power Level = 330 kWt
A-5
Kr-85 Inventory
Power Level = 330 kWt
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APPENDIX C
ACCIDENT/ABORT ENVIRONMENT MODELS
Throughout the majority of a Space Base Mission, explosive and combustible sources
present which can cause potential damage to the reactor power modules due to blast frag-
mentation, overpressure and/or the thermal environment. Typical environment models
of the major hardware of concern are presented in this appendix and for the most part
have been obtained from References C-l, C-2 and C-3.
It is important to note that the data presented is based largely on analytical studies and
experiments. Conclusions drawn could be altered due to several of the following assump-
tions and unknowns:
1. The general launch vehicle/power module configuration consists of INT-21 and
an S-II kick stage with a 6. 6m (21. 7 ft) diameter power module payload.
2 Airburst and sea level conditions are assumed.
3. At the launch complex, the S-IC and S-II are the sole contributors to the blast.
4. The blast parameters of the S-IC and S-II are determined separately.
5. Blast parameters for liquid propellents may be adequately defined using TNT
equivalents.
6. Prediction techniques for liquid and solid propellants can. be applied as per
Reference C-3.
7. Configuration detail is lacking on particular spacecraft, power module and inter-
facing vehicle systems and structure.
8. Equipment locations are not explicitly defined.
9. Shielding and blockage effects can only be estimated.
10. Fragmentation shapes, sizes and velocities are estimated from analytical and
somewhat typical experimental studies.
11. Actual INT-21, Tug and Space Shuttle blast and fragmentation characteristics
are sensitive to location, mixing time and local conditions.
C-l
12. The presence and quantities of liquid metals will be an insignificant factor in
the overall blast/overpressure values.
C.I EXPLOSIVE SOURCE IDENTIFICATION
Explosive sources exist on the INT-21, Space Base Reactor Power Modules, the Space
Shuttle, Tug, and other interfacing vehicles. The primary explosive sources during launch
are assumed to be the INT-21, S-IC and S-n stages. The secondary sources on-board
the Space Base and launch vehicles are relatively small and in some instances remote
from the power module. Therefore, they are not considered a means of direct damage
to the reactor/shield. The propellant make-up of the Tug has not been explicitly defined
and for purposes of this analysis is assumed similar to the Space Shuttle.
C.I.I INT^21 LAUNCH VEHICLE
One or two reactor power modules are launch by a single INT-21 and are in relative close
vicinity to the S-n stage. The primary and secondary explosive sources on the INT-21 are
specified in Table C-l.
Table C-l. INT-21 Launch Vehicle Explosive Sources
Source Location
Primary Sources
Main Propellants
~2,080 t (4,590 klb)
~ 443 t (977 klb)
Secondary Sources
Main propellant pressurization tanks H and O
j£ £
Stage separation retrorocket motors
(8) 36.2t (80 klb) thrust-solids
Pyrotechniques/destruct explosive system
Main propellant pressurization tanks
Ullage propellant motors
(8) 10. 3t (22. 9 klb) thrust-solids
Pyrotechniques/destruct explosive system
S-IC
s-n
S-IC
S-IC
AFT Skirt
S-IC
s-n
s-n
Aft Interstage
S-II
C-2
C. 1. 2 SPACE SHUTTLE
The Space Shuttle only presents an explosive source to the power modules during rendez-
vous, replacement and disposal operations in orbit. Maximum on-board/in-orbit explosive
sources in the instance assumed are~ 5.4t (11.9 klb) of LOX and~ 1.9t (4.2 klb) of LH .
C. 1. 3 REACTOR POWER MODULE
Explosive sources within the power module consist of up to 250 kg of NaK located in the
primary and intermediate coolant loops and high pressure He-Ze gas stored in the lower
section of the power module.
C.2 EXPLOSIVE OVERPRESSURE/BLAST MODEL
The model for the INT-21 launch vehicle was developed using the TNT equivalency techni-
ques currently in use for various liquid propellants. It is realized that propellants do not
necessarily behave as TNT and, therefore, may exhibit a different pressure-time relation-
ship. However, considerably more theoretical and experimental work has been documented
concerning the blast phenomena of TNT, thus providing a relatively easy way of charac-
terizing a propellants explosive potential in terms of TNT equivalents.
The most severe potential overpressure and impulse environment occurs as a result of an
on-pad explosion of the launch vehicle. The peak overpressures and impulses shown in
Figure C-l, are based on data obtained from Project Pyro tests used to predict blast ef-
fects for SNAP-27 during Apollo launches (Reference C-2). Similar results are obtained
by using the prediction methods for determining liquid propellant explosive hazard in
Reference C-3.
The Space Base power modules are located between 15 and 30 meters from the center of an
S-II explosion and 40 to 60 meters from the S-IC explosion center.
Mixed RP-l/LOX explodes as a detonation like TNT, but explosions of LOX/LH do not act
£i
like TNT explosions with respect to the static pressure decay with time or with respect to
peak pressure decay with distance. A LOX/LH explosion is a slower type of explosion
C-3
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Figure C-4. Total Overpressure vs. Explosion Yield for Vehicle Stages
at 200 Feet from S-IC Explosion Center
Other aspects of the blast wave which are important in the assessment of the response
of structures include the impulse and duration of the pressure pulse. These quantities
are given in Figures C-5 and C-6, respectively, for the static and dynamic components.
Figure C-7 shows curves of duration and impulse for the total pressure wave.
In considering the effect of the combined pressure environment, three blast situations
can be postulated which should bracket the possible range of effects. The first of these
is the explosion of any single stage (although this is not a credible situation). In this
instance, an explosion in the S-II stage would have the worst effect as seen from Figures
C-3 and C-4, mainly due to the proximity of this stage. Secondly, the S-H stage can be
postulated to be involved in the initial explosion with a subsequent explosion occurring in
the S-IC as the blast wave propagates. The combined effect of these successive explosions
would be to extend the period during which the power module exposed to the blast pressure
with little increase in pressure over that from the initial explosion. For the last and most
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Figure C-5. Pressure Impulse vs. Explosion Yield for Vehicle Stages
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Figure C-7. Impulse and Duration of Total Pressure vs. Yield at 200 Feet
from S-IC Explosion Center
reasonable case, the primary explosion could occur in the S-IC stage with propagation of
the blast wave setting off an explosion in the S-n. A combination of the pressures would
probably occur yielding an augmented pressure wave at the power module.
C.3 EXPLOSION YIELDS
The previous section was concerned with the characterization of the model representing
the explosion pressure environment. Most of the information given is presented as a
function of yield of the explosion. The expected magnitudes of the explosion yields will
now be discussed in order to complete the picture.
Project PYRO test results have been used to arrive at a curve of probability of occur-
rences versus blast yield as shown in Figure C-8. Estimated failure data from launch
pad aborts involving other vehicles, measured missile size data, and data from full scale
tests were analyzed and a prediction of the yields from cryogenic systems was made. The
C-8
analysis predicts that 95 percent of all aborts will have yields less than 15. 5 percent TNT
equivalent, which is in reasonable agreement with the PYRO correlations.
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Based on past experience the most probable yield of a liquid hydrogen fueled vehicle of
the S-II size is in the 1-2 percent range. The curve of Figure C-8 has been terminated
at a 1 percent yield for this reason.
C. 4 OTHER OVERPRESSURE ENVIRONMENTS
Although the INT-21 launch vehicle is the largest potential explosive source, the power
module is exposed to a variety of other potential explosive sources during the mission.
In-space overpressures caused by blasts are usually not a problem because the vacuum
environment does not provide a means for transmitting blast overpressures. However,
when an explosion occurs within a confined space, the expanding gas can rapidly pressurize
the space, resulting in high pressure. In addition, the high velocity gas will develop a
dynamic pressure with a significance not yet evaluated.
C-9
Static overpressures as a function of altitude are given in Figure C-9. Corresponding
curves of dynamic pressure and total overpressure are given in Figures C-10 and C-ll,
respectively. The impulse of the blast waves and total pressure duration curves are shown
in Figures C-12, 13, and 14.
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Figure C-9. Peak Static Pressure vs. Altitude for INT-21 Stages
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C.5 FIREBALL THERMAL ENVIRONMENT
The most severe explosive overtemperature environment in the mission occurs as a result
of an INT-21 booster explosion. The thermal model for the INT-21 presented below is
assumed to be the same as that for the Saturn V as developed and studied in detail for the
SNAP-27 program (Reference C.2). This assumption tends to be somewhat conservative.
Figure C-15 presents the thermal flux model of the INT-21 fireball. This figure gives the
radiant heat flux within the fireball as a function of time. Fireball liftoff from the ground
occurs after eight seconds, but the heat flux is assumed to continue due to the hot stem
below the rising fireball. From observations of pad aborts, the duration of this stem is
approximately 50 percent of liftoff time. After the fireball has completely left the ground
and the stem has ceased, there is a residual fire from propellant fuels which is assumed
to exist for 60 minutes.
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Figure C-15. Heat Flux from INT-21 Fireball vs. Time
Figure C-16 shows the thermal environment in terms of the corresponding effective black
body radiating temperature of the fireball. This assumes that the fireball and after fire
have a constant emissivity of 1.0. Convective heat transfer is considered to be negligible
as compared with radiant transfer and is not included in the model analyses. After the
fireball has lifted and no longer provides significant radiation to the pad surface, the after
2
fire will yield a heat flux of about 13 BTU/second-ft .
The term "firestream" refers to the characteristics of the long term release of energy by
the burning propellants. Since TNT equivalent yields in the range of 1 to 20 percent are
expected with the most probable yields of 1-2 percent, the bulk of the thermal energy of
in-flight aborts will be released in the form of a stream of fire following the explosion.
This firestream differs from the pad abort afterfire because there is no collecting surface
for the propellants and because there is relative motion between the vehicle and air.
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Figure C-16. Fireball Temperature vs. Time for INT-21
The primary firestream source considered is the INT-21. Since the power module is lo-
cated forward of the source of the firestream with respect to a fire in the booster, the most
severe heat transfer situation would occur if the vehicle turned end for end and continued
to fly backward. The possibility of tumbling makes this situation appear remote.
Curves of firestream duration as a function of altitude for the INT-21 stages are shown
in Figure C-17 (References C. 1 and C.2). Figure C-18 shows curves of firestream
initial temperature.
C.6 FRAGMENTATION MODEL
Fragmentation and shrapnel from the explosive sources can cause severe damage to the
power module (penetration of the LiH shield and primary coolant loops, etc.) The princi-
pal source at prelaunch and launch is the INT-21. The possibility of a penetration which
would sever fuel elements and release fuel is considered fairly remote as velocities of
edge-on fragments must be over 450 m/sec (1500 ft/sec), possibly as high as 6000 m/sec
(2000 ft/sec).
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No experimental data is available on the fragment distribution of an exploding INT-21.
The data shown in Figure C-19 has been based on Project PYRO Film records of an explod-
ing S-IVB model made 3m (10 ft) from.the top of the dome and is reported in Reference C.2.
The fragmentation and velocities recorded are assumed to be somewhat less than those
which may be achieved from the S-n.
The absence of a significant quantity of intervening materials in the power module launch
configuration may allow some of the high velocity shrapnel to strike the reactor/shield,
but penetration into the core is unlikely. In addition, as is noted in Section 4, the quantity
of fission products available for release at launch are very low.
Figures C-20 and C-21 relate the number of fragments to fragment size for two ranges of
blast yields. It is expected that the number of fragments involved with the INT-21 will be
somewhat higher.
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Figure C-19. Tankage Fragment Velocity Distribution (S-IVB Pyro Tests)
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CONVERSION F A C T O R S
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temperature
Volume
International
Units
m/sec
2
m
Kg/m2
Joule
Newton
m
Kg
watt
o
Newton/m
m/sec
K
m3
English Units
ft/sec
ft2
in2
lb/ft3
lb/in3
Btu
Ibf
ft
nm
Ibm
Btu/ sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Atmosphere
lbf/in2
lbf/ft2
ft/sec (fps)
F
in3
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
3.
10.
1550.
6.242
3.610
9.479
2.248
3.281
5.399
2.205
9.488
5.691
3.413
3.413
1.451
2.088
3.281
281
764
39
x 10~2
x 10 ~5
xlO"4
x 10'1
x 10~4
xlO-4
x 10 "2
xlO-4
x 10~2
(9/5 -459.67/tK)
6.097 xlO4
ft2 35.335
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Criticality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probability
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed Material
Dose Guidelines
Oosimetry
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or imminent
degradation or failure of hardware. (In the safety analysis, no distinction is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which may or may not result from a system failure or mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and participates released to the air.
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
Internal pressures.
Radiation causing atomic displacement in semiconductor devices * sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage.
A condition where a radioactive material is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe.
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor. (As used in safety analysis results in a reactor excursion.)
The act of increasing the density of the core which results in increased reactivity and possible
criticality.
A gas blanket used to provide an inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations.
12An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurence of > 10 .
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction.
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain criticality.
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of "relative probabilities" of the individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree).
Same as "Breached".
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc. (e.g., washing, filtering, chipping).
An excursion (safety analysis assumes ~ 100 MW-sec) accompanied by a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
particulates.
Nuclear hardware (e.g., reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a critical mass.
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware.
The spread of nuclear fuel and radioactive debris on the earth's surface following impact or
destructive excursion.
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety analysis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries.
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation.
II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion
Exposure Limit
Fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burial
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard Source
Immediate Reentry
Impact in Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
Impact in Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
Intact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
Interfacing Vehicle
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment signal-to-noise ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality.
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime.
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power. The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System.
Generally associated with the termination of the mission or flight. Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after intended lifetime.
A rapid and usually unplanned increase in thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor.
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula
tory agencies or limits which preclude equipment damage.
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nuclide such
as U-235 or Pu-239.
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioisotopes in a heat source used in producing energy.
A shaped body of nuclear fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source. Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation.
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere.
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil.
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components.
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout.
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result in harm or
damage to personnel and equipment.
The location and/or origin of the hazard.
Very early reentry of the reactor (e.g., misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting in 1-2 day reentry).
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material on the Continental Shelf or in a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely.
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion.
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation.
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an Interaction
with the Manned Space Base.
Ill
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
lonization Damage
Land Impact
Loss of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non-credible
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Poison
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-poison
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological Consequences
Radiological Hazards
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
Radiation causing surface damage in materials (e.g., the fogging of film).
Nuclear hardware which impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early in the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident.
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and Interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases.
Material used in a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron capture: Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors In a thermal reactor.
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid.
Represents no hazard to the general populace.
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurrence of < 10
not worthy of concern.
-12 Considered
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact.
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events.
Immersion of reactor in an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion.
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor crlticality under all foreseeable circumstances.
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a reactor.
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base.
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude.
A poison which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reacttcity. Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison".
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with the fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay. Commonly associated with an excursion event.
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub- .
critical due to water surging in and out of the core.
The radiation exposure effect on personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event.
Hazards associated with radiation as differentiated from other sources.
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
in a given mission or phase thereof.
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit.
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super-critical and negative values to reactors which are sub-critical. (Usually ex-
pressed In multiples of a dollar.)
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Reactor Fails to Survive Reentry
Reactor Survives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative Probability
Repair /Replacement
Ruptured
Safety
Safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere.
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating; radiation shield may be damaged.
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield.
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices.
Consists of (a) physically repairing all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s).
Same as "Breached".
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property.
Conditlon(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple Injuries to personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any injury to
personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel Injury (SPD-1A).
A separate, possibly automatic, mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program.
All aspects of the Space Base mission including all prime and support hardware and personnel
both on the ground, at sea or In orbit, which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space; these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit. A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first
stage thrust.
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode.
Material in which isotopes of an element may be incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical, biological or physical process.
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